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I. Introduction
The Delaney Clause, the most famous federal health statute, bars Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of any carcinogenic food addi-
tive.1 In an era when scholars and politicians are again voicing concern
about the propensity of legislatures to delegate broad power to administra-
tors,2 the Delaney Clause is an exceptional illustration of Congress's ca-
pacity to enact specific laws.' The Clause seems to express the unequivo-
cal judgment that consumers should not be exposed to food ingredients
shown to cause cancer, regardless of the benefits the ingredients might
provide or the magnitude of the risk that they might present. Like many
extreme policies, the Delaney Clause has proved increasingly difficult to
administer.
The Clause was not part of the original food additives bill that FDA's
parent, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), had
introduced in the House of Representatives in 1958. That bill merely re-
quired that a food additive be shown "safe" before it could be approved."
At first HEW opposed a specific ban against carcinogens, but it withdrew
objection when Congressman Delaney's proposed amendment was revised
to confirm FDA's scientific discretion in interpreting the results of animal
t Arnold Leon Professor of Law and Dean, University of Virginia School of Law. Deserving
special thanks for their assistance are Christopher Clubb, Class of 1988, and Douglas Snyder and
Ralph Wright, Class of 1989, University of Virginia School of Law. I am also grateful to my aca-
demic colleague, Kenneth Abram, and to Richard Cooper, Peter Barton Hutt, William Schultz, and
Michael Taylor for helpful comments on earlier versions.
From 1975 to 1977 1 was Chief Counsel to the Food and Drug Administration and in that role I
was involved in some of the decisions discussed in this article.
1. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 360b(d)(1)(H), 376(b)(5)(B) (1982).
2. E.g., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1982). But see Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Deci-
sions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
3. See J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYS-
TEM 92-103 (2d ed. 1985).
4. See infra text accompanying note 278.
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tests.' Departmental spokesmen thereafter claimed that the law meant the
same with or without the Delaney Clause.6 The language finally enacted
appears as a proviso in section 409(c) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic (FD&C) Act. Its instructions appear nonproblematic: FDA
should not approve additives that have been shown to cause cancer in
humans or have been shown, through animal experiments, to be potential
human carcinogens.7
Implementation of this policy might have engendered little controversy
if the universe of "food additives" had remained well-defined, if few com-
pounds had displayed the capacity to "induce cancer" in laboratory ani-
mals, and if no food constituents shown to cause cancer had gained popu-
larity among consumers or producers. However, experience has frustrated
both the Clause's opponents and its defenders. Improvements in analytic
chemistry have enlarged the universe of compounds that FDA regulates as
food (and color) additives.8 More extensive testing of chemicals and more
sensitive protocols have enhanced toxicologists' ability to identify sub-
stances capable of producing tumors, including several substances adopted
for food use years ago.' Some of these substances gained market accep-
tance long before their carcinogenicity was discovered.1" Any one of these
developments might have caused FDA officials to question the Delaney
Clause's literal instructions; together they have provided irresistible incen-
tives to reinterpret or ignore them.
In addition to these science-driven pressures on regulators, the public
health community's concerns about the relationship between diet and can-
cer have shifted focus. A consensus has emerged that dietary patterns in-
fluence cancer incidence." Investigators have also revealed that the human
5. See infra text accompanying notes 285-301.
6. See infra text accompanying note 311.
7. Regulators, and scientists too, consider the results of properly conducted experiments in ani-
mals, primarily rodents, to be highly relevant evidence of a substance's capacity to cause cancer in
humans. See COMMI'ITEE ON THE INST''L MEANS OF ASSESSMENT OF RISKS 10 PUB. HEALTH,
COMM'N ON LIFE SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'I. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RISK As-
SESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL. GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 20-33 (1983) [hereinafter
RISK ASSESSMENT. All but one of the substances now recognized as human carcinogens cause cancer
in laboratory animals, though to be sure hundreds of animal carcinogens have not yet been confirmed
as human carcinogens. Id.
The proponents of Delaney relied on a second premise as well, namely that "safe" levels of expo-
sure could not be determined for some carcinogens. See infra text accompanying notes 282 & 335.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 64-77.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 78-94.
10. Saccharin, for example, had been in independent use since the early 1900s, but was not found
to be carcinogenic in animals until the early 1970s. Over the years it had demonstrated its value as a
non-nutritive sweetener, particularly beneficial for diabetics. See Merrill & Taylor, Saccharin: A
Case Study of Government Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 5 VA. J. NAr. RESOURCES L.
1 (1985). Cyclamates, and possibly nitrites, also fall in this group. See Roberts, Nitrite: A Case Study
in Food Policy, 34 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 153.(1979).
11. See COMMITTEE ON DIET, NUTRITION AND CANCER, COMM'N ON LIFE SCIENCES, NAT'L
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food supply is full of substances (most occurring naturally) that have
been, or may be, shown to cause cancer in laboratory animals."a At the
same time they have downplayed the possible contribution to cancer inci-
dence of man-made chemicals, including pesticide residues and other inad-
vertent food additives."3
This article chronicles FDA's decade-long efforts to reconcile Con-
gress's language with circumstances Congress may not have foreseen and
for which it surely did not provide. The story is an intriguing study in
statutory implementation, and it vividly illustrates the impact of science on
the formulation of regulatory policy. Its most recent chapter invites debate
over the scope of administrative authority to ignore Congressional instruc-
tions in an effort to implement wise policy. 4
II. The Statutory Text and FDA's Evolving Understanding
A. The Statute
The Delaney Clause is actually three parallel provisions applicable to
three classes of food constituents: (1) food additives, the subject of lan-
guage adopted in 1958,"5 (2) color additives, the subject of an almost iden-
tical prohibition adopted in 1960;"6 and (3) animal drug residues, the
product of fine-tuning amendments to the FD&C Act in 1968.' This ar-
ticle will focus on the 1958 version and its 1960 sequel.
RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DIET, NUTRITION AND CANCER: DIRECTION4S
FOR RESEARCH ch. 1, at 14 (1982) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON DIET, NUTRITION AND CANCER];
Merrill, Reducing Diet Induced Cancer Through Federal Regulation: Opportunities and Obstacles,
38 VAND. L. REV. 513 (1985). This consensus embraces a strong suspicion of diets that are high in
animal fats and a more cautious hope that some fruits and vegetables may protect against disease.
COMMITTEE ON DIET, NUTRITION AND CANCER, supra, ch. 1, at 1-15, ch. 15, at 1-9.
12. McCann & Ames, Detection of Carcinogens as Mutagens in the Salmonella IMicrosome Test:
Assay of 300 Chemicals: Discussion, 73 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 950 (1976); Ames, Dietary Carcin-
ogens and Anticarcinogens: Oxygen Radicals and Degenerative Diseases, 221 SCIENCE 1256 (1983).
13. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETERMINING CANCER
RISKS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT 65-109 (1981); Doll & Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative
Estimates of Avoidable Risks of Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1191
(1981).
14. The story took a sharp, but possibly only temporary, turn on October 23, 1987, when the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned FDA's approval of two color
additives that had been found carcinogenic in animal feeding experiments. Public Citizen v. Young,
831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Agency ruling that precipitated this decision provides the last
chapter of my chronicle. The court's opinion and its import for FDA's future implementation of the
Delaney Clause are discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 46 & 389.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1982).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 376 (1982).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 360b (1982).
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Section 409(c), as amended, reads in part as follows:
(3) No such regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation of the data
before the Secretary-
(A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food additive,
under the conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be
safe: Provided, That no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is
found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is
found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the
safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man and animal
18
In recent years the key question has been whether the Delaney Clause
added anything to the general safety standard and specifically whether, in
the case of carcinogens, it converted a general directive to exercise prudent
scientific judgment into a rigid expression of legislative policy. As we be-
gin exploring this issue it is worth examining the statute more closely.
One of the Delaney Clause's noteworthy features is its location. Be-
cause it appears as a proviso to the general standard for evaluating food
additives, the Clause literally applies only to substances that are "food
additives." 19 It does not automatically proscribe FDA approval of animal
carcinogens that are not "food additives," even if they might be present in
or added to food."0 Congress's later adoption of similar language for color
additives and animal drug residues reinforces this point. It is not clear
that members of Congress appreciated the full significance of this limita-
tion, but there is no doubt that the proponents of the food additives legis-
lation were aware that they were not requiring premarketing proof of
safety for all food constituents. Accordingly, we can say that from the
beginning FDA had authority to decide whether specific substances
fell within the class to which the premarketing proof of safety
requirement-and thus the Delaney Clause-applied.
The Delaney Clause, moreover, seems redundant. It accompanies lan-
18. The statute continues:
[E]xcept that this proviso shall not apply with respect to the use of a substance as an ingredi-
ent of feed for animals which are raised for food production, if the Secretary finds (i) that,
under the conditions of use and feeding specified in proposed labeling and reasonably certain to
be followed in practice, such additive will not adversely affect the animals for which such feed
is intended, and (ii) that no residue of the additive will be found (by methods of examination
prescribed or approved by the Secretary by regulations, which regulations shall not be subject
to subsections (f) and (g) of this section) in any edible portion of such animal after slaughter or
in any food yielded by or derived from the living animal.
21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
19. Merrill, Regulating Carcinogens in Food: A Legislator's Guide to the Food Safety Provisions
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 77 MICH. L. REv. 171, 203-17 (1978).
20. Id. at 203-04, 217-22.
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guage that forbids approval of any additive that has not been shown to be
"safe," a standard that FDA spokespersons in both 1958 and 1960 said
could not be met by a substance that caused cancer in experimental ani-
mals.21 Nonetheless, the Agency acceded to the addition of this supposedly
redundant language in 1958 and actively sought its inclusion in 1960.22 If
the Clause was intended merely to confirm agency policy, this is perplex-
ing behavior indeed. If Congress meant simply to endorse FDA's current
judgment but leave it flexibility should the scientific consensus change,
language to that effect in a committee report would have sufficed.28
Even within the scope of its literal application, the Delaney Clause is
not self-executing. The Clause specifies that FDA may not "deem" a food
additive "safe" if two circumstances converge: (1) the additive "induces
cancer" when (2) it is fed to animals24 or is administered to them by other
means "appropriate" for assessing the safety of food additives. Deciding
whether these conditions exist requires expert judgment, presumably by
FDA. The interpretation of animal test results is not a simple exercise.25
The conclusion that a substance has "induced cancer" in animals embod-
ies a series of findings based on evidence that is frequently equivocal.2
Whether a test by a route other than ingestion qualifies as "appropriate"
also demands scientific judgment. The Delaney Clause does not purport to
dictate how these judgments are to be reached. The statute's silence is
consistent with the assumption that FDA was to adhere to the evolving
standards of the disciplines that collaborate in chemical safety
assessment.1
7
21. See infra note 329; infra text accompanying note 301.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 300-01, 318 & 335.
23. Syntax and location do not, of course, determine definitively legislative intent. Inclusion of the
Delaney Clause in the statute itself may have been seen as a convenient and harmless way to appease
Representative Delaney. Nevertheless, Agency officials' claims that the 1958 clause would change
nothing should not be taken at face value either, for it was clearly in FDA's interest to appear to
agree with Delaney's position on the merits while asserting the freedom to revise its policy if the
merits warranted. By 1960, HEW and FDA had apparently lost interest in preserving flexibility, for
Secretary Flemming assured the House Commerce Committee that the Agency had no scientific basis
for seeking authority to approve any carcinogenic color. He promised that FDA would return to
Congress, presumably for new legislation, should science later provide such a basis. See infra text
accompanying notes 326-31.
24. The statute speaks in terms of inducing cancer "in man or in animals," but the former restric-
tion has not yet engendered controversy. The debate thus far has focused exclusively on the statute's
application to animal carcinogens.
25. The toxicologist must identify damaged tissues in hundreds of animals; determine which le-
sions are to be classed as tumors; diagnose those that are malignant and those that are benign; and
compare the frequencies of tumors in dosed and control groups. See, e.g., RISK ASSESSMENT, supra
note 7, at 20-33. For a discussion of the various factors that can influence the choice of risk assess-
ment techniques, see Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J.
ON REG. 89 (1988).
26. Id. at 29-32.
27. When FDA listed Orange No. 17 and Red No. 19 for external use in 1986, it cited a discus-
sion initiated on the Senate floor by Senator Jacob Javits during debate on the Color Additives
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Yet there remains a kernel of the Delaney Clause that appears to fore-
close choice-making by FDA. The text seems to preclude the Agency's
deeming safe a substance that is acknowledged to be a food additive and
that meets the Clause's other criteria. The natural reading is that once
FDA has concluded that a substance is a food additive and has induced
cancer in animals, it may not sanction its use, even if the Agency might
otherwise conclude that consumers who ingest the additive would not face
any significant risk. For many years, this was FDA's view of the law as
well.28
B. FDA's Escape from Delaney
Part III of this Article examines the milestones in FDA's reinterpreta-
tion of the Delaney Clause and describes the developments that have
spurred it. But to place these decisions in context we should first preview
FDA's current, and, at least recently, rejected, view of the law.
The first test of FDA's policy involves the 1960 Color Additives
Amendment and its version of the Delaney Clause.29 Orange No. 17 and
Red No. 19 have been used for many years to color drugs and cosmetics.
Both were among the several dozen colors in use at the time of the pas-
sage of the 1960 amendments and thus eligible for "provisional listing,"
Amendments of 1960. Senator Javits obtained confirmation that the Delaney Clause would be imple-
mented using the rule of reason. See Listing of D&C Orange No. 17 for Use in Externally Applied
Drugs and Cosmetics, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,331, 28,342 (1986) [hereinafter D&C Orange No. 171; see
also Listing of D&C Red No. 19 for Use in Externally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics, 51 Fed. Reg.
28,346, 28,359 (1986) [hereinafter D&C Red No. 191.
28. See Saccharin and Its Salts, Proposed Rulemaking and Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996 (1977).
In its opinion overturning FDA's decision to approve permanent listing of Orange No. 17 and Red
No. 19, the D.C. Circuit noted:
The FDA candidly acknowledged that its safety findings represented a departure from past
agency practice: "In the past, because the data and information show that D&C Orange No.
17 is a carcinogen when ingested by laboratory animals, FDA in all likelihood would have
terminated the provisional listing and denied CTFA's petition for the externally applied uses
• . . without any further discussion."
Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting D&C Orange No. 17,
supra note 27, at 28,341).
29. FDA has defended its new interpretation of the Delaney Clause in terms that would apply to
both the 1958 and 1960 versions. See Brief for Respondents, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1548). It relied on essentially the same arguments in announcing that it
would not ban methylene chloride, a conceded animal carcinogen, for use in decaffeinating coffee-a
food additive use. Cosmetics; Proposed Ban on the Use of Methylene Chloride as an Ingredient of
Aerosol Cosmetic Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,551 (1985).
The court's opinion in Public Citizen v. Young, however, recognizes that there may be differences
in the framework for regulating food additives and, possibly, in the legislative history of the 1958
Delaney Clause, that might justify different interpretations of the twin provisions. See 831 F.2d at
1119-20. A challenge to FDA's methylene chloride ruling has been dismissed as premature. Public
Citizen v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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that is, approval pending confirmation of safety in accordance with the
new law's requirements. 0
As has often occurred when Congress has mandated the testing of older
chemicals,3 modern studies of provisionally listed color additives have re-
vealed that some-Orange No. 17 and Red No. 19 among them-produce
tumors in animals. The two colors thus would appear to fall under the
1960 Delaney Clause, whose applicability is undisputed. Yet FDA not
only refused to ban them;"2 on August 7, 1986, it sanctioned their contin-
ued use, concluding that each is "safe" for human use and that the Dela-
ney Clause does not bar their approval.3
Unlike ingested food and color additives, FDA reasoned, Orange No.
17 and Red No. 19 are used in products that are applied topically and in
low concentrations. Accordingly, anticipated human exposure, even as-
suming lifetime use, is low.34 Coupling its estimate of exposure with anal-
ysis of the dose-response relationship observed in animal experiments,
FDA arrived at estimates of the human cancer risks posed by the two
colors.3 5 Applying a widely accepted extrapolation model,36 the Agency
estimated that the maximum risks to humans exposed to drugs and cos-
metics containing the colors were, respectively, one in nineteen billion and
one in nine million.3 On this basis FDA concluded that the colors met
the law's general requirement that they be shown to be "safe." Their esti-
mated risks could be zero, and in any case were well below the level that
in other contexts it had considered safe. 8
FDA relied on the same risk estimates to escape the Delaney Clause,
30. See Color Additives: Provisional Regulations; Postponement of Closing Dates, 42 Fed. Reg.
6991 (1977).
31. See, e.g., COMMITI-EE ON SCIENTIFIC AND REGULATORY ISSUES UNDERLYING PESTICIDE
USE PA'I'ERNS AND AGRICULTURAL. INNOVATION, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, REGULATING PESTICI)ES IN FOODs: THE DELANEY PARADOX 36-37 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter RE;ULATING PESrICIDESj.
32. Letter from Frank Young, FDA, to Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Public Citizen (June 21, 1985) (re-
sponse to Public Citizen petition to remove colors from provisional list) [hereinafter Young Reponse to
Public Citizen].
33. See D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27.
34. While uncertainty always surrounds such exposure estimates, even FDA's critics have not
offered plausible evidence that its estimates in this case are wrong. Brief for Petitioners at 17-18,
Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1548).
35. See generally RISK ASSESSME:NT, supra note 7.
36. The petitioning Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association presented safety data for both
colors based on a multistage model which used "the extrapolation curve that best fits the experimental
data." D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 23,338; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at 28,354.
An FDA scientific review panel assumed that "[t]he linearized multistage model reflects the true
relationship between dose and response." It noted that the model might either accurately reflect or
overstate the risk at low doses. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,340; D&C Red No. 19,
supra note 27, at 28,355.
37. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,344; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at 28,360.
38. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,344; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,360-61.
Yale Journal on Regulation
but its reasoning took a different tack. Rather than attempt to square its
conclusion with the statute's language, the Agency invoked its "inherent"
authority to "overlook circumstances that in context may fairly be de-
scribed as de minimis." 9 It found support for this authority in Alabama
Power Co. v. Costle,"° where the D.C. Circuit declared that "[ulnless
Congress has been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis for an im-
plication of de minimis authority to provide exemption when the burdens
of regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value.""' Rejecting the sugges-
tion that the Delaney Clause is extraordinarily rigid,42 FDA pointed to
passages in the legislative history of the 1960 Amendments that in its view
confirmed its authority to interpret the law in light of scientific
advances.4
With its approval of Orange No. 17 and Red. No. 19, FDA arrived at
an interpretation of the Delaney Clause that would allow it to approve
weak carcinogens to which humans are exposed only in small quantities.44
If one accepts the premise that quantitative risk assessment can reliably
estimate human cancer risks, the result arguably represents sound policy.
But this result is reached by reading the Delaney Clause out of the stat-
ute. According to FDA, no carcinogenic additive that presents more than
an insignificant risk can be considered "safe." However, an additive that
presents only an insignificant risk not only may be considered "safe," it
also escapes the Delaney Clause. A provision that for thirty years has
been considered the epitome of risk-averse legislation thus turns out to
have no independent force at all.4
As noted above, shortly before this article went to press the D.C. Cir-
cuit overturned FDA's decision to list Orange No. 17 and Red No. 19
39. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also D&C Orange
No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,344; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at 28,359.
40. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
41. Id. at 360-61.
42. Young Response to Public Citizen, supra note 32, at 32.
43. See D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,342; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,359.
44. FDA has consistently spurned any suggestion that it possesses greater discretion in applying
the Delaney Clause to additives already in use at the time of its enactment than to additives for which
approval is sought for the first time. Nor has it attempted to defend its decisions on Orange No. 17
and Red. No. 19 (or its action on methylene chloride) as a variety of "inaction," even though they are
implemented through the Agency's failure to act to terminate their approval. See Heckler v. Chancy,
470 U.S. 821 (1985). FDA is correct in assuming that it must defend its de minimis theory on the
merits rather than seek ways to avoid judicial review. Its decision on the two colors very clearly
represents formal agency action, for, while in fact FDA failed to take steps to curtail their continued
use, in form it affirmatively approved their marketing by moving them from the provisional list to the
status of permanently listed. Moreover, the Agency has never suggested its theory would protect only
additives already in use; rather, it has implied that it could be the basis for the approval of new uses
and new substances.
45. See Cooper, Stretching Delaney Till It Breaks, RE;UL.AION, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 11.
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permanently in the face of the Commissioner's finding that each color in-
duces cancer in experimental animals. The court concluded that neither
the legislative history of the 1960 Clause nor the judicial precedents FDA
had invoked supported so bald a departure from the statute's plain mean-
ing. The court further found that Congress could reasonably have meant
to prohibit the introduction and use of all carcinogenic color additives,
even though some, including the two at issue, might pose human health
risks "it seems altogether fair to characterize . . .as trivial."4
III. FDA's Decisions Under the Delaney Clause
A. Coverage of the Clause
FDA's policy evolved gradually in a series of decisions on specific issues
and problems (exemplified by specific food constituents) to which the stat-
ute provided no obvious answer or, sometimes, provided an answer that
appeared unsound. Through this incremental process, the Agency had ar-
rived at a coherent view of the food and color additive laws: it would
decline to ban any carcinogenic additive that poses no greater human can-
cer risk than one in one million."7 This "interpretation" of the Delaney
Clause, however, represented a reversal of the position FDA embraced
immediately after enactment, a position that acknowledged the Clause's
automatic ban of additives found to induce cancer in animals.
While the Agency held to this view for many years, it never went out of
its way to invoke the Delaney Clause nor did it attempt to ban all carcin-
ogens from human food. On only four occasions did FDA rely on the
Clause as the basis for refusing to allow a substance in food. Even during
the 1960s, when the Clause was clearly understood to forbid approval of
carcinogenic food or color additives, FDA had few occasions to enforce the
provision.
There are several explanations for this inactivity. So far as the public
record reveals, FDA rarely received petitions to approve additives that had
been shown to cause cancer in laboratory animals. The ingredients that it
acknowledged as problems were already used prior to 1958. Most of these
had not previously been thoroughly tested,48 and few of those that under-
went toxicological testing in the subsequent decade appeared to cause can-
cer. Indeed, it seems likely that supporters of the Delaney Clause believed
that few additives would be affected. In short, relatively few food ingredi-
ents were initially shown or suspected to be animal carcinogens.
46. Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
47. See REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 31, at 39 (regarding contaminants/constituents).
48. See Merrill & Taylor, supra note 10; Roberts, supra note 10.
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Furthermore, the statute itself is constructed in ways that constrict the
literal coverage of the Delaney Clause and afford FDA opportunities to
avoid its application. For example, while the layperson might assume that
the term "food additive" embraces any chemical that a person "adds" to
food, the statutory definition itself contains several exceptions. The excep-
tion for "color additives," is of no moment, because, as already noted, the
1960 Color Additive Amendments contain their own Delaney Clause."'
But other exceptions, which significantly narrow the scope of Congress's
apparent refusal to sanction the knowing addition of animal carcinogens
to human food, are worthy of brief summary.
One of the most significant explicit exceptions to the definition of "food
additive" is that for any "pesticide chemical in or on a raw agricultural
commodity." 50 It has allowed approval for use on human food crops of
numerous chemicals now convincingly demonstrated to cause cancer in
laboratory animals.5" Another exception covers drugs administered to live-
stock whose residues may remain in meat, milk, or eggs consumed by
humans.52 In 1962 Congress modified the Delaney Clause for this cate-
gory of added food constituent.53 A third exception excludes "any sub-
stance used in accordance with a sanction or approval granted" by FDA
or the Department of Agriculture prior to 1958." 4 These express but op-
erationally ambiguous exceptions to the "food additive" definition have
presented FDA with many opportunities to rule on the coverage of the
Delaney Clause, and to take into account the practical consequences of
extending its ban on carcinogens.5"
The language of the Delaney Clause itself has allowed FDA some
room to maneuver. The statute specifies "that no [food] additive shall be
deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or
animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evalua-
tion of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5) (1982), which reads in part:
(B) A color additive (i) shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use which
will or may result in ingestion of all or part of such additive, if the additive is found by the
Secretary to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found by the Secretary,
after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of additives for use in food, to
induce cancer in man or animal, and (ii) shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for
any use which will not result in ingestion of any part of such additive, if, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of additives for such use, or after other relevant
exposure of man or animal to such additive, it is found by the Secretary to induce cancer in
man or animal. . ..
50. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1982).
51. REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 31, at 36.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1982).
53. See 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1982).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1982); see Merrill, supra note 19, at 214-17.
55. See Cooper, supra note 45.
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animal. . .. "" These contingent phrases inescapably, and perhaps by
design, have given FDA flexibility in applying the statutory ban. For ex-
ample, while the statute does not specify by whom it must be "found" that
an additive "induces cancer," undisputed tradition has left this a finding
for the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. 7 FDA commisioners have de-
cided whether tests were "appropriate" for the evaluation of an additive's
safety. The Agency has assumed the authority to demand that safety tests
meet prevailing scientific standards in design and execution.58 And sub-
stantial discretion accompanies the Agency's responsibility for interpreting
the results of animal tests. In determining whether an additive "induce[s]
cancer," the Agency must select criteria for deciphering animal tissues and
choose a standard of statistical significance to arrive at a qualitative judg-
ment. FDA effectively has authority to decide what evidence will support
or dictate a positive finding. Will it be satisfied with a positive result in
one sex of one species? In both sexes of a single species? Only in two
species? Are benign tumors to count? Only if they accompany malignant
tumors? 9 Likewise, the statute's silence gives FDA authority to question
56. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982).
57. See Merrill, supra note 19. In the current regulatory context, where the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) has assumed a significant role in overseeing rulemaking by executive agen-
cies, questions could arise about the scope and independence of the Commissioner's scientific role.
Indeed, in the very decision that has given rise to the first challenge to FDA's de minimis theory,
OMB appears to have played a significant, and perhaps decisive, role. One Congressional committee
has found that FDA staff members and the Commissioner of Food and Drugs at first expressed
unwillingness to rely on this theory to approve Orange No. 17 and Red No. 19. HHS' Failure to
Enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: The Case of Cancer-Causing Color Additives, H.R. REP.
No. 151, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The Department of Justice also exercised a heavy hand over
the explanations offered by FDA for the ultimate decision, reportedly insisting that the FDA Com-
missioner withdraw his earlier acknowledgements that the two colors "induce cancer" and revise his
reasoning for their approval. See FDA Continues to Permit the Illegal Marketing of Carcinogenic
Additives, H.R. R:P. No. 361, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
The D.C. Circuit had no occasion to evalute the propriety of either intrusion on the Commis-
sioner's decisional authority. The role of OMB was not challenged by the petitioners, and the court
essentially treated FDA's last-minute effort to withdraw its findings that the two colors "induce can-
cer" as spurious. It decided the case on the grounds first asserted by the Agency. See Public Citizen v.
Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1120-22 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
58. See 21 C.F.R. § 170.20(s) (1986); see also Walden, FDA with a Capital L, 31 Fool) DR u;
Coss,. L.J. 649, 652-53 (1976); Brisson, A Look at the Bioresearch Monitoring Program: The
Agency Perspective, 38 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 184 (1983).
59. Risk assessment, the evaluation of potential human health effects from an environmental haz-
ard, involves four steps. Step one, hazard identification, defines the nature of the hazard using data
from epidemiologic studies, long-term animal studies, short-term studies and analysis of the agent's
molecular structure. Step two is dose response assessment, determining the relationship between the
dose of an agent and the effect it causes in humans. As there is frequently little data on humans, there
is heavy reliance on animal data. Since animal studies are generally conducted using high doses, low
dose effects must be extrapolated from the high dose information by the use of various models. There
must also be mathematical adjustments performed to account for the differences among species in
extrapolating from animal studies to humans. The third step, exposure assessment, requires determi-
nation of who will be exposed to the agent, and in what concentrations or amounts. The fourth step,
risk characterization, is the estimation of the hazard's extent in public health terms. See RISK AssE.ss-
MEN'C, supra note 7, at 29-30.
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the reliability of test results. It may dismiss the results of studies that it
believes to be incomplete or dishonest.6" Judgments of this sort are obvi-
ously an integral part of administering the statute. While FDA has not
adopted formal rules for resolving all such issues,61 one can guess how it
has behaved. It is likely that FDA has been more willing to interpret tests
of new additives as suggesting disqualifying carcinogenicity than to find
that familiar ingredients "induce cancer."6 Some observers believe that
FDA has been slow to characterize any additive as a carcinogen.63 This
reluctance may predate more recent decisions in which FDA has resorted
to legal rather than scientific arguments to avoid the Delaney Clause. It is
to these decisions that we now turn.
B. Erosion of the Assumptions Underlying the Delaney Clause
The coverage of the Delaney Clause, and thus the problems encoun-
tered in administering it, are largely a function of two circumstances: (1)
the number of substances that fall within the definition of "food additive,"
and (2) the number of substances within this universe that are found to
"induce cancer." Through the 1970s, scientific advances in two arenas
enlarged dramatically the universe of substances to which the Delaney
Clause might apply. At the same time, a consensus began to emerge
60. The FD&C Act does not expressly empower the Agency to punish, or indeed to ignore, ex-
perimental data that have been falsified or are the result of fraudulent or inept research, but its
inherent authority to insist on the integrity of experimental reports seems uncontested. And FDA has
based formal decisions largely on its conclusions that the data submitted by a petitioner could not be
considered reliable evidence of the findings they purported to sustain.
For example, in 1975 FDA stayed a regulation for the use of the non-nutritive sweetener as-
partame. Although the notice gave details, the basis for the action was clear:
Preliminary results of an audit of the records of certain animal studies conducted by or for the
petitioner, including studies on aspartame, indicate the need for a comprehensive review of
certain of the research data held by or for the petitioner. The Public Board of Inquiry is
therefore being postponed until questions raised by the audit have been resolved.
Aspartame; Stay of Effectiveness of Food Additive Regulation, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,907 (1975). From
other sources, it was apparent that there were dubious laboratory practices as well as possible misrep-
resentations in the long term animal toxicity studies supporting the food additive petition. See Preclin-
ical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1976 - Part 11: joint Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
50, 72-78 (1976) (statement by Alexander M. Schmidt, M.D., FDA Commissioner).
The following year, FDA proposed withdrawal of approval for the new drug Naprosyn on the
basis of inconsistencies and omissions in the data submitted from its supporting animal studies.
Naprosyn Tablets: Opportunity for Hearing on Proposal To Withdraw Approval of New Drug Ap-
plication, 41 Fed. Reg. 45,605 (1976). In the case of a new drug application, the authority to revoke
approval upon discovery of misrepresentation is explicit. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(4) (1982).
61. See BUREAU OF FOODS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TOXICOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE
SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF DIRECT FooD ADDITIVES AND COLOR ADDITIVES USED IN FOOD 23-25,
48-50 (1982).
62. REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 31, at 41.
63. See id. at 38-39, 41.
Vol. 5: 1, 1988
Delaney Clause
among public health experts that while a substantial portion of human
cancer was linked with diet, little could be attributed to synthetic chemi-
cals in food.
FDA officials were not oblivious to these developments. Agency spokes-
persons remarked on the dramatic advances in analytical chemistry which
were revealing "additives" in food whose occurrence had not previously
been expected. They also recognized that more comprehensive and sensi-
tive testing of chemicals was expanding the list of proven animal carcino-
gens. And they became less hesitant about pointing out that the food sup-
ply contains hundreds of trace chemicals, most present "naturally," that
have been associated with tumor formation in experimental animals. Fur-
thermore, Agency officials were reminded of the growing concern about
the links between dietary patterns and human cancer when food producers
began promoting products as high in fibre or rich in Vitamin C while
invoking the findings of the National Cancer Institute. These develop-
ments eroded both of the assumptions of the framers of the Delaney
Clause: few chemical "additives" caused cancer, but those few presented a
serious threat to public health.
1. Progress in Analytical Chemistry: Enlarging the Universe of
"Additives"
Regulation of chemicals used in food production and processing, such as
pesticides and packaging materials, has for decades depended on the ca-
pacity of FDA inspectors to measure residues and thereby enforce health-
based limits on their occurrence. The protection afforded by such limits in
turn depended on the sensitivity of the analytical methods chosen to en-
force them. Improvements in analytical chemistry have had the disconcert-
ing propensity to reveal residues where there should be none, thus requir-
ing the Agency to set more stringent limits or explain why the residues it
could now detect were safe.
According to a 1979 HEW report, the smallest amounts measurable by
analytical techniques had decreased by up to seven orders of magnitude
since 1930, bringing picogram amounts of many chemicals within the
reach of detection. 64 The best documented, and perhaps most dramatic,
improvements in analytical chemistry have occurred in the methods for
detecting pesticide residues. Until 1955, assay methods for specific pesti-
cide residues were primitive; most were colorimetric (involving color com-
64. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, 90TH CONG., IST SESS.,
FOOD SAFETY: WHERE ARE WE? (Comm. Print 1979) (statement by U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ.,
and Welfare).
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parisons using standard reference solutions) or nonspecific. 6 "Any residue
in a food sample containing less than 0.05 ppm was usually reported, in
all good faith, as zero or nondetectable." ' The development of thin layer
and gas chromatography improved analytical sensitivities by more than
one thousand times.67 These powerful technologies were in their infancy
in 1958.
In a 1966 study of pesticide residues in food, 0.05 ppm was the sensitiv-
ity limit for all but one group of pesticides." Twenty-four of the chemi-
cals reported by FDA researchers in 1986 had concentration ranges below
0.05 ppm. Confining comparison to just these chemicals, as many as
twenty-four found in 1986 would probably have escaped detection in
1966. In a survey done between 1980 and 1982, FDA researchers found
residues of sixty different chemicals in an analysis of 120 food items. The
number detected ranged from a low of eight in dairy products to a high of
twenty-six in garden fruits.6 9 Many of these residues were detected at
very low levels. For thirty-nine chemicals, or almost two-thirds of the
sample, residues were detected at levels under 0.05 ppm, or fifty ppb, the
1955 limit of detection. Had this study been performed with the analytical
techniques available in 1955, thirty-nine chemicals out of sixty probably
would have escaped detection.
A recent example demonstrates how advances in chromatographic anal-
ysis can create a regulatory problem. P-toluidine, a contaminant in some
color additives, is an animal carcinogen. Chemists had not detected P-
toluidine in Green No. 6 using gravity elution chromatography,71 which
had a limit sensitivity thought to be at least 250 ppm.72 In 1979, however,
a scientist using high pressure liquid chromatography (HPLC) reported
that there might be P-toluidine contamination in Green No. 6. The subse-
quent use of HPLC with ultraviolet absorption or fluorescence detectors
to analyze the separated chemicals proved capable of detecting P-toluidine
residues down to ten ppm. This technique confirmed in 1982 that P-
toluidine was present at an average concentration of 393 ppm.73 The in-
65. Van Middelem, Assay Procedures for Pesticide Residues, in PESTICID)S IN THF ENVIRON-
ME'NT pt. II, at 315 (R. White-Stevens ed. 1971).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Duggan, Barry & Johnson, Pesticide Residues in Total-Diet Samples, 151 SCIENCE 101, 102
(1966).
69. Gartrell, Craun, Podrebarac & Gunderson, Pesticides, Selected Elements and Other Chemi-
cals in Adult Total Diet Samples October 1980-March 1982, 69 J. A. OFFICIALS ANAL.YTICAL
CHEMIST'rRv 146, 146 (1986); id. at 157 (Table 3).
70. D&C Green No. 6; Listing as a Color Additive in Externally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics,
47 Fed. Reg. 14,138, 14,139 (1982).
71. Id. at 14,139-40.
72. D&C Green No. 5; Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 24,278, 24,279 (1982).
73. D&C Green No. 6; Listing as a Color Additive in Externally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics,
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formation about Green No. 6 raised suspicions concerning Green No. 5,
which was derived from Green No. 6."' Chemists using HPLC with fluo-
rescence detected the presence of P-toluidine in Green No. 5 at levels of
.57 to 2.54 ppm.75
Just as improvements in instrumentation have allowed FDA scientists
to detect more substances in food at lower concentrations, other agencies
have discovered increasing numbers of previously undetected chemicals in
the environment. The Environmental Protection Agency began monitoring
organic chemicals in the nation's drinking water in 1973, when it reported
finding 253 different chemicals. By 1979, it had identified more than 700
"foreign" chemicals in drinking water."'
FDA scientist Albert Kolbye summarized the trend:
[A]nalytical chemists can now detect a whole new galaxy of low
levels of substances in food. Previously the limits of qualitative iden-
tification and quantitative measurement were in the parts per thou-
sand range: today parts per trillion are not uncommon and in some
instances routine. This represents a millionfold increase in our abil-
ity to detect "chemicals" in food.77
The universe of detectable chemicals "added" to human food had thus
grown vastly larger than the universe of additives legislators had con-
fronted in 1958.
2. Progress in Toxicology: Enlarging the Universe of Carcinogens
Proponents of the Delaney Clause did not expect that significant num-
bers of food ingredients would prove to be carcinogenic. In a 1957 article
advocating that carcinogenic additives be forbidden, National Cancer In-
47 Fed. Reg. 14,138, 14,340 (1982).
74, D&C Green No. 5; Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 24,278, 24,279 (1982).
75. FDA confronted another dilemma during the 1970s as older mouse uterine assays and then
even chromatographic methods for detecting DES residues in animal tissue were discredited by more
sensitive assays. A 1979 food industry paper stated that the sensitivities of assays for DES residues
had increased from 100 ppb in 1958 to one ppb, or even levels measured in parts per trillion. Expert
Panel on Nutrition and Safety, Inst. of Food Technologists, The RisklBenefit Concept as Applied to
Food, in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON A;RIC., NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, 90TH CON.., 1ST
SF.ss., FOOD SAFETY: WHERE ARE WE? 630 (Comm. Print 1979).
76. Menzer & Nelson, Water and Soil Pollutants, in CASARETT AND DouLL's ToxICOLOGY:
THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 825, 838 (C. Classen, M. Amdur & J. Doull 2d ed. 1980).
77. Kolbye, Decision-Making Issues Relevant to Cancer-Inducing Substances, in REGUI.ATORY
ASPECTS OF CARCINOGENESIS AND FOOD ADDITIVES: THE DELANEY CLAUSE 93, 94 (F. Coulston
ed. 1979). In 1986 FDA noted: "There is no indication that in 1958 Congress foresaw the likelihood
that within less than thirty years after the Delaney Clause was enacted, science would have
progressed so far as to be able to document the widespread presence of trace amounts of proven
carcinogens in food." Listing of D&C Red No. 8 and D&C Red No. 9 for Use in Ingested Drug and
Cosmetic Lip Products and Externally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,877, 43,894
(1986).
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stitute (NCI) scientist W.C. Hueper identified only four direct food addi-
tives, eight food colors, and three classes of chemical contaminants as po-
tential targets.7 Hueper stated:
It is unlikely. . . that many of the presently used additives and con-
taminants of foodstuffs, especially most of those of purely inorganic
nature, unless they are radioactive or belong to the group of carcino-
genic metals . . . introduce any carcinogenic hazard into the general
food supply. . .. '9
The 1960s marked not only the advent of systematic testing of chemi-
cals for carcinogenicity, but also the rapid increase in the number of in-
tentional food additives in use. By 1966, the total number of direct addi-
tives approached 2,430.80 The numbers of new additives approved each
year fluctuated widely,81 however, and by the 1970s the increase had
slowed to a trickle. During this period relatively few older direct additives
were subjected to testing. In 1975, of the 540 chemicals under test in the
NCI Carcinogenesis Program, only nine were food additives.8 But
ninety-four were pesticides and agricultural chemicals, some of which
might find their way into food. In 1976, the NCI program included four-
teen food additives and eighty-five pesticides and related chemicals. 83 The
National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Diet, Nutrition and
Cancer, in a table entitled, "Some Food Additives and Contaminants Sus-
pected or Proven to be Carcinogenic in Laboratory Animals," listed
twenty-two intentional additives, of which twenty had been identified be-
tween 1974 and 1980. Suspect unintentional additives included eight sin-
gle agents and seven chemical groups (organocholorine pesticides, poly-
cyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, cycads, nitrosamines, tannins, pyrrolizidine
alkaloids, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs))."'
While the proportion of food additives suspected to be carcinogenic in
animals has not increased significantly, this finding is deceptive because
relatively few additives have been thoroughly evaluated. A National Acad-
emy of Sciences (NAS) committee in 1984 reviewed a list of 8,627 chemi-
78. Hueper, Potential Role of Non-Nutritive Food Additives and Contaminants as Environmen-
tal Carcinogens, 62 A.M.A. ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY 218, 222-24 (1957).
79. Id. at 218.
80. Sanders, Food Additives, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 10, 1966, at 107.
81. THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMM., NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., CHEMICALS AND
HEAL:TH REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 66 (1973).
82. DIVISION OF CANCER CAUSE AND PREVENTION, NAT'L CANCER INST., REPORT OF THE
CARCINOGENESIS PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 1975, at 130.
83. DIVISION OF CANCER CAUSE AND PREVENTION, NAT'L CANCER INST., THE CARCINOGENE-
SIS PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 1976, at 155.
84. See COMMITTEE ON DIET, NUTRITION, AND CANCER, supra note 11.
Vol. 5: 1, 1988
Delaney Clause
cals "regulated or classified by FDA . . . as direct food additives, indirect
food additives, GRAS substances, colors, and flavors." It found there was
"no toxicity information available" for forty-six percent of the chemicals.
Data sufficient for a complete risk evaluation were available only for five
percent.
8 5
Moreover, the 8,000-plus food-use substances represented less than
one-sixth of the rapidly expanding universe of chemicals to which humans
are exposed. Within this larger universe, the number of chemicals identi-
fied as animal carcinogens appears to have grown more sharply: "When
the Delaney amendment was adopted approximately twenty-five years
ago, chemical carcinogens were considered rare in man's environ-
ment. . . . The number of chemicals which have been shown to be carci-
nogenic in animals over the past decade has grown enormously and repre-
sents a wide spectrum of unrelated chemical structures. ' '8 . The Task
Force on Environmental Cancer placed the estimate of carcinogens at
"about 1,000 chemicals."8 7 The National Toxicology Program's (NTP's)
First Annual Report on Carcinogens noted that of 34,000 chemicals listed
as toxic by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
2,330 had "one or more unevaluated studies dealing with
tumorigenicity. "88
While the percentage of chemicals that display carcinogenicity is proba-
bly not large, increased testing has produced a steady increase in the total
number of reported animal carcinogens. According to the 1975 report of
NCI's Carcinogenesis Program, eighty-six of the 540 chemicals under
study in that year had been reported to have "carcinogenic activity."89
NTP, which absorbed the NCI bioassay program, had completed full
evaluations of 252 chemicals by 1980.90 NTP's Second Annual Report
included twenty-five human carcinogens and sixty-three additional sub-
stances drawn from a pool for which there were positive NCI bioassay
findings. 9' NTP's Third Annual Report, issued in 1982, classified ninety-
85. STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF Toxic AND POTENTIALLY TOxIC CHEMICALS
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT'L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES ro DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES
12 (1984).
86. Heuper, supra note 78, at 218.
87. TASK FORCE ON ENVIRONMENTAl. CANCER AND LUNG DISEASE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS: ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND CANCER AND HEART AND LUNG DISEASE 4
(1978).
88. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FIRST ANNUAl. RE-
PORT ON CARCINOGENS 3 n.4 (1980).
89. DIVISION OF CANCER CAUSE AND PREVENTION, NAT'L CANCER INST., REPORT OF THE
CARCINOGENESIS PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 1975, at 59-60.
90. NATIONAL TOXICOI.OGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 1 NTP
TECHNICAL BULLETIN No. 3, at 2 (1980).
91. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SECOND ANNUAL
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five chemicals as "reasonably anticipated to be carcinogens," based on lim-
ited human evidence or sufficient animal bioassay evidence.92 The follow-
ing year's report expanded the "official list" by thirty-one chemicals, for a
total of 148, including 119 substances in the "reasonably anticipated to be
carcinogens" group.93
As Bruce Ames has pointed out:
Out of about 200 chemicals tested by NCI in eight years, 60 percent
were judged carcinogenic, 33 percent noncarcinogenic, and 7 percent
inadequately tested. The high percentage of carcinogens found is
somewhat disturbing, as the conventional wisdom is that carcinogens
are very rare. This discrepancy could be accounted for by the fact
that more suspicious chemicals are being tested. It could also be that
carcinogens are more common than we think. We have no idea of
what the true percentage of carcinogens is among chemicals in gen-
eral (including natural ones) when tested at the maximum tolerated
dose in rodents. Even if it is 10 percent, our current regulatory poli-
cies, which assume carcinogens are rare, are in trouble.94
3. Shifting Focus from Man-Made to Natural Dietary Constituents
Both the structure and the language of the FD&C Act betray a bias in
favor of home-prepared products of American agriculture and a suspicion
of "artificial" ingredients. The Food Additives Amendment embodies this
prejudice, excluding from its coverage substances "generally recognized as
safe" based on their prior use in food while requiring premarket proof of
safety for most chemical additives. Scientific debate during the 1950s rein-
forced this dichotomy, focusing suspicion on a relatively small number of
foreign chemicals and, if only by silence, exonerating basic constituents of
the food supply.
By the 1970s, the dialogue between researchers and public health offi-
cials had changed dramatically. Sir Richard Doll and Richard Peto esti-
mated that nearly one-third of all cancers are diet-related, but attributed
no more than one percent to chemical additives in food (including pesti-
cides). Bruce Ames continued to report the results of research identifying
carcinogens naturally present in food, arguing that regulation of carcino-
REPORT ON CARCINOGENS (1981).
92. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THIRD ANNUAL RE-
PORT ON CARCINOGENS (1982).
93. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH ANNUAL
REPORT ON CARCINOGENS (1985).
94. Letter from Bruce Ames in Letters: Cancer and Diet, 224 SCIENCE 658, 668 (1984).
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genic risks has been mistakenly preoccupied with man-made chemicals.95
In the face of this consensus, it is not surprising that FDA officials should
have become uncomfortable with legal interpretations that dictated auto-
matic banning of trace chemicals and ingredients shown to be carcinogenic
in animal bioassays. Hueper's 1957 article identifying direct carcinogenic
food additives, colorants, and chemical contaminants mentioned only a few
potential "natural" carcinogens. By 1961, however, his list of potential
carcinogens included seventeen direct food additives and nineteen food
dyes, as well as a number of indirect additives, pesticides, and other envi-
ronmental pollutants. He included tannic acid, which occurs naturally in
some food substances, and "thermic and oxidation products of oils and
fats," while noting that the evidence for heated fats was "equivocal and
contradictory."96 Hueper observed that smoking meat and fish, and
processes such as roasting and baking which char food, may all produce
"3-4-Benzopyrene," a known carcinogen.97 Despite the increasing interest
in naturally occurring carcinogenic substances, however, synthetic chemi-
cals dominated Heuper's roster of dietary carcinogens.
Widespread study of the natural occurrence of carcinogens in food did
not begin until the 1970s. 98 By 1982, when the NRC Committee on Diet,
Nutrition, and Cancer surveyed the literature, numerous mutagenic and
carcinogenic substances in the American diet had been identified. Aflatox-
ins, a mold product widely present on corn and peanuts, and other
mycotoxins have demonstrated carcinogenicity in animals.99 A wide vari-
ety of plant constituents have demonstrated mutagenic and carcinogenic
activity. A number of naturally occurring estrogenic compounds have been
identified in palm kernels, clover, and legumes such as soybeans. Another
animal carcinogen, ethyl carbamate, or urethan, occurs naturally at low
concentrations in fermented foods and beverages."' In this country, most
of the nitrate and perhaps twenty percent of the nitrite ingested comes
from vegetables. The risk from these chemicals derives from their role in
the formation of N-nitroso compounds (e.g., nitrosamines), which are po-
tent carcinogens.
The development of in vitro tests for mutagenicity by Ames and others
in the 1970s led to the identification of entire new classes of potentially
carcinogenic food constituents."0 In 1977, Nagao (with Sugimura) discov-
95. Ames, Magaw, & Gold, Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENC 271 (1987).
96. Hueper, Carcinogens in the Human Environment (pt. 2), 71 A.M.A. ARCHIVES PATHOIOGY
355, 358-362 (1961).
97. Id. at 369.
98. See COMMITTEE ON DIET, NUTRITION AND CANCER, supra note 11.
99. Id. ch. 12, at 6 (Table 12-1).
100. Id. ch. 12, at 18.
101. Sugimura, Sato, Ohgaki, Takayama, Nagao & Wakabayashi, Overview: Mutagens and Car-
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ered that charred surfaces of broiled fish and meat had mutagenic activity
equivalent to 500 times the amount of benzopyrene reported in a charcoal
broiled steak. 102 That same year, scientists discovered that pyrolysis
(breakdown by heat) of nearly all the amino acids tested produced muta-
genic activity. Studies in 1980 and 1981 showed the presence of mutagens
derived from the pyrolysis of proteins in broiled beef, cuttlefish, chicken,
sardines, and grilled onions.'0 3 Five studies showed that the mutagens de-
rived from heating food proteins or amino acids produced cancer in labo-
ratory animals.'04 Research was not only directed at heat-formed
mutagens but also at mutagens which are present naturally in plants, such
as flavonoids. Thought to contribute to the mutagenic activity of a number
of foods, flavanoids are found naturally in coffee, grape juice, raisins, on-
ions, red wine, whiskeys, brandies, and black, green, and roasted tea.'0 5
In a 1983 Science article, Bruce Ames examined the risks from natural
dietary carcinogens.' 0 6 He began with the assertion, "Despite numerous
suggestions to the contrary, there is no convincing evidence of any genera-
lized increase in U.S. (or U.K.) cancer rates other than what could plausi-
bly be ascribed to the delayed effects of previous increases in tobacco us-
age."' 1 7 He claimed that the chief causes of cancer were more likely to be
found not in comparatively recent industrial activity but in longstanding
lifestyle patterns, including, prominently, diet. Ames emphasized that our
dietary exposure to some naturally occurring teratogens, mutagens, and
carcinogens was very large, but our knowledge of their effects was still
meager. He contrasted the huge body of toxicologic information regarding
synthetic agents to which our exposure is very low.'0 8 Naming alcohol,
mold products, and nitrite, nitrate, and nitrosamines, Ames concluded,
"There are large numbers of mutagens and carcinogens in every meal, all
perfectly natural and traditional."'0 9
cinogens in Cooked Food, 206 PROGRESS IN CLINICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RES. 85, 85 (1986) [herein-
after Sugimura].
102. Id. at 85; see also COMMITTEE ON DIET, NUTRITION AND CANCER, supra note I1, ch. 13,
at 3.
103. COMMITTEE ON DIET, NUTRITION AND CANCER, supra note 11, ch. 13, at 4-6.
104. Id. ch. 13, at 8.
105. Id. ch. 13, at 10-12.
106. Ames, Dietary Carcinogens and Anticarcinogens, 221 SCIENCE 1256 (1983).
107. Id. at 1256.
108. Id. at 1257-68.
109. Id. at 1261. Ames's article elicited vehement response. Samuel Epstein and several co-
signatories challenged Ames's statement about cancer trends, his minimization of the risks of synthetic
chemicals, and his overstatement of dietary risks. See Letters: Cancer and Diet, 224 SCIENCE 658
(1984). Ames rejoined that large numbers of mutagens had been identified in cooked food and in
plants and molds, and that some had been shown to be carcinogenic in bioassays. Id. at 668, 670. He
later stated, "we are ingesting enormously more in both number and amount of natural pesticides and
other natural toxic molecules (and traditional mixtures such as cooked food) than we are of man-made
substances." Id. at 758.
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In the years since the NRC report and Ames's original article, scientists
have continued to investigate naturally occurring mutagens and carcino-
gens in food. All of the mutagens discovered in broiled meat and tested in
bioassays as of 1986 proved carcinogenic.' An additional class of
mutagens, the nitropyrenes, were identified in grilled chicken and found to
be carcinogenic in animals. Researchers discovered that soy sauce and chi-
nese cabbage became mutagenic after treatment with nitrite."' l Investiga-
tors calculated that human dietary exposure to these compounds was
greater than exposure from previously recognized sources such as inhala-
tion of diesel exhaust." 2 While some scientists recognized as early as the
1950s that carcinogens might be naturally present in foods or occur natu-
rally during food preparation, investigation of these phenomena did not
begin in earnest until the 1970s. Scientists have begun to define the
dimensions of this "natural" dietary risk only within the past five years.
The number of known or potential naturally occurring carcinogens is still
increasing. The risk they pose may approach and perhaps far surpass that
from man-made chemicals.
C. Administrative Escapes from the Delaney Clause
When administrators conclude that a legislative mandate no longer
makes sense they can be expected to respond in one of two ways: They
may circumscribe the cases to which the mandate applies, or they may
attempt to reinterpret the mandate. FDA Commissioners have done both.
1. "Added" Food Constituents v. "Food Additives"
One of the most significant "exceptions" to the Delaney Clause that
FDA has crafted derives from the Agency's interpretation of two other
provisions of the FD&C Act." 3 Since its enactment in 1938 the Act has
applied a more tolerant standard to foods that naturally contain hazardous
materials than to foods containing "added" toxicants. The 1938 statute
singled out for rigorous control-primarily through seizure of "adulter-
ated" products-foods that might be injurious to consumers because they
contained any "added poisonous or deleterious" substance, without defin-
ing what "added" meant. Foods containing "non-added" poisons whose
consumption in excessive amounts or without proper precautions might be
110. Sugimura, supra note 101, at 85, 88-89.
111. Nagao, Wakabayashi, Fujita, Tahira, Ochiai & Sugimura, Mutagenic Compounds in Soy
Sauce, Chinese Cabbage, Coffee and Herbal Teas, 206 PROGRE. S IN CLINICAL & BIOL()GICAL. RF.S.
55, 56-57 (1986).
112. Sugimura, supra note 101, at 94-96.
113. See Merrill & Schewel, FDA Regulation of Environmental Contaminants of Food, 66 VA.
L. REv. 1357 (1980).
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hazardous could only be seized if FDA proved them "ordinarily injuri-
ous" to consumers.
114
This dichotomy recognized that many agricultural commodities require
care in preparation or ingestion; it focused, therefore, on "added" hazards
that growers or manufacturers could control. Later amendments to the
food safety provisions of the FD&C Act have dealt with various categories
of "added" constituents, such as pesticide residues, food and color addi-
tives, and animal drug residues. Each amendment has converted a
prosecutory system of control into a licensing regime." 5 However, these
licensing requirements did not cover all potentially hazardous substances
whose presence in food could be ascribed to human activity. Notably,
Congress created no premarket approval system for industrial contami-
nants of food.11
The Act did not specify whether such materials should be regulated
under the rigorous "added" constituents standard or under the looser "or-
dinarily injurious" standard. 1 17 FDA preferred the former because it
could set tolerance levels for such materials and because, even if it chose
not to, proving adulteration would be easier. Use of the power to set toler-
ances would enable the Agency to pressure growers and producers to take
greater precautions to limit contamination.' 8
In 1974 FDA promulgated regulations in which it asserted that food
contaminants as a class were "added" constituents." 9 Ironically, this ap-
proach provided FDA with potentially too powerful a weapon, for the
Act's expansive food additive definition, coupled with the Delaney Clause,
threatened to make any food contaminated by a carcinogenic industrial
chemical "adulterated."' 20 By the 1970s, for example, industrial users of
PCBs would have been hard pressed to argue that they could not "reason-
114. Merrill, supra note 19, at 186-89.
115. Merrill & Taylor, supra note 10, at 14.
116. That is, substances introduced by human activity into the environment which find their way
into food through "natural" processes, such as water pollution.
117. Merrill & Schewel, supra note 113, at 1365-82.
118. Id. at 1370-73.
119. Department of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Food & Drug Admin.: Poisonous or Deleterious
Substances in Food, 39 Fed. Reg. 42743 (1974).
120. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1982), which reads in part:
(s) The term "food additive" means any substance the intended use of which results or may
reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or other-
wise affecting the characteristics of any food (including any substance intended for use in
producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or
holding food; and including any source of radiation intended for any such use), if such sub-
stance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experi-
ence to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown through scientific procedures (or,
in the case of a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific
procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe under the conditions of its
intended use. . ..
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ably expect" some PCBs to get into waterways and hence into food. " '
And since PCBs are carcinogenic, all contaminated fish would be
"adulterated," and all shipments of PCBs for uses that might pollute
streams would be subject to regulatory action as "unsafe" food addi-
tives.122 FDA escaped this ineluctable if bizarre result by concluding that
such contaminants could not be food additives because they performed no
functional purpose in food. 28 Congress, the Agency reasoned, could not
have meant to bring within the "food additive" category substances which
could not possibly meet the standard for approval. 2
Another substance that FDA wished to regulate as "added," but not as
a "food additive," was aflatoxins, potent animal carcinogens that probably
cause human liver cancer. FDA had no difficulty concluding that aflatox-
ins in raw peanuts were not "food additives" because they could not be
characterized as having any intended use. 125 But it was more difficult to
explain why aflatoxin-contaminated peanuts, when combined with other
ingredients in peanut butter, were not "food additives" which, because
they contained a carcinogen, were barred by the Delaney Clause. 2 It is
not surprising, then, that FDA has never announced, much less attempted
to explain, its position that tainted peanuts are not unsafe "food
additives." '27
2. "Carcinogens" That Do Not "Induce Cancer"
At the same time it was devising its legal theory for regulating environ-
mental contaminants of food, FDA was also facing a petition for an addi-
tive to animal feed that presented awkward questions under the Delaney
Clause. The petition sought approval, under the Food Additives Amend-
ment, for the marketing of a selenium-enriched feed premix for livestock.
It is important to note that the Act's definition of "food" includes food
121. Cf Natick Paperboard Corp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1975).
122. Merrill & Schewel, supra note 113, at 1415-23.
123. See Department of Health, Educ., & Welfare: Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food
and Food Packing Material, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,746, 42,747-48 (1974); Merrill & Schewel, supra note
113, at 1360-70.
124. Department of Health, Educ., & Welfare: Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food and
Food Packing Material, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,746, 42,747-48 (1974).
125. Aflatoxins in Shelled Peanuts and Peanut Products Used in Human Foods: Proposed Toler-
ance, 39 Fed. Reg: 42,751, 42,751 (1974). Indeed, one could have said that they were not "added" by
human agency but simply developed through natural processes. This characterization, however, would
have defeated FDA's goal of setting aflatoxin tolerances and thereby applying pressure on producers
to control their occurrence.
126. Merrill, Regulations of Toxic Chemicals (Book Review), 58 TEx. L. REv. 463, 477-78
(1980).
127. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 106 S.Ct. 2360 (1986).
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consumed by animals, 2 ' and that for many years FDA has reviewed peti-
tions for approval of feed additives for livestock.'2 9
In a 1973 proposal,' 30 FDA ruled that the Delaney Clause did not bar
the approval of selenium as an additive to livestock feed because "[tihe
anticancer clauses do not apply in the case of an agent that (1) occurs
naturally in practically all foods, (2) is used in a manner such that its
natural level in food is not increased, (3) has a definite hepatotoxic effect/
no-effect level, and (4) has a possible carcinogenic effect which is associ-
ated only with the hepatotoxic effect."'' The Agency cited evidence of
selenium's widespread, albeit varying, natural occurrence in foods such as
corn, as well as evidence that selenium is "essential for normal growth
and metabolism in [many species of] animals."' 32
FDA recognized, however, that selenium's link to cancer in laboratory
animals raised concerns about its safety for humans who consumed food
derived from livestock to whose feed it was added. The Agency solved this
dilemma by positing that the animals would excrete any selenium that
they did not require for basic nutrition. Thus, the addition of selenium to
livestock feed would not be expected to increase the levels to which
humans were exposed naturally. 33 Turning to selenium's liver toxicity
and apparent carcinogenicity, the Agency found that the experimental evi-
dence clearly demonstrated a "no-effect" level for selenium's hepatotoxic-
ity; below dietary levels of 0.5 ppm no animals displayed liver damage." 4
The levels of selenium supplementation proposed were well below this
"no-effect" level. Furthermore, FDA reported, NCI scientists agreed with
its conclusion that liver tumors did not occur in test animals that did not
receive doses of selenium high enough to produce cirrhosis.' 35 The carci-
nogenic effect was thus "secondary" to selenium's conventional toxicity-a
toxicity that occurred only at levels much higher than those for which the
petition sought approval.'
128. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (1982).
129. The Delaney Clause applies to feed additives, but with a significant caveat enacted in 1962.
This caveat is central to the next episode in our chronicle, but FDA did not rely on it in approving
the petition for selenium-a substance associated with tumor induction in three different animal stud-
ies. See R. MERRI.L & P. HuTr, FooD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 477-78, 484
(1980).
130. Selenium in Animal Feed, Proposed Additive Regulation, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,458 (1973).
131. Id. at 10,460.
132. Id. at 10,458.
133. Id. at 10,459.
134. Id. at 10,460.
135. Id. at 10,459. This discussion could presage the creation of another significant "exception" to
the Clause if scientists confirm their speculations that some non-genotoxic carcinogens will display
"no-effect" levels.
136. FDA took the opportunity to enlarge on its narrow ruling that selenium could be approved,
the Delaney Clause notwithstanding, by offering an analogy to beverage alcohol. It noted that heavy
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FDA's proposal concluded with a discussion of Congress's rationale for
enacting the Delaney Clause." 7 The Clause was predicated on the princi-
ple that not even a single molecule of a carcinogen should be allowed in
human food because scientists did not fully understand the mechanisms of
carcinogenesis. FDA conceded that in the case of "primary" carcinogens
this ignorance persisted. But, it continued, if a substance is found to pro-
mote cancer only through its dose-dependent primary toxic effects, the
substance poses no risk of cancer so long as its "no-effect" level is not
exceeded.1"
The selenium decision marked the first time that FDA had knowingly
approved the intentional addition of an animal carcinogen to food in the
face of the Delaney Clause. At the time, however, the ruling did not excite
much interest."3 9
3. Elusive Residues of Carcinogenic Animal Drugs and Feed
Additives
The next episode in FDA's efforts to make sense of the Delaney Clause
also took place in the early 1970s. The Agency's reasoning is notable both
for its sophistication and for its portent: FDA's methodology underpins all
of its subsequent efforts to limit the Delaney Clause.
To understand what has come to be called FDA's "sensitivity of
method" doctrine, we must advert briefly to the original language of the
1958 Delaney Clause. That language appeared flatly to prohibit FDA
approval of any carcinogenic additive to human food or to animal feed.
The definition of "food additive," however, excluded substances whose use
in food had been previously sanctioned by FDA or the Department of
Agriculture. " " Prior to the 1958 enactment of the Food Additives Amend-
ment, FDA had approved the marketing of a number of agents designed
consumption of beverage alcohol by humans is associated with cirrhosis of the liver, which in turn is
associated with an increased incidence of liver cancer. The Agency asserted that beverage alcohol
(undeniably a "food additive") and other food constituents with similar effects "are not by reason of
their capacity to induce liver damage when abused by being consumed at high levels, properly classi-




139. No formal objections to the proposal were ever filed, no lawsuit was brought, and no Con-
gressional hearings ensued. Nor was the decision or its rationale criticized within the communities
that have challenged FDA's de minimis interpretation of the Delaney Clause. The fact that the initial
"consumers" of selenium would be livestock and not humans might have muffled opposition; or per-
haps critics recognized that denial of the petition would leave FDA in the anomalous position of
refusing to allow the addition of selenium to feeds grown in selenium-deficient regions while permit-
ting it in areas where crops naturally contained amounts sufficient to support robust livestock growth.
Even FDA's gratuitous analogy to beverage alcohol failed to provoke comment.
140. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(4) (1982).
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to promote livestock growth, including diethylstilbestrol (DES).1" 1 Even
then it was recognized that DES caused cancer in animals, and by 1960
suspicions were growing that it might cause cancer in humans as well.""
FDA's pre-1958 approvals for DES were predicated on the assumption
that no measurable amount of the material remained in human food de-
rived from the treated livestock. But the 1958 Delaney Clause contained
no language that confined its prohibition to carcinogens added to human
food. And even then some FDA scientists doubted that the Agency could
assure that none of the DES administered by implantation would not
make its way into, thereby "becoming a component of," human food. Ac-
cordingly, after the Food Additives Amendment's passage, FDA abruptly
stopped approving new petitions for the marketing of DES as a livestock
growth promotant. This action did not curtail DES use; it simply confined
purchasers to suppliers who had obtained approval prior to 1958 and
whose products were therefore not subject to the new Delaney Clause. 4
In 1962 Congress amended the original 1958 language by adding the
so-called "DES proviso."1 '44 The amendment was designed to allow all
makers of DES and similar products to compete on an equal footing, sub-
ject to whatever restrictions FDA found necessary to assure the safety of
human food. The proviso stipulates that the Delaney Clause does not bar
approval of a carcinogenic animal drug or feed additive if FDA concludes
that, when the substance is used as directed, "no residue of the additive
will be found" in human food derived from treated animals, by the
Agency's specified method of chemical analysis." 5 The language triggered
a decade-long effort within FDA to devise criteria for analytical methods
for carcinogenic veterinary drugs and feed additives. 46
141. DES typically was administered either by implantation in the animal or as an addition to its
feed. Address by Richard Kingham, Course on Food and Drug Law for FDA Scientists at Univ. of
Va. Sch. of Law (Aug. 18, 1978); see also R. MERRILL & P. HUT, supra note 129, at 484.
142. The drug has occasioned much litigation, including one ground-breaking decision. See
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). One of the
best accounts of the early steps in the discovery of DES's carcinogenicity for humans is M. SHAP, A
NATION OF GUINEA PIGS 163-90 (1979).
143. See R. Kingham, Statutory and Administrative Theories by which FDA Avoids Applying the
Delaney Clause, November 10, 1977 (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also R. MER-
RILL. AND P. HuTTr, supra note 129.
144. Drug Amendments of 1962 § 104(f), 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c), 376(b) (1982).
145. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 376(b)(5)(B) (1982).
146. See Cooper, supra note 45, at 12. At first the Agency embraced whatever seemed to be the
most powerful method available for a substance, subject to the important qualification that it be rapid
and inexpensive enough for use by governmental laboratories. But methods for different compounds
varied widely in their capacity to find trace residues. Furthermore, chemists were continually develop-
ing more powerful methods, which made a policy that demanded the "best available" method a recipe
for constant revision of the terms of approval-and use-of veterinary drugs and feed additives. Ac-
cordingly, by 1970, FDA generally demanded that the proponent of any carcinogenic drug or feed
additive supply a practicable method of analysis capable of measuring residues at the two parts per
billion (ppb) level. Id.
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By 1973, amidst mounting controversy, 47 FDA officials concluded that
its early approaches to prescribing methods for "finding" residues in
human food could not be justified. Continual improvements in chemical
analysis made a "best available" requirement inherently unstable. A uni-
form standard for all animal drugs failed to take account of differences in
carcinogenic potency. The "overlooked" residue of one drug might pose
virtually no human risk of cancer, while the same quantity of another
drug might raise serious health concerns.
The emergence of quantitative risk assessment for carcinogens per-
suaded FDA officials that it was possible to distinguish significant differ-
ences in risk. They also realized that an assay's failure to detect a toxicant
in a medium does not mean that none is present, only that none is detecta-
ble at the limit of measurement of the method used.148 Each new method
of analysis seemed to find residues that had previously escaped detec-
tion,"" suggesting that administration of any drug to livestock was almost
147. See Regulation of Diethylstilbestrol (D.E.S.) (Its Use as a Drug for Humans and in Animal
Feeds) (Parts 1-3): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971), 2d Sess. (1972); Hess & Clark, Div. of Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
148. Chemical Compounds in Food Producing Animals, 42 Fed. Reg. 10,412, 10,413 (1977).
149. A brief account of this history appears in Hess & Clark, Div. of Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA, 495
F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1974), which was a successful challenge to FDA's first effort to withdraw ap-
proval for the use of DES in cattle and swine.
Prior to 1971, the animal drug DES, used as a growth-promoting feed additive, could not be de-
tected in beef liver if discontinued forty-eight hours before slaughter. However, new assay methods in
1971 found DES residues in liver, and FDA extended the withdrawal period to seven days. See
Diethylstilbestrol: Extension of Withdrawal Period, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,292 (1971). By mid-1972, more
DES residues were being detected with the new methods despite the withdrawal period. FDA an-
nounced it was considering withdrawal of all DES use in feed. See Elanco Products Co. et al., Dieth-
ylstilbestrol; Notice of Opportunity for Hearing on Proposal to Withdraw Approval of New Animal
Drug Applications, 37 Fed. Reg. 12,251 (1972). The Agency then discovered that DES, even used
according to regulations, left residues which persisted for at least seven days after the drug was
stopped. Furthermore, it was doubtful that any existing assay was sensitive enough to detect the
residues present. See Diethylstilbestrol: Order Denying Hearing and Withdrawing Approval of New
Animal Drug Applications for Liquid and Dry Premixes, and Deferring Ruling on Implants, 37 Fed.
Reg. 15,747 (1972). FDA therefore ultimately revoked the regulations governing DES in animal feed.
See Diethylstilbestrol: Revocation of All Provisions for Use in Animal Feed, 37 Fed. Reg. 26,307
(1972).
DES was also given to animals in the form of implants which slowly released the drug. New
studies with radiolabeled DES showed that low levels of the drug were detectable even 120 days after
implantation, and cast similar doubts on the sensitivity of current assays. FDA consequently withdrew
approval for all New Animal Drug Applications (NADAs) for DES implants. See Diethylstilbestrol;
Order Denying a Hearing and Withdrawing Approval of New Animal Drug Applications for Dieth-
ylstilbestrol Implants, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,485 (1973). It revoked the controlling regulations, including
those which specified assay methods. See Diethylstilbestrol Implants; Revocation for Use Alone or in
Combination With Testosterone, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,926 (1973). Some manufacturers challenged FDA's
revocation of NADAs and the controlling regulations in court. The Agency denied additional hearing
requests which followed a motion to stay the revocation. See Diethylstilbestrol: Order Denying Hear-
ing to Vineland Laboratories, Inc., and Hess & Clark, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,510 (1973). The court then
vacated FDA's orders and remanded the case to the Agency for further action. Hess & Clark, Div. of
Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court directed FDA to address the factual
issues concerning relevance of its radioactive tracer studies to commercial use of DES and its safety,
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certain to leave some residues even though they might be, for a time, be-
low the limits of detection. FDA officials decided in 1973 to cut through
this conundrum and fashion a policy whose general requirements would
apply to all carcinogenic animal drugs and feed additives, but whose spe-
cific demands would be calibrated to the risks posed by individual com-
pounds.15 To do this, the Agency had to grapple with the meaning of the
1962 amendment. FDA rejected the suggestion that Congress had meant
to preclude approval of any carcinogenic drug whose residues might find
their way into human food. Adoption of this interpretation, it concluded,
would nullify the 1962 amendment, which was clearly intended to facili-
tate marketing of growth-promoting agents for use in livestock production
so long as consumers were protected. 51 The Agency explained its aban-
donment of its earlier policies of demanding the "best available" method
and later insisting on a detection capability of two ppm for all
drugs-which ignored differences in potency." 2
FDA then articulated what has become its general approach to regulat-
ing carcinogenic residues of animal drugs and feed additives, even though
the underlying regulations have never been adopted.1 53 In a sentence, the
Agency said that it would interpret the "no residue will be found" lan-
guage as allowing approval of any carcinogenic compound whose sponsor
provides an analytical method capable of detecting residues that could
pose a "significant" human cancer risk. The Agency initially proposed
that any lifetime risk of greater than one in one hundred million should
be considered significant. 54 The required analytic sensitivity was to be
id. at 994, and FDA subsequently reinstated the approvals for DES. See Diethylstilbestrol For Use in
Cattle and Sheep: Notice to Holders of New Animal Drug Applications, 39 Fed. Reg. 11,323 (1974).
It also immediately proposed revocation of the currently approved assay methods. See Diethylstilbes-
trol (DES) in Edible Tissues of Cattle and Sheep: Proposal to Revoke Test Methods for Determina-
tion of Residue Levels, 39 Fed. Reg. 11,299 (1974). Eventually, in 1979, FDA revoked NADAs for
DES given in feed or by implant, citing the insufficiency of all current analytical methods and invok-
ing the Delaney Clause. See Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals: Criteria and Proce-
dures for Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,070 (1979).
150. Compounds Used in Food Producing Animals, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,226 (1973).
151. Food Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic
Residues, 42 Fed. Reg. 10,412, 10,413 (1977).
152. FDA discussed the advantages and disadvantages of prescribing a fixed limit of detection
methodology for all carcinogenic drugs, a "practical zero." This approach "would provide a well-
defined criterion for the lowest limit of measurement that any petitioner's assay would have to sat-
isfy," but it would not "take into account differences in carcinogenic potency among carcinogens," and
it would be increasingly vulnerable to improvements in analytic capability that would undermine the
premis6 that no residues were allowed. Id. at 10,419.
153. Sponsored Compounds in Food-Producing Animals; Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating
the Safety of Carcinogenic Residues, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,530, 45,530 (1985).
154. Compounds Used in Food-Producing Animals: Procedures for Determining Acceptability of
Assay Methods Used for Assuring the Absence of Residues in Edible Products of Such Animals, 38
Fed. Reg. 19,226, 19,227 (1973). FDA in its 1977 promulgation asserted that the one in 100 million
risk level could be downgraded to one in one million with no significant compromise of public health.
Food Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic Residues,
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determined by extrapolation from animal test results demonstrating carci-
nogenicity to estimate the residue level whose human consumption could
entail any larger risk. Accordingly, if a drug's sponsor could provide FDA
a method capable of detecting such residues, the drug could, consistently
with the Delaney Clause, be approved.
While FDA's reasoning was elaborately complex, the effect of its policy
is summarized simply. FDA was (and is) prepared to ignore residues of
carcinogenic drugs and feed additives in human food that the approved
method could not detect. The Agency conceded that this policy would al-
low the intentional addition of animal carcinogens to the human food
supply-albeit only in quantities posing very small cancer risks. This pol-
icy was explained in terms of the special proviso that Congress had en-
acted in 1962. FDA did not purport in 1973 to articulate a general ap-
proach to the regulation of trace carcinogens in human food.
The "sensitivity of method" (SOM) policy has not been tested in court.
FDA's 1977 regulation, based on the 1973 proposal, was overturned on
review, but on the ground that the Agency had failed to allow opportunity
for comment on changes it had incorporated.' 55 FDA has twice since pub-
lished revised proposals designed to simplify the regulations, adjust the
criterion of "significant" risk, and moderate its demands for data from
drug sponsors. 5 While never formally upheld, however, FDA's SOM
doctrine has gained support as a scientifically sensible and legally plausi-
ble rendering of the ambiguous instructions that Congress provided in
1962.1 As we shall see, FDA's adoption of quantitative risk assessment
to reconcile the Delaney Clause with the DES proviso has presaged its
approach to other classes of carcinogenic compounds.
4. The Attempt to Ban Saccharin
No chronicle of FDA's implementation of the Delaney Clause would be
complete without examining its abortive 1977 effort to ban saccharin-the
last occasion it sought to enforce the Clause. A detailed account of this
42 Fed. Reg. 10,412, 10,421 (1977).
155. Animal Health Inst. v. FDA, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep.
(CCH) 38,154 (D.D.C. 1978).
156. See Chemical Compounds in Food Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for Evaluat-
ing Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,070 (1979); Sponsored Compounds in Food-
Producing Animals; Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating the Safety of Carcinogenic Residues, 50
Fed. Reg. 45,530 (1985).
157. EPA has applied the doctrine to approve pesticide residues on processed crop byproducts that
are used for animal feed. See R:Gu.ATING PEs'ricItIDs, supra note 31, at 220-24; Thiodicarb: Pro-
posed Tolerances, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,452 (1985).
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episode is available elsewhere; 58 a brief summary will reveal its key
lessons.
In April, 1977, FDA proposed to withdraw approval for the use of
saccharin in all foods, including artificially sweetened soft drinks, and in
ingested cosmetics and drugs as well.' 59 The Agency said it would enter-
tain new drug applications for table-top sweetening products made of
saccharin, provided they were accompanied by clinical evidence that the
products were effective in weight control. This announcement was based
on the results of a series of animal experiments, culminating in a Cana-
dian government study which demonstrated that saccharin induced malig-
nant tumors in second-generation male rats. As the legal basis for its pro-
posal, FDA invoked both the Delaney Clause and the Food Additives
Amendment's "general safety clause."
FDA's proposal triggered protests from consumers, legislators, clini-
cians who treated juvenile diabetics, and manufacturers of saccharin-
sweetened foods. Congress acted quickly to prevent implementation of the
ban,60 directing FDA to commission studies by NAS and amending the
FD&C Act to foreclose for two years any FDA action based on the ex-
isting animal test to ban or restrict use of saccharin.'' The Saccharin Ban
Moratorium provisions have been reenacted four times.162
Though they foresaw opposition from several quarters, FDA officials
were surprised by its intensity and had not seriously explored interpreta-
tions of the statute that might have allowed them to avoid a ban of
saccharin. To be sure, none of the escape routes the Agency had previ-
ously charted (or later devised) appeared plausible. Saccharin was un-
equivocally a "food additive" in the Agency's view because only five years
earlier it had promulgated what it termed an "interim food additive regu-
lation" to confirm the legality of saccharin use while further tests were
underway. 6' The Canadian study appeared to confirm that it was pure
158. See Merrill & Taylor, supra note 10.
159. Saccharin and Its Salts: Proposed Rule Making, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996 (1977).
160. Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-203, 91 Stat. 1451 (1977).
161. The first study was to assess: (1) the "current technical capabilities" to predict human risk
from food additives which were animal carcinogens; (2) the risks and benefits of foods which contain
toxins or carcinogens, the means of risk/benefit evaluation and the statutory authority for balancing
those factors; (3) instances where restrictions are inappropriate, considering the risk/benefit balance;
and (4) the relationship between Federal policies for regulating food and those for regulating deleteri-
ous substances with non-food uses. The second study was to determine "the chemical identity of any
impurities" in saccharin, potential human risk from any impurities, and the health benefits associated
with nonnutritive sweeteners, particularly saccharin. Id. at 1451; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, SACCHARIN: TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF RISKS AND BENEFITS, PART 1 (1978); NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FOOD SAFETY POLICY: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIETAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS (1979).
162. See Merrill & Taylor, supra note 10, at 58.
163. Saccharin and Its Salts: Removal From Generally Recognized as Safe List; Provisional Reg-
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saccharin, not some contaminant, that caused tumors in male rats."" The
SOM theory did not fit, for saccharin was ingested directly by humans.
Furthermore, the estimated cancer risk attributable to saccharin consump-
tion (roughly one in ten thousand"A5) was measurably higher than the
figure FDA had only recently embraced as the threshold of "signifi-
cance."' 6 Even if agency officials had anticipated the possibility, the de
minimis doctrine could not have saved saccharin.
In short, by 1977 FDA officials believed that they had exhausted every
available excuse for not enforcing the Delaney Clause, including the claim
that more time was needed to complete and analyze studies of saccharin's
effects, a claim which had sustained the ingredient for nearly a decade.
FDA's proposed ban of saccharin can therefore be viewed as the reluctant
action of an agency that had already come to question the wisdom of the
Delaney Clause and in other contexts had exploited legal devices to avoid
it.167
This interpretation of the history is consistent with, though it does not
corroborate, the view voiced by groups who claimed that FDA invoked the
Delaney Clause in order to bring it into ridicule and enhance the pros-
pects for Congressional repeal. 6 After all, they argued, FDA could have
relied solely on the general safety clause to support its proposed ban; its
emphasis on Delaney seemed gratuitous. In any event, the Agency's pro-
posed ban provoked a Congressional rebuke-despite its protestations that
it was merely carrying out Congress's instructions. But Congress left the
Clause intact, crafting language that preserved it for all other food (and
color) additives found to induce cancer, and later ignoring proposals to
modernize the food safety provisions of the FD&C Act.'6 9
The repudiation of its saccharin proposal taught FDA officials that
some food ingredients enjoy a distinct status. Congress's rejection of the
very premises that inspired enactment of the Delaney Clause sent a clear
message: some ingredients are too important to ban.' 70 A second, more
important lesson was that legislative revision of the law was improbable.
Congress was prepared to create exceptions to the FD&C Act's general
ulation Prescribing Conditions of Safe Use, 36 Fed. Reg. 12,109 (1971).
164. See Merrill & Taylor, supra note 10, at 35-46.
165. Saccharin and Its Salts: Removal From Generally Recognized as Safe List; Provisional Reg-
ulation Prescribing Conditions of Safe Use, 36 Fed. Reg. 12,109 (1971).
166. See supra text accompanying note 156.
167. See Merrill & Taylor, supra note 10, at 78-84.
168. See Schultz, The Bitter Aftertaste of Saccharin, 40 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 66 (1985).
169. See, e.g., H.R. 1819, H.R. 3482, H.R. 3378, S. 587, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see also
Hutt, Food Legislation in Perspective, 34 FOOD DRU; COSM. L.J. 590 (1979).
170. See Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Proposed Phasing Out of Nitrites in Foods
(Mar. 1979), reprinted in R. MERRILL & P. Hu'rt, supra note 129, at 782; see also Roberts, supra
note 10.
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requirements-including ingredient-specific exceptions to the Delaney
Clause-but it seemed unwilling to entertain seriously any categorical re-
visions of this icon. Almost none of the food safety bills subsequently in-
troduced risked frontal repeal of the anticancer language that Congress
almost casually, perhaps even reluctantly, had included in 1958."' The
saccharin episode, therefore, probably strengthened the conviction among
some FDA officials-and others outside the Agency-that if the problems
presented by literal application of the Delaney Clause were to be solved,
administrators would have to solve them."'2
5. Migrating Food Packaging Materials
Well before 1974 FDA had approved a variety of food-contact uses of
the plastic acrylonitrile."' In that year the Agency was presented with a
petition to use the material in fabricated beverage containers, a product
with a potentially vast commercial market. The Agency granted the peti-
tion, setting separate limits on the amount of residual acrylonitrile mono-
mer that could remain in the container itself and on the amount that could
permissibly migrate into food."" FDA scientists were aware at the time of
concerns that acrylonitrile might be an occupational carcinogen and of in-
dustry plans to test it in animals. The limits on residual monomer and on
migration were considered adequate to protect consumer health.
FDA's decision provoked formal objections, accompanied by a demand
for an evidentiary hearing, from the Natural Resources Defense Council
171. Thus, in outlining the need for and desirable features of new food safety legislation, Senator
Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee and chief sponsor of
several bills to restructure the law, omitted even to mention the Delaney Clause. Hatch, Areas for
Change in the Food and Drug Laws, 38 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 97 (1983). See generally Weeda,
Food Safety Regulation-Time for Change and Compromise, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 375
(1985).
172. See Hut, FDA Can Handle Food Safety Issues Most Effectively, Legal Times of Wash.,
Apr. 27, 1981, at 28. But see Pape & Taylor, Congress, Not FDA, Should Rewrite Delaney Clause,
Legal Times of Wash., May 25, 1981, at 34. See also Henteleff, "Modernizing" the Delaney Clause,
38 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 147 (1983). Saccharin also demonstrates that some carcinogenic additives
provide benefits that may outweigh even significant cancer risks. The Delaney Clause is often cited as
the reason FDA could not take those benefits into account. But this is one defect of the statute for
which Delaney is not responsible, and which judicial (or legislative) approval of FDA's de minimis
theory would not correct. FDA has consistently held that the general safety clause does not allow
consideration of an additive's benefits. This position has never been seriously challenged, and the
legislative history supporting the Agency's view appears convincing. See generally Cooper, supra note
45.
173. By 1974, FDA had granted approval under food additive regulations for the use of acryloni-
trile copolymers in cellophane, adhesives, paper and paperboard packaging components, plastics, vari-
ous coating applications, such as for nylon or polyolefin films, and a number of other applications.
Acrylonitrile Copolymers Intended for Use in Contact with Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
39 Fed. Reg. 38,907, 38,907 (1974).
174. Food Additives Resulting From Contact With Containers or Equipment and Food Additives
Otherwise Affecting Food; Acrylonitrile/Styrene Copolymer, 40 Fed. Reg. 6489 (1975).
Vol. 5: 1, 1988
Delaney Clause
(NRDC). 76 NRDC asserted that acrylonitrile had not been shown to be
safe for food contact use and that, in any case, it should not be approved
for nondegradable beverage containers because of adverse environmental
consequences. The Agency delayed responding to these objections. It was
reluctant to acknowledge that adverse environmental effects might play
any role in its regulation of food additives under a statute that required
only proof of safety for ingestion.' 76 Furthermore, FDA scientists had re-
ceived preliminary reports from the now-ongoing toxicological study
which suggested that acrylonitrile caused cancer.
Eventually FDA acted. It was aware that the Coca-Cola Company was
poised to begin distribution of soft drinks in acrylonitrile containers sup-
plied by the petitioner, Monsanto. To forestall this, acting Commissioner
Gardner announced that FDA was staying its prior approval on several
grounds. 77 First, recent toxicological findings suggested that acrylonitrile
might be teratogenic and revealed suspicious masses in test animals. Sec-
ond, new analyses of the Monsanto containers indicated that acrylonitrile
migration might exceed the announced limits. 78 Third, the consumer ex-
posure would increase sharply with the marketing of acrylonitrile bever-
age containers. Fourth, NRDC's objections had raised a number of sub-
stantial questions which merited a hearing. 79 The effect of this order was
to suspend the approval of Monsanto's food additive petition and send the
company immediately into court.
Monsanto won an initial victory in the D.C. Circuit, which ordered
175. Monsanto Co. v. Gardner, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH)
38,097 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Food Additives: Acrylonitrile Copolymer Beverage Containers;
Stay of Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,546, 13,548 (1977).
176. FDA had begun to assemble data on the environmental impact of plastic beverage bottles in
1973. Manufacturers and Distributors of Plastic Bottles for Carbonated Beverages and Beer Use:
Requirement of Environmental Impact Analysis Reports, 38 Fed. Reg. 24,391 (1973). However, in
1975 it announced that unless an adverse environmental effect was prohibited by the FD&C Act or
another law it administered, it was "legally precluded from taking or restraining from taking any
action upon that adverse impact," and it published a regulation to that effect. Environmental Impact
Considerations: Legal Effect of NEPA on Agency Action, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,662, 16,662 (1975). The
Environmental Defense Fund prevailed in a court challenge of the Agency's stance. Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Mathews, 410 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1976). FDA then revoked its contested
regulations. Environmental Impact Considerations: Revocation of Impact Determination Regulation,
41 Fed. Reg. 21,768 (1976). The Agency did complete an environmental impact statement for plastic
bottles in 1976. Plastic Bottles for Carbonated Beverages and Beer; Availability of Final Environmen-
tal Impact Statement, 41 Fed. Reg. 43,944 (1976). In 1977, FDA announced that it was taking no
action on that environmental impact determination. It was evident from the discussion that FDA's
evaluation for safety was a separate exercise from determination of environmental impact, and the
Agency did not consider environmental impact in determining whether an additive was "safe." See
Plastic Bottles for Carbonated Beverages and Beer: Environmental Impact Determination, 42 Fed.
Reg. 9227 (1977).
177. Food Additives: Acrylonitride Copolymer Beverage Containers; Stay of Regulations, 42 Fed.
Reg. 13,546 (1977).
178. Id. at 13,547.
179. Id. at 13,548.
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FDA to conduct an expedited hearing on the safety of the company's
plastic bottle.' 80 The hearing resulted in a ruling by Commissoner Donald
Kennedy that the Monsanto beverage container was a "food additive"
which had not been demonstrated to be safe. 8 ' Under extreme testing
conditions, Kennedy found, Agency scientists had been able to detect mi-
gration into food from Monsanto's original bottle. Kennedy conceded that
no migration could be detected from Monsanto's second-generation bottle,
which it had designed to reduce the level of residual acrylonitrile mono-
mer. Nevertheless, Kennedy ruled that this bottle, too, was a "food addi-
tive" because it could be predicted, based on the tests of the first bottle,
that some monomer would migrate even if it escaped detection.' 82
On review in the D.C. Circuit, Judge Leventhal's majority opinion re-
jected Commissioner Kennedy's ruling, but it provided FDA some practi-
cal guidance in the interpretation of its statute:
The Court is . . . concerned, that the Commissioner may have
reached his determination in the belief that he was constrained to
apply the strictly literal terms of the statute irrespective of the public
health and safety considerations. . . . [Tihere is latitude inherent in
the statutory scheme to avoid literal application of the statutory defi-
nition of "food additive" in those de minimis situations that, in the
informed judgment of the Commissioner, clearly present no public
health or safety concerns.18
The Monsanto opinion became one of the two chief intellectual sources
of FDA's subsequent approval of Red No. 19 and Orange No. 17. The
other was the Agency's acceptance of quantitative risk assessment as a tool
for estimating the health risks of low-level carcinogens. However, FDA
ultimately did not find it necessary to rely on Judge Leventhal's de
minimis language to resolve the problem posed by acrylonitrile and other
carcinogenic food packaging materials, which confronted the Delaney
Clause as soon as it became apparent that trace amounts were likely to
migrate into packaged food. After prolonged internal debate, FDA eventu-
ally approved Monsanto's plastic bottle on the theory that it was not the
"additive," but a "constituent," which induced cancer, 8 4 a theory that it
180. Monsanto Co. v. Gardner, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH)
38,097 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
181. Indirect Additives: Polymers; Acrylonitrile Copolymers Used To Fabricate Beverage Con-
tainers, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,528, 48,543 (1977).
182. Id. at 48,532.
183. Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
184. Indirect Food Additives: Polymers; Acrylonitrile/Styrene Copolymers, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,635,
36,638 (1984).
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had previously and more fully articulated in regulating several color
additives.185
Predictably, participants in the current dispute over FDA's application
of the de minimis theory differ in their views of this precedent. Leventhal
invited the Commissioner to focus on the substance rather than on the
vocabulary of Congressional policy.' 86 But two features of the case
weaken its force in the present context. First, it is not clear that the court
understood that FDA was dealing with a carcinogen. While the Agency
record contained evidence of the preliminary toxicological findings, FDA
had consciously refrained from reaching a definitive judgment-in part
because it did not want to establish a precedent of acting on the basis of
reports from incomplete or unreviewed scientific studies.18
Second, FDA was not (and thus neither was the court) dealing with the
language of the Delaney Clause, which the Agency had not relied on in
any of its decisions. While Leventhal did not qualify his endorsement of
FDA's authority to "avoid literal application" of the statute, the food ad-
ditive definition differs from the Delaney Clause. The former's
phrasing-"likely to become a component of food"-is facially indetermi-
nate. In devising a scheme of premarket approval for some but not all
chemicals used in food production and marketing, Congress had to draw
some sort of boundary. There is little evidence that the drafters focused on
the possibility of migration at the molecular level. More importantly,
there is no suggestion that the authors of the 1958 law intended to cir-
185. As Richard Cooper has pointed out, Judge Leventhal's de minimis exception is remarkably
similar to FDA's own solution to the conundrum posed by the DES proviso. But Cooper notes that
Leventhal went a step further, and invited the Agency to disregard residues of a substance that it was
confident would be found in food if it thought that the substance posed "no public health concern."
See Cooper, supra note 45, at 13-14.
186. In its brief in the Red No. 19/Orange No. 17 dispute, the government interpreted Monsanto
as authorizing the exclusion of a probable carcinogen from definition as a food additive if the risk is de
minimis, thus escaping the Delaney Clause. The government argued that, under Monsanto, FDA
may also approve the use of a carcinogenic color additive if the risk is likewise de minimis. Brief for
Respondents at 31-32, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1548). The
intervenor Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association similarly argued that Monsanto had the
practical effect of exempting a carcinogen which posed a de minimis risk from regulation under the
Delaney Clause. Brief for Intervenor-Respondent: The Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association
at 24, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1548).
187. The language of FDA's stay of regulations suggests that it was reluctant to act until all the
data had been submitted:
The issues raised in the objections are substantial. The Commissioner anticipates, therefore,
that when the chronic feeding study is complete or possibly sooner it will be appropriate to
convene an evidentiary hearing under section 409 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. 348) to resolve those factual issues. .. . The Commissioner concludes that it is in
the public interest to act prudently, albeit not definitively, at this time on the acrylonitrile
copolymer beverage containers.
Acrylonitrile Copolymer Beverage Containers; Stay of Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,546, 13,548
(1977).
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cumscribe FDA's authority to define the precise boundary based on judg-
ment and experience.
By contrast, the Delaney Clause is framed to restrict FDA's discretion.
The purpose of the Clause, at least for its proponents, was to preclude
decisions that the looser general safety clause would have allowed. 8 The
current debate over FDA's approval of Red No. 19 and Orange No. 17 is
really about the capacity of Congress, through conscious choice of statu-
tory language, to curtail administrative discretion. Monsanto does not
speak directly to this question.189
6. The "Special" Case of Lead Acetate
A color additive that came under scrutiny as a result of FDA's efforts to
resolve the status of all provisionally listed colors caused the Agency's next
confrontation with the Delaney Clause. Lead acetate has been used as a
color additive in cosmetics for many years, chiefly in hair coloring prod-
ucts marketed to disguise greying hair. This form of lead is also an une-
quivocal carcinogen when ingested by mice and rats.' Because hair dyes
containing lead acetate are applied dermally, FDA faced the question of
whether lead acetate was absorbed through the scalp. This question was
difficult to resolve because humans are exposed to lead from many other
sources and lead can always be found in their tissues at low, though fluc-
tuating, levels. The key problem for FDA was to distinguish lead ab-
sorbed from hair dyes from this "natural" background. 9'
This issue proved to have legal as well as scientific importance. The
Delaney Clause in the Color Additive Amendments is really two clauses.
The first tracks the language of the 1958 Clause; the second applies to
noningested additives, and provides that a color additive
shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use that will
not result in ingestion of any part of such additive, if, after tests
which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of additives for
such use or after other relevant exposure of man or animal to such
188. See infra text accompanying notes 288 & 304-07.
189. Judge Williams's opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108
(D.C. Cir. 1987), distinguished Monsanto in two sentences:
The opinion makes no suggestion that anyone supposed acrylonitrile to be carcinogenic, or that
the Delaney Clause governing food additives . . . was in any way implicated. Thus the case
cannot support a view that the food additive Delaney Clause (or, obviously, the color additive
one) admits of a de minimis exception.
Id. at 1118.
190. General Specifications and General Restrictions for Provisional Color Additives for Use in
Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics; Provisional Listing of Lead Acetate: Postponement of Closing Date, 43
Fed. Reg. 8790, 8791 (1978).
191. Id. at 8792-93.
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additive, it is found by the Secretary to induce cancer in man or
animal.192
Thus, even if FDA were able to confirm that lead acetate in hair dyes was
absorbed through the scalp, for the Delaney Clause to apply the Agency
would have to find that the rodent feeding studies demonstrating carcino-
genicity were "appropriate" for evaluating the safety of such a non-
ingested additive. FDA contrasted this requirement with the ingested use
portion of the Delaney Clause under which, it declared, a "finding of
carcinogenicity alone renders the additive 'unsafe' as a matter of law. ' 93
Though it confirmed through radiotracer studies that tiny amounts of
lead acetate were absorbed through the scalp of hair dye users, FDA ulti-
mately concluded that the rodent carcinogenicity studies were not appro-
priate for evaluating the colors' safety for this use. The Agency's reason-
ing followed an unusual path. Indeed, the Agency conceded that "this
conclusion is based upon the unusual combination of scientific facts pecu-
liar to lead acetate in hair dyes, a combination which will rarely, if ever,
be presented again in this context."'1 94
FDA based its conclusion on two findings, neither of which it attempted
to link textually with any conventional meaning of the term "appropri-
ate." First, it pointed out that while users of lead acetate hair dyes might
absorb trace amounts of the color, even frequent use would result in aver-
age daily absorption of no more than 3/10 millionths of a gram, increas-
ing the user's body lead burden by less than one percent. "Such an in-
crease," the Agency said, "does not augment the existing risk of acute or
chronic lead toxicity, including cancer, in any clearly discernible, much
less significant, manner. ' '195
Second, FDA cited quantitative assessments performed by its own staff
and by the sponsor of lead acetate, which predicted, respectively, a lifetime
cancer risk from this level of absorption of ten in ten million and ten in
18.5 million. "These very conservative risk assessments support a conclu-
sion that any risk likely to result from use of lead acetate hair dye cannot
be considered significant in terms of public health protection." '96 Thus
convinced that any cancer risk posed by the use of lead acetate in hair
dyes was "minute," FDA found that lead acetate was "safe for use in hair
dyes." The conclusion that the carcinogenicity studies were not "appropri-
192. 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1982).
193. Lead Acetate: Listing As a Color Additive in Cosmetics That Color the Hair on the Scalp,
45 Fed. Reg. 72,112, 72,115 (1980) (emphasis supplied).
194. Id. at 72,115.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 72,116.
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ate" for evaluating the safety of this use of lead acetate appeared to flow,
more as a matter of ipse dixit than analysis, from this finding of safety.197
The Agency implied that ingestion studies would not be considered "ap-
propriate" for evaluating the cancer-causing potential of noningested color
additives unless they yielded risk estimates that would cause it to find an
additive unsafe.
Formal objections to FDA's approval of lead acetate, in addition to con-
testing the Agency's view of the law, focused chiefly on its apparent will-
ingness-claimed to be implicit in its risk estimates-to allow some con-
sumers to get cancer. 9 ' The objecting parties did not, however, press their
views to a hearing or seek judicial review of FDA's decision.'99
7. "Constituents" of Additives
Many of FDA's most difficult decisions have arisen in the context of its
efforts to review the safety or effectiveness of products already on the mar-
ket. Each of the major amendments to the FD&C Act authorizing
premarket approval for a class of products or adding new approval re-
quirements has imposed on FDA the obligation to review older products
and bring them into compliance with the new standards.200 This exercise,
in addition to claiming substantial agency resources and imposing heavy
testing burdens on the private sector, has invariably revealed that some
older products do not meet the standards demanded of new ones.''
197. Id. For additional discussion of FDA's regulatory approach to lead aetate in hair dyes, see
Taylor, History of Cosmetic Color Additive Regulation: Creative Maneuvering by FDA Bodes Well
for the Future, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 152, 161-62 (1982); Cooper, supra note 45, at 14-15.
198. Removal of Stay of Regulation for the Listing of Lead Acetate as a Color Additive in Cos-
metics That Color the Hair on the Scalp; Confirmation of Effective Date, 46 Fed. Reg. 15,500,
15,501 (1981).
199. See id. In 1986, FDA rejected the contention of the Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Asto-
ciation that feeding studies were inappropriate for a Delaney Clause evaluation of the externally
applied color additive Red No. 19:
FDA's decision concerning lead acetate was based upon the unusual combination of scientific
facts, peculiar to the use of lead acetate in hair dyes, which the agency recognized "will rarely,
if ever, be presented again in this context" (45 Fled.] R[eg.] 72112, 72115; October 31, 1980).
Similar facts do not exist in the case of D&C Red No. 19. For example, a key factor that
influenced FDA's judgment that the Delaney Clause just did not apply to lead acetate was the
fact that a background level of lead is always present in the blood of humans, a background
level much greater than the possible increase in lead burden that would result from the use of
lead acetate in hair dyes. There is, of course, no background level of D&C Red No. 19 in
humans. The agency believes that the tests on D&C Red No. 19 are appropriate for an evalu-
ation of the substance under the Delaney Clause.
D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at 28,359. The Agency rejected the same argument for the exter-
nally applied color additive Orange No. 17. See D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,342.
200. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1982)); Color Additive Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat.
397 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1982)); see also REGUI.ArING PFSTICIDES,
supra note 31, at 36-37.
201. See Mcllwain v. Hayes, 690 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Cutler v. Hayes, 549 F. Supp.
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This scenario is illustrated by FDA's efforts to confirm the safety of
color additives that were in commercial use before 1960. The Color Addi-
tive Amendments allowed the Agency initially to "provisionally list" those
colors whose safety was not already suspect and contemplated that it
would then review and permanently "list" those that met contemporary
safety criteria. FDA delayed undertaking any systematic review for nearly
fifteen years. By the mid-1970s, when it took up the effort in earnest,
intervening advances in safety assessment necessitated that many of the
still "provisionally listed" colors undergo new testing."°0
The results of the tests FDA demanded in 1977 proved disconcerting.
Some listed colors, like Orange No. 17 and Red No. 19, were shown to be
animal carcinogens.113 Several others were discovered to contain trace con-
taminants, which in other tests also displayed carcinogenicity. The latter
discovery posed for FDA the question whether the 1960 Delaney Clause
precluded permanent listing of the parent colors when contemporary tests
showed them to be safe and failed to demonstrate that they induced
cancer.
That an additive, not itself a carcinogen, might contain a substance that
induces cancer when tested separately was not unprecedented. FDA's pol-
icy for such cases prior to 1977 was clear if not well-publicized: the Dela-
ney Clause precluded approval even if the parent compound did not in-
duce cancer."0 " The discovery that carcinogenic contaminants occurred in
several currently approved colors, whose numbers had been shrinking,
caused the Agency to rethink this policy. Quantitative risk assessment
again provided the tool for reconciling the Agency's reluctance to invoke
the Delaney Clause with its duty to protect consumers.
In what has become known as its "constituents policy," ' 5 FDA inter-
preted the Clause to apply only to the "additive" for which approval was
sought, that is, to the compound whose coloring properties provided the
raison d'etre for using it. The unavoidable, nonfunctional carcinogenic
contaminant was a mere "constituent" of the additive. So long as the
1341 (D.D.C. 1982); Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1979).
202. Color Additives: Provisional Regulations; Postponement of Closing Dates, 42 Fed. Reg. 6991
(1977).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
204. In the regulatory history section of its Federal Register notice on carcinogenic constituents of
food and color additives, FDA stated that, "with a few exceptions" its past practice had been to
disallow any additive containing even small amounts of carcinogens even if the additive itself was not
carcinogenic. Policy for Regulating Carcinogenic Chemicals in Food and Color Additives, 47 Fed.
Reg. 14,464, 14.465 (1982).
205. Id.; see also Bachrach, D & C Green No. 5:judicial Review of the Constituents Policy, 39
Fooin DR:(; Cos.t. L.J. 299, 301-05 (1984); Henteleff, supra note 172, at 149-52.
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"additive" did not induce cancer when tested, the Delaney Clause did not
come into play.2 06
This left the issue whether the "additive"-the color with its
"constituents"-was safe for human ingestion. FDA could not claim the
contaminant posed absolutely no risk, for it had been demonstrated to
cause cancer in animals. Nor did it question the premise that carcinogene-
sis is presumptively a no-threshold process. But it declined to follow this
logic to the conclusion that the parent additive had not been shown to be
safe. FDA interpreted the statute's "general safety" standard as requiring
a finding that the additive, at likely ingestion levels, would present no
"significant" risk to consumers.20 7 Quantitative risk assessment was to be
used to determine whether the risk associated with the carcinogenic con-
stituent would be "significant. 2 0
8
FDA used this technique in approving the listing of Green No. 6, a
color additive that contains as a contaminant n-toluene, an acknowledged
animal carcinogen.20 9 Because the additive is used in small quantities at
low levels in relatively few foods and ingested drugs, estimated human
exposure is quite low. Likely exposure to the carcinogenic constituent is,
predictably, even lower, so low that the estimated human cancer risk is on
the order of one in fifteen million to one in 150 million. According to
FDA, this risk did not prevent a finding that Green No. 6 was safe within
the meaning of the statute.210
FDA's interpretation of the staute was challenged in court by Glenn
Scott. 21 ' The nominal subject of the action was FDA's listing of Green
No. 5, which contained the same carcinogenic constituent as Green No. 6,
but in even smaller quantities.212 Scott's central claim was that the Dela-
ney Clause barred FDA from approving an additive that contains any
carcinogenic material. 213 He insisted that the statute did not allow FDA
to distinguish between the parent compound and its "con-
stituents. "214
The Sixth Circuit rejected this contention.2"5 Though the perfunctory
opinion explored none of the difficulties with FDA's position, the case was
206. Henteleff, supra note 172, at 150-52.
207, Id.
208. Id.
209. D&C Green No. 6; Listing as a Color Additive in Externally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics,
47 Fed. Reg. 14,138 (1982).
210. Id. at 14,144-45.
211. Scott v. FDA, 728 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1984). Scott is an inventive and tenacious litigant who
has challenged other FDA actions.
212. Id. at 323; D&C Green No. 5, Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 24,278 (1982).
213. Scott, 728 F.2d at 324.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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a victory for FDA in its efforts to narrow the reach of the Delaney
Clause. It provided support for FDA's reading of the general safety stan-
dard as allowing approval of color and presumably food additives that
carry very small, albeit real, cancer risks. The ruling implicitly sanctioned
the Agency's reliance on quantitative risk assessment to estimate the risks
posed by low-dose carcinogens."' 0
IV. Surrender of the Citadel
In the decisions chronicled in Part III, FDA chipped away at the edges
of the Delaney Clause. None of the issues it faced had been anticipated or
resolved by Congress in 1958 or in 1960. Arguably, FDA did no more
than exercise its delegated authority to make sense of the statute it is re-
sponsible for administering, and it always purported to ground its decision
in the statutory text. By contrast, FDA's de minimis theory, on which it
rests approval of Red No. 19 and Orange No. 17, conflates the Delaney
Clause and the general safety clause, seemingly leaving no case in which
the anticancer language would bar approval of an additive the Agency is
prepared to characterize as "safe." Moreover, as initially articulated by
FDA, the de minimis doctrine does not rest on an interpretation of Con-
gress's language. Rather, it represents an assertion of administrative
power to ignore the statute's literal terms when their application seems
unwise.
A. FDA's Explanation for De Minimis
FDA's approval of Orange No. 17 and Red No. 19217 was anticipated
in two earlier rulings in which the Agency advanced its de minimis the-
ory. The Agency first embraced the de minimis doctrine in rejecting a
demand that it immediately ban six provisionally listed colors as animal
carcinogens. FDA Commissioner Young announced in June 1985 that the
Agency would permit the colors' continued use pending assessment of
their risks.2"' Young conceded that this postponement could not be justi-
216. The court of appeals summarized FDA's assessment of the cancer risk associated with
human exposure to the trace levels of p-toluidine present in Green No. 5, and observed that the
petitioner "does not contest the validity of the tests employed by FDA in determining that [the color]
was safe .. " Id. at 325. The court went on to say:
The FDA's conclusion that the risk levels ascertained after testing D&C Green No. 5 . . .
were so low as to preclude a reasonable harm from exposure to the additive within the mean-
ing of the General Safety Clause, is also in accordance with the law. . . . This finding is
consistent with the holding in Monsanto v. Kennedy. . ..
Id.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 29-45.
218. Provisional Listing of Certain Color Additives; Proposed to Extend Closing Dates, 50 Fed.
Reg. 26,377 (1985) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 81).
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fled if FDA were barred from ultimately "listing" the colors; 1 9 he as-
serted, however, that the Delaney Clause does not preclude approval of a
carcinogenic additive if the human cancer risk is "de minimis."
Commissioner Young assumed, if he did not expressly concede, that the
colors in question had been shown to induce cancer in animal experi-
ments. Though he acknowledged that the Agency then lacked the data
needed "to form the proper basis of a risk calculation,"22° Young argued
that "[ilf the risk associated with a color is essentially negligible, there is
no gain to the public, and the statutory purpose is not implemented, if the
words of the statute are interpreted not to leave the Agency any discretion
to apply it reasonably." 2 1 According to Young, the 1960 legislative his-
tory demonstrated that Congress meant to allow FDA to approve individ-
ual carcinogenic colors if scientists could determine that expected exposure
levels posed no significant human health risks.22
Commissioner Young's explanation of the Delaney Clause was the first
official suggestion that a de minimis risk policy might protect directly
added food ingredients that themselves induce cancer in animals. In its
earlier decisions on carcinogenic animal drugs, contaminants of color addi-
tives, and migrating food packaging materials, FDA dealt with substances
whose presence in food served no functional purpose. Moreover, in ex-
plaining the Agency's theory, Young did not purport to interpret the lan-
guage of the statute.
The implications of Young's ruling became clearer when FDA later
announced preliminary decisions on another acknowledged carcinogen,
methylene chloride. The Agency proposed to ban methylene chloride as an
ingredient of cosmetics on the ground that expected exposure levels ren-
dered those products unsafe.223 At the same time, it declined to revoke the
existing food additive approval for the use of methylene chloride to decaf-
feinate coffee, a use which leaves measurable residues in both the beans
and the coffee brewed from them. FDA asserted that the human cancer
risk posed by methylene chloride residues in coffee was so low it did not
warrant regulatory concern. Citing both Alabama Power and Monsanto,
the Agency relied on its "inherent" administrative authority to ignore the
statute's literal command when confronted with trivial risks.22 For the
219. Young Response to Public Citizen, supra note 32, at 28.
220. Id. at 19.
221. Id. Commissioner Young cited Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 955 (D.C. Cir.
1979), which applied the de minimis principle to the threshold definition of a food additive.
222. Young Response To Public Citizen, supra note 32, at 33-34.
223. It relied on section 601(a) of the FD&C Act, a provision that does not include an express
ban on carcinogens.
224. Cosmetics; Proposed Ban on the Use of Methylene Chloride as an Ingredient of Aerosol
Cosmetic Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,551, 51,555-56 (1985).
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first time, FDA linked the de minimis standard to a specific risk level: a
lifetime cancer risk no greater than one in one million, it asserted, should
be considered below the threshold of regulatory concern. 25 Agency scien-
tists had estimated that the upper bound cancer risk for consumers of
large amounts of decaffeinated brewed coffee was one in one million,
while the risk to consumers of large amounts of decaffeinated instant cof-
fee was one in 2.5 million." 8 Deciding that the actual risk was probably
lower, FDA concluded: "[T]here would be no safety gain to the public if
it interpreted the Delaney Clause to require a ban on this use of methy-
lene chloride.
2 27
B. The Justice Department's Reformulation
FDA applied the de minimis doctrine for the first time in late 1986,
when it published final orders permanently listing Orange No. 17 and
Red No. 19.28 The Agency had asked the National Center for Toxicolog-
ical Research (NCTR), part of FDA, to review the risk estimates submit-
ted by the colors' proponents. 229 A panel of NCTR scientists agreed that
the two colors should be considered animal carcinogens, but it confirmed
industry claims that each posed very small risks. 3 ' FDA Commissioner
Young relied heavily on the panel's findings in explaining that the colors
could be permanently listed, Delaney Clause notwithstanding.23
FDA's ruling precipitated formal objections.232 The objectors did not
contest the Agency's assessment of the risks posed by Red No. 19 and
Orange No. 17; instead they challenged FDA's legal conclusion that the
statute allowed the approval of additives found to cause malignant tumors
in laboratory animals.2"3 They thus declined the evidentiary hearing to
which the statute would have entitled them, setting the stage for an imme-
diate judicial challenge to FDA's de minimis theory.
225. Id. FDA thus embraced the same risk standard it had relied on in interpreting the DES
proviso and in assessing the safety of food and color additives containing carcinogenic constituents.
226. Id. at 51,553-55.
227. Id. at 51,555. The ruling on methylene chloride was promptly challenged. The case was
dismissed on ripeness grounds in Public Citizen v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
228. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,346.
229. Provisional Listing of Certain Color Additives; Proposal to Extend Closing Dates, 50 Fed.
Reg. 26,377-79 (1985).
230. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,331, 28,338-341, 28,346, 28,354-57.
231. Id. at 28,341-42; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at 28,357-58.
232. Brief for Petitioners, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-
1548). Ordinarily, Public Citizen would stay FDA's listing of the colors pending an evidentiary hear-
ing. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(e)(2), 376(b)(5)(C), 376(d) (1982).
233. The objectors did not squarely concede the reliability of FDA's risk assessment methodology
or its estimates, but they made clear that it was the Agency's legal position to which they objected. See
Brief for Petitioners at 2-17, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-
1548).
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In March 1987, just a few days before the government's brief in the
case was to be filed, FDA published two notices offering revised explana-
tions for its original rulings declining to apply the Delaney Clause.234 To
understand the government's shift of position one must recall FDA's origi-
nal explanation for its approval of Orange No. 17 and Red No. 19. The
Agency acknowledged that the colors had been shown to induce cancer in
properly designed and conducted animal experiments .2s  But it also
found 236 that the cancer risk associated with human exposure to each color
was extremely small-one in nineteen billion in one case, one in nine
million in the other. These estimates, it said, were tantamount to findings
that the colors posed no human risk of cancer at all. 217
Based on this conclusion FDA invoked what it characterized as the
well-established doctrine that an agency may decline to follow literal stat-
utory language if to do so would yield no public gain. 238 FDA relied
chiefly on Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,2 39 where the D.C. Circuit had
declared, that "[ulnless Congress has been extraordinarily rigid, there is a
likely basis for an implication of de minimis authority .. ."24o Turning
to the language and history of the Color Additive Amendments, the
Agency concluded that Congress had not been "extraordinarily rigid" but,
indeed, had left room for the consideration of evidence that specific addi-
tives might present essentially no risk to humans even though they in-
duced cancer in animals.24'
234. Correction of Listing of D&C Orange No. 17 for Use in Externally Applied Drugs and
Cosmetics, 52 Fed. Reg. 5081 (1987); Correction of Listing of D&C Red No. 19 for Use in Exter-
nally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics, 52 Fed. Reg. 5083 (1987).
235. See D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,344; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,357.
As noted below, see infra text accompanying notes 242-65, under pressure from the Department of
Justice FDA attempted later to explain that it had not in fact found the colors to be carcinogenic in
the sense addressed by the Delaney Clause. The Agency's original rulings, however, appeared une-
quivocal. After rejecting industry arguments that the Delaney Clause did not apply because feeding
studies were not appropriate tests for evaluating the safety of additives for external use, FDA affirmed
that each color "induces cancer when tested in laboratory animals." See D&C Orange No. 17, supra
note 27, at 28,334-36, 28,341; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at 28,349-52, 28,357.
There was little discussion of this finding, but the Agency would not have taken the unusual step of
referring the industry risk estimates to NCTR if its own scientists had not been convinced that each
color had induced cancer. Nor would proponents of the colors have devoted so much effort to demon-
strating that the risks were small if they had discovered a plausible basis for contesting these findings.
236. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,344; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,360.
237. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,343-44; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,360.
238. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,342-44; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,359-61.
239. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir, 1979).
240. Id. at 360. FDA also relied on Monsanto v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979), which
dealt specifically with the Food Additives Amendment.
241. D&C( Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,343; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,359.
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Delaney Clause
Though surely controversial, FDA's reasoning was straightforward.
The Agency found that Red No. 19 and Orange No. 17 were as safe for
human consumption as color additives could be shown to be, despite their
propensity to cause cancer in rodents at high feeding levels customary in
bioassays. The Department of Justice, however, declined to defend FDA's
bold logic. Departmental lawyers reportedly forced Commissioner Young
to advance an alternative, wholly unprecedented, rationale for the
Agency's decisions to approve the two colors. "42
FDA's revised explanation retracted its earlier findings that Orange
No. 17 and Red No. 19 induce cancer.243 According to this explanantion,
because the colors do not "induce cancer," the Delaney Clause does not
bar their approval.24 And because the colors' estimated risks are negligi-
ble, they may be approved under the general safety clause.24
This reasoning's most startling feature is the assertion that Red No. 19
and Orange No. 17 do not "induce cancer." The government's brief ac-
knowledges that FDA found that "the color additives do indeed. . . cause
some test animals to develop cancer at certain levels of ingestion." '46 But
this finding was not tantamount to a conclusion that the colors "induce
cancer in man or animal within the meaning of the Delaney Clause. 24 7
The test animals received exceedingly high doses.248 If the likelihood of
cancer at lower doses, comparable to those humans would encounter, is de
minimis, FDA may conclude that the additive does not "induce cancer"
and is therefore not subject to the Delaney Clause.2 49 According to the
government's brief, FDA never intended to find that Red No. 19 and Or-
ange No. 17 "induced cancer" in the legal sense. The likelihood that they
would cause cancer in animals at doses "comparable" to those experienced
by humans was "so remote that it cannot even be said to be a genuine risk
at all." 25
This novel argument perplexed close observers of the dispute, including
supporters of FDA's de minimis theory.25' The Agency reportedly acqui-
esced in this reasoning at the Department of Justice's insistence.252 Divin-
242. Food Chemical News, Feb. 23, 1987, at 35.
243. Correction of Listing of D&C Orange No. 17 for Use in Externally Applied Drugs and
Cosmetics, 52 Fed. Reg. 5081, 5082-83 (1987).
244, Id. at 5083-84.
245. Id.
246, Brief for Respondent at 8, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No.
86-1548).
247. Id. at 10.
248. Id. at 18.
249. Id. at 15.
250. 52 Fed. Reg. 5083, 5084 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 74, 81, 82).
251. See Food Chemical News, Feb. 23, 1987, at 35.
252. For a detailed, if not entirely balanced, account of the Department of Justice's eflbrts to
persuade Commissioner Young to reexplain his decision, see FDA Continues to Permit the Illegal
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ing the motives of the Department's lawyers involves guesswork, but two
mutually reinforcing hypotheses seem plausible.
One byproduct of FDA's new theory is that literal application of the
Delaney Clause would not bar approval of the colors. It can shift from an
argument that relies mainly on judge-made law to one that exploits the
propensity of reviewing courts-most notably the Supreme Court-to de-
fer to agency interpretations of their own statutes.25 The government is
thus asking courts to defer to FDA's interpretation of what "induce can-
cer" means. From its perspective, the controlling precedent is no longer
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,2" but Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.255
A second possible explanation for the Department of Justice's discom-
fort with FDA's original explanation lies in an obscure opinion issued by
the Department's own Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in 1979. The rul-
ing involved nitrite, a familiar and controversial food additive. FDA and
the Department of Agriculture sought Attorney General Griffin Bell's
opinion on their authority to delay banning nitrite's use should a recent
laboratory experiment demonstrate that the substance induced cancer. The
agencies believed that its health benefits2"6 probably outweighed any
human cancer risk,2 5 7 and they sought a ruling which gave them discre-
tion to "phase out" the use of nitrite.
The Attorney General's response was disappointing. Although OLC as-
Marketing of Carcinogenic Additives, H.R. REP. No. 361, 25th Report by the Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-22 (1987).
253. See Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549
(1985); Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986).
254. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
255. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Department of Justice may have hoped as well to exploit the long
line of cases confirming the courts' general deference to the factfinding of regulatory agencies operat-
ing on the "frontiers of science." E.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1974). If the government were able to persuade the court that FDA's interpretation of the statutory
"induce cancer" language should be deferred to, presumably the Agency's subsequent rulings on indi-
vidual additives would, as a practical matter, be reversal proof. The authority to decide what carcino-
gens should be retricted or banned would thus shift to the executive branch.
256. Most notably, nitrite can prevent the formation of botulinum toxin.
257. In its 1972 response to early reports suggesting cancer risks from nitrite or nitrate, FDA
pointed out that there had been no episodes of botulism in foods treated with those chemicals. Out-
breaks did occur, however, before nitrate was used commercially as a food preservative. The Agency
continued:
There is need, therefore, to consider with extreme care any changes in regulations governing
the use of these substances. From a public health standpoint, the choice to be made is between
the risk of the possibility of a chronic illness (cancer) and a very real and more immediate
hazard (botulism).
Food Additives: Use of Sodium Nitrite, Sodium Nitrate, Potassium Nitrite, and Potassium Nitrate, 21
C.F.R. § 121 (1972). Three years later, after an expert panel recommended lower permissible levels
of nitrite, FDA again cautioned that "in the desire to reduce levels to eliminate the possibility of
nitrosamine formation, the very real public health hazard of botulism cannot be ignored." Nitrates,
Nitrites and Salt: Notice of Professional Rulemaking, 40 Fed. Reg. 52,614 (1975) (codified at 9
C.F.R. §§ 318, 381).
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sumed that some uses of nitrite would not be subject to the Delaney
Clause,25 it characterized the agencies' discretion narrowly: "The respon-
sibility and the authority to decide whether nitrites are in fact carcino-
genic rest exclusively with your two Departments."259 Once such a finding
is made, however, "the statutes contemplate that Congress will make the
ultimate determination whether its continued use will be permitted."26
Both Attorney General Bell and the accompanying OLC memorandum
stressed that Congress, in the general safety standard and the Delaney
Clause, had already formulated the nation's policy for regulating carcino-
genic food ingredients.26'
OLC's discussion of the Delaney Clause is redolent of FDA's early
statements:
Congress chose to treat potentially carcinogenic substances with ex-
treme caution by enacting the Delaney Clause, which prohibits the
Secretary from establishing tolerances for any substance found to in-
duce cancer when ingested by man or animal. Such a substance is
therefore unsafe in whatever amount it may be added.262
The memorandum criticized FDA's contemplated phaseout of nitrite as
flatly inconsistent with "the statutory requirement of a finding to a rea-
sonable certainty that no harm will result from the addition of a food
additive."2"3 It expressly rejected FDA's chief legal justification for
258. After the Justice Department's ruling, FDA explained how the definition of a food additive
at 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(4) (1982) functioned as a grandfather clause for the use of nitrite as a meat
preservative:
The legal basis for allowing the preservative use of nitrites in meat (at levels up to 220 ppm)
lies in pre-1958 USDA regulations approving that use. This USDA "prior sanction" ... ex-
cludes nitrites in meat from the definition of "food additive" (see section 201(s)(4) of the [Fed-
eral Food and Cosmetic Act] (21 U.S.C. 321(s)(4))) and thus means that nitrites may be used
lawfully in meat for preservation purposes without an FDA food additive regulation approving
that use.
Nitrites in Bacon; Proposed Exception From the Color Additive Definition and Request for lnfttrma-
tion on Other Meat Products That May Qualify for the Exception to the Color Additive Definition,
44 Fed. Reg. 75,659, 75,660 (1979) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 70). Although a pre-1958 regulation
exempted nitrite use in meat from regulation under the Delaney Clause, no similar regulation could
then be found to exempt the use of nitrite in poultry. See Nitrates and Nitrites in Poultry Products;
Proposed Declaration That No Prior Sanction Exists, 44 Fed. Reg. 75,662 (1979) (codified at 21
C.F.R § 170 (1987)).
259. Letter from Attorney Gen. Griffin Bell to Secretaries of HEW and Agric. (Mar. 30, 1979),
reprinted in Secretary of Health Educ. and Welfare, and Secretary of Agric.-Authority Under the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Meat Inspection Act and Poultry Products Inspection Act, To
Authorize Continued Use of Nitrites as Food Additives, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 19, at 1, 2 (1979).
260. Id. at 3.
261. Harmon, Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Proposed Phasing Out of Nitrites in
Foods (Mar. 30, 1979), reprinted in 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 19, at 3, 17-20, 31. John Harmon was
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel.
262. Id. at 17 (emphasis supplied).
263. Id. at 19.
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delayed enforcement264-section 306's authorization to refuse to initiate
action against "minor violations. '
My speculation that Attorney General Bell's 1979 exegesis on the De-
laney Clause influenced the Department of Justice's recent refusal to de-
fend FDA's original de minimis theory is admittedly just that. Neither
Commissioner Young's revised explanation of his approval of Red No. 19
and Orange No. 17 nor the government's brief adverts to the nitrite epi-
sode. However, the nitrite opinion is easy to locate and recent enough to
be recalled by Department lawyers.
FDA's revised explanation is the only one that would sustain its posi-
tion without repudiating Bell's ruling. The Agency's current position pur-
ports to avoid the apparent clash between its approval of the two colors
and the unusually explicit policy expressed in the Delaney Clause. By its
terms, that policy applies to additives found to "induce cancer." Because,
according to Commissioner Young, no such finding has been made for
264. Events in 1980 made FDA's proposed phasing out of nitrates and nitrites unnecessary. Pub-
lic Citizen in 1979 had challenged the prior-sanctioned status of nitrites as preservatives and suggested
they might even be color additives under the exclusive jurisdiction of FDA. Public Citizen v. Fore-
man, 471 F. Supp. 586 (D.D.C. 1979); see R. MERRI.L. & P. Hur-", supra note 129, at 77 n.3. The
court ruled that the Department of Agriculture and FDA had properly found a pre-1958 sanction for
the use of nitrite as a preservative. 471 F. Supp. at 593.
The District Court had not ruled on the status of nitrite as a color additive, but referred that
question to FDA for study. 471 F. Supp. at 594. FDA proposed an exception from the color additive
definition for nitrite in bacon. Nitrites in Bacon; Proposed Exception From the Color Additive Defini-
tion and Request for Information on Other Meat Products That May Qualify for the Exception to
the Color Additive Definition, 44 Fed. Reg. 75,659, 75,660 (1979) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 70
(1987)). In 1980, it deferred action on that question for other meat products. Nitrites in Bacon;
Proposed Exception From the Color Additive Definition and Request for Information on Other Meat
Products That May Qualify for the Exception to the Color Additive Definition; Separation of the
"Color Imparting" Issue from the "Exception" Issue for Red Meats Other Than Bacon, 45 Fed. Reg.
32,324 (1980); see R. MERRILL & P. Hut-r, supra note 129, at 77 n.3.
Also in 1980, the Department of Agriculture obtained evidence of a sanction for the use of nitrate
and nitrites which predated the Sept. 6 enactment of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958). See Nitrates and Nitrites in Meat and Poultry Products; Declara-
tion and Codification of Prior Sanctions, 48 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1983). Thus, as used in both meat and
poultry, nitrites and nitrates were not food additives within the meaning of section 201(s) of the
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1982), and therefore not subject to the
Delaney Clause. These findings, plus the postponement of the color question, eliminated most of the
nitrite-related pressures on FDA. FDA codified the prior sanctioned status of nitrate and nitrite early
in 1983. 21 C.F.R. §§ 181.33, 181.34 (1987).
265. Section 306 as codified reads: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring the
Secretary to report for prosecution, or for the institution of libel or injunction proceedings, minor
violations of this chapter whenever he believes that the public interest will be adequately served by a
suitable written notice or warning." 21 U.S.C. § 336 (1982). The Justice Department did not find
this applicable.
The proposed phasing out of nitrites through the withholding of enforcement is of a different
order. . . .The effect of the policy-indeed its purpose-would be to authorize the continued
use of nitrites in certain products under circumstances that would concededly constitute non-
minor violations of the specific terms of the Food and Drug Act.
Harmon, supra note 261, at 27-28.
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Red No. 19 and Orange No. 17, Congress's policy is not violated. Indeed,
it is not applicable.
V. The Legislative History of the Delaney Clause
A. Background
In 1958 Representative James J. Delaney of New York persuaded his
colleagues to include an anticancer provision in the Food Additives
Amendment, and two years later they incorporated similar language in
the Color Additive Amendments. 66 Since one question surrounding
FDA's current efforts to escape these clauses is the effect members of
Congress expected them to have, a survey of the 1958 and 1960 legislative
histories is appropriate.
Participants in the debate over FDA's policy frequently assume that the
two anticancer clauses have the same meaning. 67 This assumption has
some logic. Continuity in the membership of the relevant House and Sen-
ate committees suggests that views would remain consistent. And during
the 1960 debates members spoke as though the issue were whether to
reenact the policy they had previously adopted for food additives. None
suggested that carcinogenic colors should be treated differently from carci-
nogenic food additives.
FDA, on the other hand, at first opposed the inclusion of the 1958
Delaney Clause, while two years later its representatives invited Congress
to adopt anticancer language for color additives. HEW Secretary Flem-
ming testified in 1960 that the Agency would seek amendments to the law
if scientific advances ever provided the tools for determining that some
level of a carcinogen could be safe.268 Thus, it is not implausible that the
1960 Delaney Clause might represent a sharper barrier to approval of
266. See Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397-407 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321, 331, 333, 342,
343, 346, 348, 351, 352, 354, 361, 362, 364, 371, 376, 441 (1982)).
267. See Brief for Intervenor-Respondent at 27-33 & n.34, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d
1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1548); see also Harmon, supra note 261, at 17 (acknowledging that
"the immediate legislative history of the Food Additives Amendment itself is somewhat sparse"). The
memorandum then turns to the testimony offered "less than two years after passage of the Food
Additive Amendment" by Secretary Flemming in support of the color additive Delaney Clause. Id. at
17-19. See infra text accompanying notes 326-33 for a full discussion of Secretary Flemming's testi-
mony. The Department of Justice memorandum essentially equates the 1958 and 1960 Delaney
Clauses:
In view of the fact that the anticancer clause in the Color Additive Amendment was patterned
after that in the Food Additives Amendment, and was enacted on the basis of the Secretary's
statement of its intended scope and rationale, based on his familiarity with and contemporane-
ous interpretation of the parallel clause in the Food Additives Amendment, the foregoing [leg-
islative history] represents a reliable indication of the purpose and effect of the clause in the
Food Additives Amendment as well.
Id. at 19.
268. See infra text accompanying notes 330-31.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 5: 1, 1988
animal carcinogens. Such a distinction, of course, might hold little imme-
diate appeal for FDA, which faced the first challenge to its de minimis
theory in the context of its approval of two carcinogenic color additives.2"9
As this discussion implies, the legislative history does not yield unequiv-
ocal answers to questions about how Congress expected the Delaney
Clause to be interpreted. The history does not clearly reveal how much or
what kind of discretion FDA was to have. No doubt inclusion of the anti-
cancer clauses had appeal as an assurance that FDA would protect con-
sumers from the hazard of cancer. But not many members appear to have
thought through how the language might operate. Without Congressman
Delaney's insistence, an anticancer clause would certainly not have been
included in 1958, and possibly not in 1960. We do not know, however,
whether Delaney got his way because key supporters of the food additives
bill believed they were buying his support with valueless currency, that is,
because the Clause would not in fact curtail FDA's flexibility, or whether
they were prepared to surrender some future discretion because Delaney's
resistence could derail the whole bill. 270
With these observations in mind, we turn to the key passages of the
1958 and 1960 legislative history.
B. Enactment of the Food Additives Amendment
1. House Hearings
Beginning in July 1957 the Subcommittee on Health and Science of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on
nine different proposals to regulate chemical food additives.27 1 Congress-
man Delaney's own bill, H.R. 7798272 was the first to contain an anti-
cancer clause.273 Section 409(d) of the bill stipulated that the Secretary of
HEW "shall not approve for use in food any chemical additive found to
269. See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). With the initial success of
that challenge, and the unlikelihood of Supreme Court review, the possibility that the 1958 Delaney
Clause can be interpreted as less restrictive of administrative discretion assumes more importance for
FDA. The challenge to its failure to restrict the use of methylene chloride at first appeared to provide
an opportunity to test this theory, but the case was dismissed on ripeness grounds. See supra note 227.
The reader can judge for herself whether the legislative history would support such sharply different
readings of the two clauses.
270. See Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical Naivete and Scientific Advocacy in The Formu-
lation of Public Health Policies, 62 CALIF. L. Ri:v. 1084, 1114-16 (1974).
271. Food Additives: Hearings on Bills to Amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
with Respect to Chemical Additives in Food Before a Subcomm. of the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Comm., 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter Food Additives Hearings].
272. 103 CONc. REC. 7918 (1957).
273. H.R. 7938, introduced by Rep. Sullivan, was identical to H.R. 7798. Food Additives Hear-
ings, supra note 271, at 166 (statement of Rep. Sullivan).
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induce cancer in man, or, after tests, found to induce cancer in
animals."" 4
In response to a request for the Department's views, HEW Secretary
Marion Folsom commented on this proposed language.7 5 Folsom's main
concern appears to have been that Delaney's original clause276 would have
barred FDA from considering whether the route by which animals were
exposed was relevant to assessment of human risk. The language ulti-
mately adopted met this concern by specifying that any test, other than by
"ingestion," be appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food
additives. 77
Folsom's other point-couched as an explanation of the Department's
bill-reflects a view of FDA authority that the enacted statute arguably
rejected. He stressed: "We believe that H.R. 6747 will prohibit the addi-
tion of any chemical additive to the food supply until there is adequate
assurance acceptable to competent scientists that it will not produce cancer
or any other disorder in man under the conditions of use proposed." FDA
claims that a quantitative risk estimate based on conservative estimates of
human exposure showing that an additive poses a risk no greater than 1 x
10-6 is tantamount to assurance that the additive in fact "will not produce
cancer. . . in man under the conditions of use proposed." '278 Accordingly,
HEW's bill, H.R. 6747, might would have allowed FDA to draw on the
274. H.R. 7798, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Food Additives Hearings, supra note 271, at
10.
275. Folsom said, in part:
We, of course, agree that no chemical should be permitted to be used in food if, as so used, it
may cause cancer. We assume that this, and no more, is the aim of the sponsor. No specific
reference to carcinogens is necessary for that purpose, however, since the general requirements
of this bill give assurance that no chemical additive can be cleared if there is a reasonable
doubt about its safety in that respect.
On the other hand, the above-quoted provisions are so broadly phrased that they could be
read to bar an additive from the food supply even if it can induce cancer only when used on
test animals in a way having no bearing on the question of carcinogenicity for its intended use.
This, we think, would not be in the public interest. Scientists, I am advised, can produce
cancer in test animals by injecting sugar in a certain manner, and they can produce cancers by
injections into test animals of cottonseed oil, olive oil, or tannic acid (a component of many
foods). We think that it would unnecessary and undesirable to rule out of the food supply
sugar, vegetable oils, or common table beverages simply because, by an extraordinary method
of application never encountered at the dining table, it is possible to induce cancer by injecting
the substances into the muscles of test animals.
Food Additives Hearings, supra note 271, at 38-39.
276. Delaney's original bill, H.R. 7798, required that "[t]he Secretary shall not approve for use
in food any chemical additive found to induce cancer in man, or, after tests, found to induce cancer in
animals." H.R. 7798, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Food Additives Hearings, supra note 271,
at 12.
277. See infra text accompanying note 301.
278. Brief for Respondent at 14, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No.
86-1548).
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sort of scientific advances that underpin its de minimis policy. But Con-
gress enacted a different bill.
During the first week of House hearings, several scientists testified in
support of H.R. 7798 and Delaney's anticancer clause. Because these wit-
nesses were among those who inspired Delaney to press for an anticancer
clause,279 their testimony may provide insight into his understanding of
the provision. The first witness, Dr. William E. Smith of the Sloan-
Kettering Institute, addressed the administering agency's role in evaluat-
ing the appropriateness of animal tests for carcinogenicity:
Since the Secretary must evaluate the evidence in order to make a
finding as to the cancer-inciting properties, the carcinogenicity of any
chemical, I submit that the wording of the sentence, excluding car-
cinogens, in H.R. 7798, enables the Secretary to exercise judgment
in evaluating claims for carcinogenicity of chemicals.2"'
Smith went on to endorse the principle of refusing approval of additives
shown to cause cancer in animals.28 '
The second witness was Dr. Francis E. Ray of the University of Flor-
ida. Dr. Ray doubted that all carcinogens should be assumed to have no
threshold, but he opposed giving FDA authority to determine which ones
might be "safe."
There may be a safe dose of some cancer-producing chemicals, but
we do know there is no safe dose of certain other cancer-producing
chemicals. . . . [W]e should be on the safe side. Because we know
there is no safe minimum dose for certain cancer-producing chemi-
cals, I think we ought to adopt that rule, at least tentatively, that
there is no safe minimum dose, though I readily admit that there
may be a safe minimum dose for some cancer-producing
chemicals.2"2
Ray was prepared to concede that some carcinogens might display "safe
minimum doses," but he favored a "tentative rule" that there is no safe
279. See 104 CONG. REC. 17,420 (1958).
280. Food Additives Hearings, supra note 271, at 170 (emphasis supplied).
281. le stated:
IS]afe doses cannot he established with confidence for carcinogens because of their unusual
pharmacological action . ..
All of the present bills to amend the food law will permit use in food of safe quantities of
chemicals found harmful in higher concentration.
H.R. 7798, however, precludes extension of this safe quantity principle to carcinogens. It is
the only bill that does so.
Id. at 171 (emphasis supplied).
282. Id. at 202 (emphasis supplied).
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minimum dose. Congress adopted precisely such a rule in the Delaney
Clause, but the rule's import remains elusive. Did it establish a binding
presumption subject to revision, if science ever provided the basis for de-
termining "safe minimum doses" for carcinogens, only by Congress itself?
Or was the language chosen intended merely to endorse, but not codify,
FDA's own "tentative principle" that no carcinogen should be approved
for addition to human food?
Later, the subcommittee heard testimony from a group of research
scientists assembled by NAS. Dr. Maurice H. Seevers of the University of
Michigan claimed that "safe doses" for carcinogenic additives could be
established:
One of the cardinal principles of toxicology is that every substance
has a "no effect" dose and every substance also has a toxic
dose . ..
[T]here is a tolerance level for every compound including the so-
called carcinogenic agents.
The hazard . . . of a chemical compound for man can never be
defined in absolute terms and it is never possible to state that any
chemical substance is absolutely safe. The best we can ever expect to
do is to arrive at a situation in which we can make an intelligent
guess on the basis of a large amount of experimental data.
One of the other fundamental principles is that the person who is
making the toxicological examination or the person who is responsi-
ble for evaluating these data-and in this instance, this would apply
not only to the original investigator but also to the people in the
Food and Drug Administration who ultimately are charged with the
responsibility for making these decisions-should not be tied by any
standardized procedure. Their hands should not be tied as to the
type of tests that they shall ask for in determining toxicity or predict-
ing safety.183
Seever clearly endorsed the need for flexibility in the interpretation of
animal test results. Indeed, Seever might have gone further than FDA
was prepared to go, for he argued that the Agency should have authority
to use scientific judgment in evaluating the results of tests for carcinoge-
nicity and, apparently, in establishing levels at which even carcinogenic
additives might be safely used. HEW's own bill was not inconsistent with
this approach, but both Secretary Folsom and FDA officials stated that
they did not believe that current conventional safety assessment methodol-
ogy could be applied to carcinogens. We thus have little guidance as to the
283. Id. at 338 (emphasis supplied); see also id. at 344-46 (testimony of Dr. Spencer).
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Agency's view about the discretion it would have had before the Delaney
Clause was added.
On the final day of hearings, representatives from FDA and HEW tes-
tified in support of the Department's bill, which contained no anticancer
clause.28 FDA Commissioner George P. Larrick repeated familiar
themes:
We endorse the [American Cancer] society's goal of seeing that
cancer-producing foods are not on the American market. This was
one of the Department's cardinal aims in drafting H.R. 6747. This
bill bars the use of an additive unless it is established that it is with-
out hazard to health. Thus, the bill would prohibit the addition of
any chemical additive to the food supply until adequate evidence,
acceptable to competent scientists, shows that it will not produce
cancer in man under the conditions of use proposed.
But we see no more reason to single out cancer production for
specific mention in the legislation than to single out . . .a host of
other disorders.285
Larrick's testimony makes the case for the authority FDA wished to
exercise, and believed the administration bill allowed, and he set forth the
Agency's objections to Delaney's proposed ban on carcinogens. Larrick
was less emphatic than Secretary Folsom in assuring that FDA would not
approve carcinogenic additives under the general safety clause, "until ade-
quate evidence ...shows it will not produce cancer in man. .. 286
Larrick thus seems to have assumed that the Department's bill would al-
low FDA to rely on such yet-to-be-developed evidence-in essence, the
argument that FDA is now making. But Larrick was supporting a bill
284. H.R. 6747, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Food Additives Hearings, supra note 271,
at 4.
285. Food Additives Hearings, supra note 271, at 453-54 (emphasis supplied). The American
Cancer Society's agenda for reaching this goal was defined in a letter from James Adams, Chairman,
Legislative Comm. of the Am. Cancer Soc'y, to Hon. John Williams, Chairman, Health and Science
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. This letter, dated July 22,
1957, reads in pertinent part:
We strongly urge that your committee recommend legislation [which] embrace[s] the following
principles:
1. That the proponent of any proposed chemical additive be required to conduct tests
which will demonstrate that the additive is safe for human consumption in the manner in
which it will be used, and that these tests include one to determine whether the additive may
be carcinogenic to experimental animals. The adequacy of these tests should be determined by
the Food and Drug Administration.
2. That permission to use the additive be withheld until its safety has been demonstrated
to the satisfaction of the Food and Drug Administration by the proponent.
3. That no substance shall be approved found to induce cancer in man, or after tests pro-
vided in No. I above, found to induce cancer in animals.
Id. at 383.
286. Id. at 454 (emphasis supplied).
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that was not enacted and opposing language that, with revisions, Congress
did adopt.
One of the last witnesses at the House hearings was Congressman De-
laney himself. He criticized a recent FDA ruling that approved a one
ppm tolerance for residues of a carcinogenic pesticide,28 7 declaring that
"[tihe precedent established by the Aramite decision has opened the door,
even if only a little, to the use of carcinogens in our foods. That door
should be slammed shut and locked. That is the purpose of my anticarci-
nogen provision." '288
In assessing the impact of the Delaney Clause, this statement is ambig-
uous. The Clause enacted was rewritten by HEW ostensibly only to as-
sure that FDA would not be forced automatically to ban additives that
caused cancer only by an inappropriate route of exposure. But we cannot
be sure that the revised clause was intended to translate Delaney's criti-
cism of the Aramite decision into law.289 In any event, Congressman De-
laney was unable to persuade the House Commerce Committee to incor-
porate his language into the bill it reported later that year.
2. House Report
Following the House hearings, Subcommittee Chairman John B. Wil-
liams introduced a clean bill, H.R. 13254, which bore many similarities to
287. FDA initially established a zero tolerance for Aramite residues on certain agricultural com-
modities, but granted a one ppm tolerance on September 30, 1955 after an advisory committee of
experts appointed under section 408(g) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 3 4 6(g) (1982), concluded that
this residue level "would offer no hazard to the public." Tolerances and Exemptions from Tolerances
for Pesticide Chemicals in or on Raw Agricultural Commodities, 20 Fed. Reg. 7301 (1955). FDA
cited section 408(d)(2) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 346a(d)(2) (1982), as authority for this decision.
As a result of additional feeding studies recommended by the same advisory committee, FDA on
December 24, 1958 revoked the one ppm residue tolerance, returning to a zero level tolerance. Toler-
ances and Exemptions from Tolerances for Pesticide Chemicals in or on Raw Agricultural Commodi-
ties, 23 Fed. Reg. 10,180 (1958).
288. Food Additives Hearings, supra note 271, at 498. Later on the House floor, Delaney re-
turned to the Aramite decision in explaining the purpose of his provision: "Mr. Speaker, the signifi-
cance of FDA's former ruling on Aramite was that for the first time a precedent was set that might
give legal sanction to the introduction of so-called "safe" quantities of cancer-inciting additives into
food." He reiterated that it was the "firm purpose" of his clause to "slam shut and lock" the door that
this ruling had opened. 104 CONG. REC. 7783 (1958).
289. That decision was to approve a finite tolerance for a carcinogenic pesticide. Defenders of
FDA distinguish its de minimis policy from the formal approval of tolerances for carcinogens, that is,
the affirmative sanctioning of their presence in food. Brief for Respondent at 24 n. 11, Public Citizen
v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1548). In this context, the distinction is elusive.
As applied, FDA's de minimis policy sanctions the continued marketing of additives for specific pur-
poses, and sometimes subject to quantitative limitations, that determine the amount consumers are
likely to ingest. The Agency purports to evaluate the additive's potency and to estimate human expo-
sure. The legal standard it applies in evaluating the residual risk is whether the material, under the
conditions of likely human exposure, will be "safe." And, in at least one context where the de minimis
policy may some day be applied-the approval of pesticide residues in processed food-the conclusion
that the risk to humans is de minimis would result in the approval of a formal tolerance.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Delaney's bill but omitted the anticancer language.29 This bill was favor-
ably reported by the Commerce Committee on July 28, 1958, with this
cryptic statement: "Since the scientific investigation and the other relevant
data to be taken into consideration by the Secretary include information
with respect to possible cancer causing characteristics of a proposed addi-
tive, the public will be protected from possible harm on this count." '291
It is difficult to credit the claim that the authors of the reported bill
believed that it would have the same effect with or without the Delaney
Clause. They had heard Delaney's arguments in favor of a specific prohi-
bition against carcinogens as well as HEW's arguments against. The as-
surance that "the public will be protected" appears to endorse Commis-
sioner Larrick's assertion that FDA would not approve a carcinogenic
additive unless, after evaluating all of the evidence, it were confident the
additive would be safe.292
The report explained the so-called general safety standard that FDA
was to apply in assessing food additives:
Safety requires proof of a reasonable certainty that no harm will
result from the proposed use of an additive. It does not-and can-
not-require proof beyond any possible doubt that no harm will re-
sult under any conceivable circumstance ...
In determining the "safety" of an additive, scientists must take
into consideration the cumulative effect of such additive in the diet of
man or animals over their respective life spans together with any
chemically or pharmacologically related substances in such diet.
Thus, the safety of a given additive involves informed judgments
based on educated estimates by scientists and experts of the antici-
pated ingestion of an additive by man and animals under likely
patterns of use.293
HEW endorsed the reported version of H.R. 13254.294 After the Com-
mittee filed its report but before the bill came up for debate, however,
Delaney's colleagues were persuaded to include his anticancer lan-
guage. 2 " The reasons for this revision can only be inferred from state-
ments later made on the House floor.
It has been claimed that makers and users of food additives would have
290. H.R. 13254, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REC. 12,872 (1958).
291. H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958).
292. See id. at 4-5.
293. Id. (emphasis supplied).
294. Id. at 7.
295. 104 CONG. REC. 17,420 (1958). The language accepted by the Committee was narrower
than the version Delaney used in his own bill. The accepted version confined the prohibition to sub-
stances found to cause cancer when "ingested" or when administered by other "appropriate" tests. Id.
at 17,412.
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prevented passage of the 1958 law had they believed that the addition of
the Delaney Clause would alter the decisions FDA would reach under the
general safety clause.296 There is no direct evidence for this claim in the
legislative history.297 Of course, formal documents often fail to reveal the
political forces that determine the content of specific statutory provisions.
But the incorporation of his clause in the statute itself suggests that Dela-
ney (and his allies) wielded considerable influence, at least on this narrow
point. Of course, food industry representatives may have been content to
rely on ex cathedra claims that the statute's operation had not been
changed rather than press their point and risk the statute's defeat. But
even this hypothesis suggests that Delaney's influence was not negligible
and that, at least for many members, the inclusion of his clause was not
cosmetic.
3. House Floor Debate
On August 13, 1958, when Commerce Committee Chairman Oren
Harris brought H.R. 13254 up for a vote,298 he explained that "[w]hile
the committee felt that the bill as reported by the committee includes the
matter covered by the Delaney amendment in the general language con-
tained in the bill, there was no objection to the addition of the amendment
suggested by Mr. Delaney."2 '
Harris stated that the bill, even with the anticancer clause, had HEW's
endorsement.300 He inserted into the record a letter from HEW Assistant
Secretary Elliot L. Richardson, which read in part as follows:
296. Brief for Intervenor-Respondent at 14, 30, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1548).
297. According to the brief submitted on behalf of the users of Orange No. 17 and Red No. 19,
"[ijndustry groups agreed to drop their opposition to the Delaney Clause on the express assurances of
FDA Commissioner Larrick that 'the rule of reason would be applied to all materials, cancer produc-
ing or otherwise.' " Id. (citing Brady, Responsibility, Freedom, and the Law, 17 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 323, 326 (1962), which recounts a meeting between Larrick and industry representatives and
states that "the Commissioner was also on record with the Senate to this effect"). Wholly apart from
questions about the reliability of this source, the passage casts no light on what application of "the
rule of reason" meant. In light of the persistent concern within HEW to retain authority to exercise
scientific judgment in determining whether a substance had induced cancer, it seems likely that this
was the focus of the reported exchanges between Larrick and the industry representatives-and not
whether FDA retained authority to decide that the risk posed by an animal carcinogen was so slight
as to be negligible. See Brief for Intervenor-Respondent at 30, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d
1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1548).
298. 104 CONt;. REC. 17,412 (1958).
299. Id. at 17,414. This reveals little about Harris's understanding of the effect of the Delaney
amendment. The committee's failure to object may have been based on FDA's assurances that no
animal carcinogen could be approved under the general safety standard, or on the belief that the
amendment would not curtail the Agency's ability to find that individual carcinogens posed essentially
no risk.
300. Id.
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This Department is in complete accord with the intent of these
suggestions-that no substance should be sanctioned for uses in food
that might produce cancer in man. H.R. 13254, as approved by your
committee, will accomplish this intent. . . .Any indication that the
additive may thus be carcinogenic would, under the terms of the
bill, restrain the Secretary from approving the proposed use of the
additive unless and until further testing shows to the point of rea-
sonable certainty that the additive would not produce cancer and
thus would be safe under the proposed conditions use ...
At the same time, if it would serve to allay any lingering appre-
hension on the part of those who desire an explicit statutory mandate
on this point, the Department would interpose no objection to appro-
priate mention of cancer in food additives legislation. If the specific
disease were referred to in the law, it would however, be important
for everyone to have a clear understanding that this would in no way
restrict the Department's freedom in guarding against other harmful
effects from food additives.
It would be important, also, to use language that would provide
the intended safeguards without creating unintended and unneces-
sary complications. For example, the language suggested by some to
bar carcinogenic additives would, if read literally, forbid the ap-
proval for use in food of any substance that causes any type of cancer
in any test animal by any route of administration. This could lead to
undesirable results which obviously were not intended by those who
suggested the language ...
The enactment of a law which would seem to bar such common
materials from the diet on the basis of the evidence described above,
would place the agency that administered it in an untenable position.
The agency would either have to try to enforce the law literally so as
to keep these items out of the diet-evidently an impossible task-or
it would have to read between the lines of the law an intent which
would make the law workable, without a clear guide from Congress
as to what was meant.
This difficulty could readily be avoided, if there is still a desire to
make specific mention of cancer in the bill, by providing that "no
additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer
when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which
are appropriate to the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to
induce cancer in animals." ' 1
Richardson's letter makes several familiar points. His description of the
operation of the unamended bill implies that FDA would have
authority-after "further testing"-to approve an animal carcinogen.
This implication, however, is not pursued. One hypothesis is that Rich-
301. Id. at 17,415 (emphasis supplied).
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ardson (that is, FDA) believed that the redrafted Delaney Clause would
not foreclose such decisions. Another is that the Department was not so
interested in retaining flexibility that it was willing to resist Delaney's
efforts to incorporate anticancer language. A third hypothesis is that,
while appreciating the potential incompatibility between Richardson's in-
terpretation of the general safety standard and the language of the Dela-
ney Clause, HEW was content to leave the issue unresolved.
Richardson's letter confirms that FDA officials were concerned that
Delaney's language would force them to ban any additive shown to cause
cancer in any animal experiment, regardless of its appropriateness for as-
sessing the safety of ingested substances. They offered, and the House
committee (as well, apparently, as Delaney) accepted, the redrafted ver-
sion of the anticancer language that Congress ultimately enacted.30 2
Following Chairman Harris's explanation of the committee's inclusion
of an anticancer clause, Congressman Williams, the original sponsor of
H.R. 13254, rose to explain the bill's general safety standard:
[Tihe bill uses a concept of safety which involves the question of
whether the use of a substance in food would be hazardous to the
health of man or animal. To establish the safety of an additive the
bill requires proof of the practical certainty that no harm will result
from the proposed use of the substance. The bill does not-and
cannot-require proof beyond any possible doubt that no harm could
result under any conceivable circumstance.
Since the scientific investigation and the other relevant data to be
taken into consideration by the Secretary include information with
respect to possible cancer-causing characteristics of a proposed addi-
tive, the public will be protected from possible harm on this count. A
committee amendment to the bill expressly indicates that any sub-
stance found to cause cancer cannot be approved. 3
As the statement of one of the bill's chief proponents, this passage
claims our attention. °4 Williams first explains that the best scientists can
do is arrive at "practical certainty" that an additive will not cause harm;
they cannot prove that a substance will be harmless. This observation is
302. Id. at 17,415. Richardson's treatment of this point contains an intriguing allusion. He sug-
gests that, without modification, Delaney's language would force FDA to ban all sorts of conventional
food constituents or "read between the lines of the law an intent which would make the law workable,
without a clear guide from Congress." But "this difficulty" could be averted, Richardson argued, by
revising the language as FDA had suggested. In light of Congress's adoption of the very language that
Richardson proposed, is it legitimate for FDA "to read between the lines of the law an intent which
would make the law workable"?
303. Id. at 17,418.
304. See G. Foi.SoM, LEGISIATIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS
34-35 (1972).
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not incompatible, either textually or theoretically, with Williams's later
statement that the Delaney amendment "indicates that any substance
found to cause cancer cannot be approved." The first passage deals with
the intended operation of the general safety clause, that is, it describes
FDA's inquiry in the general case. The concluding passage describes the
law's expected operation in a specific, presumably narrower, set of cases,
in which an additive has been shown to "induce cancer" in animals. On
this analysis it would appear that Williams believed the Delaney Clause
might sometimes override a conclusion FDA might reach under the gen-
eral safety standard alone.
This possibility apparently occurred to other members of the House, for
some of them objected to Delaney's amendment. Congressman Miller ar-
gued that the bill "is impossible to enforce, that is, to determine what
foods, if any, would produce any carcinogenic tendencies in human be-
ings." Congressman Harris reassured his colleagues: "I am sure if there is
any difficulty with this amendment, . . . we will be requested by the Food
and Drug Administration to make further clarification.' '30 5
This response suggests that a chief proponent of the Food Additives
Amendment, with the Delaney Clause in its current form, believed that
amendatory legislation would be required to free FDA from any practical
difficulties in administration. Perhaps Chairman Harris believed that
FDA could seek "clarification" through more informal means, such as
correspondence with the appropriate committee chairmen. It seems un-
likely, however, that so experienced a legislator would have thought that
informal exchanges with members of Congress could readily cure dysfunc-
tional rigidities embedded in the language of the statute.306
Despite continuing controversy over its content, H.R. 13254-with
HEW's version of the Clause intact-passed the House by a large mar-
gin. °' The bill then went to the Senate, where it appears to have received
only cursory study." 8
305. 104 CONG. REC. 17,421 (1958) (emphasis supplied). Miller is the same congressman who
sponsored the 1954 Pesticide Residue Amendments, which contained no anticancer language.
306. Representative Joseph P. O'Hara, another member of the Commerce Committee, also criti-
cized the Delaney amendment:
I think it is the type of amendment that it is unfortunate to have go into a bill of this type,
because it emphasizes, for purposes which I do not quite understand, certain disease. I think
there are a lot of other diseases about which some language could have been used relating to
various types of diseases, but I do not think it would have been necessarily helpful.
Id. at 17,422. This familiar objection sheds no light on the members' general understanding of the
Delaney Clause, and very little on O'Hara's own views on the critical issue of interpretation.
307. Two-thirds of the House members present voted for the bill. Id. at 17,424.
308. Id. at 17,565.
Vol. 5: 1, 1988
Delaney Clause
4. Senate Report
The report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on H.R.
13254309 contains this discussion of the Delaney Clause:
[I]t is the intent and purpose of this bill, even without that amend-
ment, to assure our people that nothing shall be added to the foods
they eat which can reasonably be expected to produce any type of
illness in humans or animals. . . .[T]he bill is aimed at preventing
the addition to the food our people eat of any substances the inges-
tion of which reasonable people would expect to produce not just
cancer but any disease or disability."'
The report reaffirms the government's position that the general safety
clause would bar approval of any additive that FDA concluded might
cause illness in humans or in animals. The report also stressed that the
mention of cancer is not to be interpreted as diminishing concern for other
diseases. Then these two sentences: "[W]e believe the bill reads and means
the same with or without the inclusion of the [Delaney] clause. . . .This
is also the view of the Food and Drug Administration." '11
Proponents of FDA's de minimis policy cite this passage as confirming
that the Delaney Clause did not make the general safety clause more
stringent. 12 They argue that since the general safety clause was under-
stood as allowing FDA to take into account new knowledge, and specifi-
cally knowledge about the low-dose effects of carcinogens, addition of the
Delaney Clause did not curtail this authority."
While this conclusion cannot be rejected out of hand, it strains credu-
lity. The statement in the Senate report has a self-serving flavor. If FDA
officials wished to retain flexibility to take new knowledge about carcino-
gens into account, it made sense to claim that the bill, even as amended,
would allow them to do so. 3" This interpretation implies that Agency
spokesmen feared they had surrendered flexibility by agreeing to the
309. S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5300.
310. Id. at 11, 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5309-10.
311. Id. at 11, 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5310.
312. Brief for Intervenor-Respondent at 30, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (No. 86-1548).
313. The D.C. Circuit's ruling in Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
flatly rejects this argument, interpreting the 1960 Delaney Clause as curtailing discretion FDA might
otherwise have had. To be sure, the court dealt exclusively with the 1960 clause and explicitly refused
to rule on the meaning of its precursor. The dismissal of the challenge to FDA's failure to ban
methylene chloride, see supra notes 29 & 227, will delay a definitive ruling on the import of the 1958
clause's language.
314. Had the foregoing passage appeared in the House Report or during debate on the House
floor following adoption of Delaney's amendment, it would carry more force-for it was in the House
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Delaney Clause, i.e., that the bill with the Clause did mean something
different, but attempted to keep the best face on the deal they had struck.
A second possibility is that FDA officials realized that they had relin-
quished authority to find any animal carcinogen safe by conceding that
there did not yet exist any scientific basis for doing so. Under this inter-
pretation, the general safety clause itself precluded approval of carcino-
genic additives. As thus interpreted, none would disagree that the Delaney
Clause added nothing substantive to the law.
A third possibility is that neither the authors of the Senate report nor
Agency spokesmen focused clearly on the potential conflict between the
general safety standard and the Delaney Clause. The first directs FDA to
implement a two-part goal: Do not approve food additives of whose safety
you are uncertain, but do approve those you are confident will be safe.
Beyond recognizing that perfect assurance of safety is not possible and
listing factors to be considered, the statute's authors do not specify how
this is to be done.81 The addition of the Delaney Clause appears simply
to reaffirm the central message.
The difficulty with this reconstruction is that the Clause is not written
as a reaffirmation of this goal; it instructs FDA how, not merely what, to
decide. It specifies the policy consequences of a certain scientific finding,
the finding that a substance induces cancer in animal feeding or other
appropriate studies. For such substances FDA is not told merely to exer-
cise care before finding that they are safe; it is forbidden to make that
finding at all. These assertedly redundant instructions collide when FDA
later becomes convinced that it can fulfill Congress's operational goal by
approving certain animal carcinogens whose use levels or potency allow
the conclusion that no consumers will be harmed.
that the differences between FDA and Delaney were fought out.
315. The statute reads in part:
In determining, for the purposes of this section [409], whether a proposed use of a food addi-
tive is safe, the Secretary shall consider among other relevant factors-
(A) the probable consumption of the additive and of any substance formed in or on food be-
cause of the use of the additive;
(B) the cumulative effect of such additive in the diet of man or animals, taking into account
any chemically or pharmacologically related substance or substances in such diet; and
(C) safety factors which in the opinion of experts qualified by scientific training and experi-
ence to evaluate the safety of food additives are generally recognized as appropriate for the use
of animal experimentation data.
21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(5) (1982).
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5. Senate Passage
H.R. 13254, in the form passed by the House, was approved by the
Senate without further amendment on August 23, 1958. The perfunctory
floor debate did not advert to the Delaney Clause. 16
C. Enactment of the Color Additive Amendments
The 1960 Color Additive Amendments originated with a bill drafted by
HEW, 17 which from the beginning contained explicit anticancer lan-
guage. 18 The Amendments embraced the "safety in use" principle, au-
thorizing FDA to approve even toxic colors for use at levels the Agency
was confident would be safe. The incorporation of an anticancer clause
was thus an obvious and self-conscious exception to the general approach
of safety assessment embodied in the law. 19
316. 104 CONG. REC. 19,358 (1958).
317. 106 CONG. REC. 14,349 (1960).
318. See Color Additives: Hearings Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
H.R. 7624 and S. 2197, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1960) [hereinafter Color Additives Hearings].
The legislative history actually reflects some ambiguity on this point. It appears that HEW first
sent its draft bill to the Senate. The Senate Report does not reproduce the draft submitted by the
Department, and Secretary Flemming's letter of transmittal does not refer to the Delaney Clause. S.
2197, the introduced bill, made no reference to cancer. By contrast, the draft transmitted later in the
summer of 1959 to House Speaker Sam Rayburn contained an anticancer clause, as did H.R. 7624,
the bill introduced by Representative Oren Harris, Chairman of the House Commerce Committee.
Yet Secretary Flemming's letter to Speaker Rayburn is virtually identical to the one he submitted
earlier to the Senate; it too is silent on Delaney.
In his first appearance before the House committee Secretary Flemming described S. 2197 as "iden-
tical with H.R. 7624 and our proposal .. .except that the Senate bill omitted the anticancer provi-
sion. [11f the anticancer clause of the House bill were inserted in S. 2197, we would support it in that
form." Id. at 39. Later, in response to questioning by Representative Dingell, Secretary Flemming
represented that the drafts HEW submitted to the two houses were identical but conceded that "some-
where prior to its introduction [the Senate bill] lost the so-called cancer clause, or the Delaney
Amendment." Id. at 83.
It is probably not important whether HEW first embraced the desirability of incorporating the
Delaney Clause in the 1960 legislation before or only after the Senate passed S. 2197. By the time the
House came to consider the bills, it is clear that Secretary Flemming was the provision's most vigorous
proponent. The House hearings suggest that Flemming's view may have been firmed, if not inspired,
by FDA's recent frustrations in dealing with residues of DES in poultry and contamination of major
portions of the nation's cranberry crop with residues of another carcinogen, the pesticide aminotriazol.
See id. at 61-82.
319. This central purpose of the 1960 legislation accounts for statements in the legislative history
like the following passage from the House Report:
There is no justification from the point of view of the public interest, in driving either color
manufacturers or food, drug, or cosmetic producers, dependent upon the use of color, out of
business where the particular use of the color involved is one which can safely be admitted
under proper conditions of use (including tolerance limitations and certification requirements)
established by the [Secretary].
H.R. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2887, 2891.
Yale Journal on Regulation
1. Senate Passage
The HEW draft was sent sequentially to the Senate and the House.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare deleted certain
passages, including (without explanation) the proposed anticancer lan-
guage, and designated the bill S. 2197.320 Dispensing with hearings, 21 the
committee reported the bill favorably on August 21, 1959.32 Three days
later, the full Senate passed S. 2197 without amendment or debate. 3 3
2. Referral to House
In a letter transmitting the Department's draft to the House, HEW
Secretary Arthur Flemming provided only the briefest explanation of the
anticancer language:
In determining whether the use of a color additive is safe, the Secre-
tary is required to consider a broad range of factors. In particular,
however, a color additive may not be listed if it has relevant carcino-
genic potential. (This paragraph is modeled on [the original Delaney
Clause], relating to food additives.)32.
The bill introduced some ten days later by Congressman Harris did con-
tain HEW's proposed anticancer clause. 25
3. House Hearings
Secretary Flemming was the first witness in the House hearings. Flem-
ming made clear his support for the Delaney Clause by stating that if it
were inserted in S. 2197, HEW would support the Senate-passed bill. He
summarized the Department's proposal:
The Government would be authorized to take into consideration, in
determining whether a proposed use is safe, the amount of color
which would be used and the manner of use; and it would be em-
powered to set safe limits on the amount and conditions of use as
necessary to protect the public health ...
We have recommended . . . that the law contain a provision that
would prohibit the use of a color in any quantity if it is found by
appropriate tests to cause cancer in either man or animal.32 6
320. S. REP. No. 795, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 11 (1959).
321. Id. at 2.
322. Id.
323. 105 CONG. REC. 16,776 (1959).
324. Color Additives Hearings, supra note 318, at 29.
325. Id. at 5.
326. Id. at 40. Flemming noted that "we have no authority to set tolerances under the present law
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Flemming went on to explain why HEW supported a flat ban on carcino-
genic color additives.827 He rejected the claim that the proposed anticancer
clause would bar the exercise of scientific judgment, 28 but he made clear
that the role of scientific judgment would be confined. 29
In a subsequent colloquy with Chairman Harris, Flemming reiterated
HEW's distinction between the exercise of scientific judgment in identify-
ing carcinogenic activity and the discretion to set tolerances for additives
found to be carcinogenic:
When the time comes that our research reaches the place where that
threshold can be identified, where a tolerance can be established that
we know will not induce cancer in man, then we will come back and
even though we find that the use of a color in specified amounts would not be harmful. If it is harmful
to use the color in large amounts, it cannot be used at all." Id. This interpretation of the existing law
was the product of Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153 (1958), which held that FDA
was powerless to approve any color that had been shown to be toxic in animals. The ruling disabled
FDA from continuing the approval of virtually all color additives. The objective of toxicological stud-
ies, to facilitate judgments about safety in use, is to reveal the ways in which and levels at which
substances produce toxic effects. Even in 1960, any reasonably sophisticated battery of toxicity tests of
a substance would reveal it to be harmful to animals at some level. A chief purpose of the Color
Additive Amendments was to restore a safety in use standard for the approval of color additives. S.
REP. No. 795, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1959). The reader will note, however, that Flemming went
on to distinguish the treatment that was to be accorded under the new law to colors that had been
shown to cause cancer. His statement suggests that, for this subset of color additives, toxicity at any
level would continue to preclude approval.
327.
Our advocacy of the anticancer proviso in the proposed color additives amendment is based
on the simple fact that no one knows how to set a safe tolerance for substances in human foods
when those substances are known to cause cancer when added to the diet of animals. ...
Unless and until there is a sound scientific basis for the establishment of tolerances for
carcinogens, I believe the Government has a duty to make clear-in law as well as in adminis-
trative policy-that it will do everything possible to put persons in a position where they will
not unnecessarily be adding residues of carcinogens to their diet.
Color Additives Hearings, supra note 318, at 61 (emphasis supplied).
328.
It has been suggested that once a chemical is shown to induce a tumor in a single rat, this
forecloses further research and forever forbids the use of the chemical in food. This is not true.
The conclusion that an additive "is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal"
is a scientific one. The conclusion is reached by competent scientists using widely accepted
scientific testing methods and critical judgment. An isolated and inexplicable tumor would not
be a basis for concluding that the test substance produces cancer.
Id. at 62.
329.
This, I believe, is as far as our discretion should go in the light of present scientific knowl-
edge. We have no basis for asking Congress to give us discretion to establish a safe tolerance
for a substance which definitely has been shown to produce cancer when added to the diet of
test animals. We simply have no basis on which such discretion could be exercised because no
one can tell us with any assurance at all how to establish a safe dose of any cancer-producing
substance.
Unless and until cancer research makes a breakthrough at this point, the principle in the
anticancer clause is sound.
Id.
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ask the Congress to give us authority to identify the threshold or to
establish the tolerance.330
In response to a question Flemming agreed that, under the HEW bill, if a
color additive "produces one trace of cancer in animals," it would be
banned."3'
This is one of the most important passages in the legislative history of
the anticancer clauses. Here the head of the department proposing new
legislation does not merely explain the Agency's understanding of the pro-
posed law; he promises that, if scientific advances should undermine that
understanding, the department will seek-presumably by statutory
amendment-authority to incorporate these advances in its decisionmak-
ing. Flemming's testimony amounts to a concession that the language
Congress was to enact would not allow FDA to take into account ad-
vances in understanding that in principle might allow identification of safe
levels of exposure for carcinogenic additives.
During testimony of a representative of the Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association (PMA), Representative Dingell defended the House
bill's incorporation of anticancer language like that in the food additive
law.33 In contrast, Chairman Harris advocated giving FDA more discre-
330. Id. at 95 (emphasis supplied). Secretary Flemming was later quoted in the House Report
acknowledging that Congress had not yet authorized FDA to determine safe levels of use for animal
carcinogens:
Whenever a sound scientific basis is developed for the establishment of tolerances for carcino-
gens, we will request the Congress to give us that authority. We believe, however, that the
issue is so important that the elected representatives of the people should have the opportunity
of examining the evidence and determining whether or not the authority should be granted.
H.R. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2887, 2894.
331. Color Additives Hearings, supra note 318, at 103.
332. Representative DingellI argued with Representative Williams:
Mr. WILLIAMS. All I meant to say, Mr. Dingell, was that with respect to carcinogens in
colors, that [in the H.R. 76241 we are restoring the per se doctrine ...
Mr. DINGELL. Actually, in point of fact, the Delaney amendment already applies, at least as
applied by the Food and Drug Administration, already applies the per se doctrine and has
since the last food additive bill, has applied the per se doctrine to carcinogens, permitting the
establishment of tolerances in other instances. ...
Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, I do not interpret the Delaney clause as the Department does. I think
the legislative history shows it was not intended to be interpreted that way.
Mr. DINGELL. I was one of the members of the committee, and I interpret it just exactly as
the Department interprets it.
Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, I certainly do not know how you interpret it, but I know that the
Senate committee indicated rather clearly that they did not think it changed the amendment as
it had been reported by this committee.
Mr. DINGELL. In fact, it was my recollection, as you pointed out in your testimony, that
zero tolerance would be applied to substances which were carcinogens whether, as or if the
Delaney amendment were included or not.
Id. at 319-20. In a supplemental statement to the House committee, PMA's representative again
objected to FDA's rigid interpretation of the 1958 Delaney Clause: "A literal interpretation of this
section must lead to the prohibition of ...a [carcinogenic] substance even though present in trace
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tion in applying the Delaney Clause, but he acknowledged the difficulty of
deleting the Clause altogether:
People are so conscious of this deadly disease when it gets hold of
them, that it seems to me arbitrarily to throw out the Delaney
amendment would create so much fear in the mind of the American
people in their reaction against industry that it might be pretty bad.
I have a feeling that it ought not to be so construed, and if it
is so construed, that it should be modified, to permit the regular del-
egated administrative officers to deal with it practically, and in the
best interests of the health of the American people.
[B]ut I still say that since it has already been included, to then try
to eliminate it completely, I think, would bring on a lot more diffi-
culty than it would be to try to adjust it in a way that makes it
workable. ... "'
On April 5 and 6, 1960, the House Commerce Committee heard from a
panel of cancer experts assembled by the National Academy of Sciences.
An exchange with Dr. Walter E. O'Donnell of the Sloan-Kettering Can-
cer Institute illuminated the sort of discretion that Representative Dingell,
at least, believed FDA retained under the 1958 Delaney Clause:
Dr. O'DONNELL. [I]t would seem to me [the Secretary] is empow-
ered to decide when tests are appropriate for the testing of a sub-
stance and when they are not appropriate, and if he is confronted
with evidence which would appear to the average person, let's say, to
demonstrate that a substance is carcinogenic, it is his prerogative to
declare this an inappropriate test.
Mr. DINGELL. . . In effect, what the Secretary does is exercise
an intelligent judgment as to whether or not the tests are appropriate
to determine whether this substance actually happens to fall within
the bane [sic] of the so-called Delaney clause and actually determine
whether or not they induce cancer, whether these substances induce
cancer in humans or in test animals; isn't that correct?
Dr. O'DONNELL. Yes, this is his role." 4
Secretary Flemming testified again on the final day of hearings and
reiterated HEW's support for the Delaney Clause:
The Department's position is that the proposed color additives legis-
lation should include an anticancer clause that makes illegal the use
amounts. This is, of course, the interpretation made by the Secretary." Id. at 589 & n.1.
333. Id. at 327, 329.
334. Id. at 422.
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of any color that will induce cancer when tested by appropriate
methods.
We believe this position to be the only sound public policy in view
of the fact that our experts tell us present scientific techniques do not
permit them to state unequivocally how much or how little of a sub-
stance that induces cancer when administered to animals will induce
cancer when administer [sic] to man ...
[T]he opposition to inclusion of an anticancer clause arises largely
out of a misunderstanding of how this provision works. It allows the
Department and its scientific people full discretion and judgment in
deciding whether a substance has been shown to produce cancer
when added to the diet of test animals. But once this decision is
made, the limits of judgment have been reached and there is no relia-
ble basis on which discretion could be exercised in determining a safe
threshold does [sic] for the established carcinogen. 35
4. Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee
While the color additive bill was under consideration by the House
Commerce Committee, the White House released a study of the use of
chemicals and drugs as food additives.3 6 The expert panel's report ex-
pressed concern over the potential impact of the 1958 Delaney Clause:
Section 409(c) . . . prohibits the approval of a food additive regard-
less of the amount that is found to be required to increase the inci-
dence of cancer in test animals. A literal interpretation of the section
must lead to the prohibition of such a substance even though present
in trace amounts. 37
The panel declared that such a ban would be foolish if it barred useful
chemicals that induced cancer in animals only at very high level doses.338
The panel predicted that scientists would soon be capable of estimating
the risks posed by low doses of carcinogens, and urged that FDA have
authority to follow a "rule of reason" in administering the Delaney
Clause.3 9 The panel refrained, however, from expressing an opinion
335. Id. at 500-01.
336. PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF THE PANEl. ON FOOD ADDITIVES
(1960), reprinted in Color Additives Hearings, supra note 318, at 394.
337. Id. at 396.
338. Id. at 397.
339. The panel wrote in part:
It is to be emphasized that the present difficulty in establishing whether there are permissible
levels for certain possibly carcinogenic food additives is accentuated by the limited relevant
scientific information available. From the experience obtained in animal experiments and study
of humans who have been exposed to carcinogens in the course of their work such as cited
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about the correct legal interpretation of the statute. 4
This report surfaced during consideration of the 1960 Delaney Clause
and was embraced by three Senators a week after the Senate had passed
the Color Additive Amendments with the Clause intact.3 41
The panel's report forecast the likelihood that scientists "eventually"
would be able to assess "the probability of cancer induction from a partic-
ular carcinogen in minute doses." FDA now claims that modern tech-
niques of quantitative extrapolation from animal experiments permit it to
do just this."4 2 But the panel implicitly acknowledged that the statute
might not allow FDA to exploit such knowledge when it recommended
that the law be amended "if [it] does not permit the Secretary . . . to
exercise discretion consistent with the recommendations of this report. ' '9
43
5. House Committee Report
The Commerce Committee favorably reported H.R. 7624, repeating
and endorsing Secretary Flemming's defense of the Delaney Clause. The
House Report discussed several proposed amendments to the anticancer
provision and explained why none had been adopted:
One industry witness objected to any anticancer clause. Another wit-
ness argued that it is possible to establish safe tolerance levels for
substances that produce cancer when fed to test animals. Some would
have the ban on cancer producers apply only to colors that induce
above, the panel believes that the probability of cancer induction from a particular carcino-
gen in minute doses may be eventually assessed by weighing scientific evidence as it becomes
available.
The special emphasis placed by the Congress on the protection of the public from the danger
resulting from the addition of possible carcinogens to food calls for prudent administration of
section 409(c). . . Since an area of administrative discretion based on the rule of reason is
unavoidable if the clause is to be workable, it is essential that this discretion be based on the
most informed and expert scientific advice available. Until the causes of carcinogenesis are
better understood, each situation must be judged in the light of all applicable evidence.
Id. at 398 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
340. "If existing legislation does not permit the Secretary ...to exercise discretion consistent
with the recommendations of this report, it is recommended that appropriate modifications in the law
be sought." Id. at 398.
341. See infra text accompanying notes 355-56. It should be noted that the report was not au-
thored by persons responsible for administering the Delaney Clause or by either House of Congress.
Moreover, the report appears to urge a more flexible interpretation-at least of the 1958 clause-than
FDA had yet embraced.
342. See D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,341; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,357.
343. Close analysis of the report does not reveal whether this recommendation is addressed to
FDA's discretion to decide whether a substance has been shown to induce cancer in animals tests-the
sort of discretion that Secretary Flemming defended-or the discretion to utilize later-developed meth-
ods for assessing "the probability of cancer induction from a particular carcinogen in minute
doses .. " But the text makes clear that the report's authors were taking no position on the legal
question of what discretion either Delaney Clause in fact allowed the Agency.
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cancer when ingested in an amount and under conditions reasonably
related to their intended use. And another witness proposed that the
cancer clause be taken out of its present position in the bill and
added with material language changes to section 705(b) (5) (A) so
that it would become simply one of the factors for the Secretary to
consider in evaluating the safety of a color additive.
It is evident that such proposed changes are intended to give the
Secretary the right to establish tolerances for presumed safe levels of
colors that produce cancer when tested under appropriate laboratory
conditions. Thus, any of the proposals, if adopted, would weaken the
present anticancer clause in the reported bill. For this reason all of
the proposed changes were rejected by the committee ...
Some of the panel members have suggested that despite these diffi-
culties, in extraordinary cases, the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare should have the authority to decide that a minute
amount of a cancer-producing chemical may be added to man's food
after a group of scientists consider all the facts and conclude that the
quantity to be tolerated is probably without hazard. 3"
The committee decided that the anticancer provision should be retained
without change.34
6. House Floor Debate
There was discussion, but no further illumination, of the Delaney
Clause on the House floor. 46 After brief debate the full House approved
H.R. 7624."" Chairman Harris immediately called for consideration of
the Senate-passed bill, S. 2197, but moved that it be amended to include
344. H.R. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2887, 2895. Among the rejected amendments was one that would have allowed FDA
"to decide that a minute amount of a cancer-causing chemical may be added to man's food after a
group of scientists . . . conclude that the quantity to be tolerated is probably without hazard." Id.,
1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2895.
345. See id., 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Niws at 2896. FDA's defenders acknowledge
that the Agency lacks authority to establish "tolerances" for any carcinogenic additive, but they insist
that this is not what the agency is doing when it invokes the de minimis doctrine. Brief for Respon-
dent at 24 n.l , Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1548); Brief for
Intervenor-Respondent at 34, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-
1548). That is surely different in form from the promulgation of a regulation that affirmatively sanc-
tions specific levels of additive on the premise that they will be "safe" for human consumption. FDA's
continued approvals of Red No. 19 and Orange No. 17 do not in form authorize specified levels of
exposure. Rather, FDA's argument is that levels likely to be consumed by individuals carry so low a
risk of cancer that the additives may be considered "safe." But the intellectual exercise involved in
reaching this conclusion about hypothesized (as opposed to sanctioned) levels is similar, involving as it
does the extrapolation from results of high dose exposure in animals to estimated levels of human
exposure.
346. 106 CONG. REc. 14,349 (1960).
347. Id. at 14,373.
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the Delaney Clause. The amendment was agreed to and S. 2197 then
passed the House. 48 A few days later Senator Lister Hill, Chairman of
the Committee on Labor and Public Health and co-sponsor of S. 2197,
secured the upper chamber's concurrence in the House-passed version. 49
7. Senate Reconsideration
One week after both houses had approved S. 2197, Senator Javits
moved that the Senate reconsider the vote by which it had concurred in
the House bill.350 Javits asked to have the "Conclusions and Recommen-
dations" portion of the report of the President's special panel inserted into
the record, asserting that it demonstrated that the Delaney Clause was to
"be used and applied within the 'rule of reason.' " Javits then engaged in
an exchange with Senators Dirksen and Hill designed to create legislative
support for a flexible interpretation of the Delaney Clause:
Mr. DIRKSEN. . . . They tell that both the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare and private industries can live with
this legislation, and that the rule of reason will prevail. I think that
is the manner in which most of those who have come to discuss it,
particularly the advisers of some of the commercial interests, have
approached it.
Mr. JAVITS. [Tihe assurance the Senator from Illinois has just
given us . . . is a caveat to our own agency [FDA?] to apply the
rule of reason. I yield to no one in my anxiety to have the law ap-
plied to the full, in terms of public health and safety. But at the
same time we do not want the application of the law to "go over-
board." We wish it to be fair. ...
Mr. HILL. Mr. President, after consultations with Secretary Flem-
ming . . . I wish to state that I agree. ...
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alabama then
join in the assurance given by [Mr. Dirksen], namely that, fully con-
sistent with health and safety-and all of us are absolutely commit-
ted to guarding and safeguarding them in every possible way, he, too
feels that the legislative record here should show clearly that the rec-
ommendation as to the application of the rule of reason by the en-
forcing agency is expected to be applied?
Mr. HILL. I would say so.
3 51
348. Id. at 14,378.
349. Id. at 15,136.
350. Id. at 15,380.
351. Id. at 15,381.
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At the conclusion of this exchange, Senator Javits's motion to reconsider
was tabled.3 51
It is difficult to know what to make of this episode. By the conventions
of statutory interpretation, the colloquy among Senators Javits, Dirksen,
and Hill is not entitled to much weight."' It occurred long after the re-
sponsible committees had completed their work and a full week after the
two houses had agreed on the final legislation. The Congressional Record
does not reveal how many Senators were on the floor at the time Senator
Javits moved for reconsideration; no others are recorded as participating
in the discussion.""' One has the impression that Senator Javits and his
colleagues were concerned that the 1960 Delaney Clause would restrict
FDA's authority more than they believed desirable, and, accordingly, they
seized upon a motion to reconsider as a device to "make history" of their
own.
The Senators' statements are unilluminating. Senator Javits secures
"assurance" from his two colleagues that "the rule of reason" should
guide FDA's interpretation of the Delaney Clause. But we are left in the
dark about how FDA is to apply this principle. In the light of discussions
at both the hearings and on the House floor, it would be entirely reasona-
ble to infer that Javits and his colleagues wished to reaffirm FDA's au-
thority to exercise scientific judgment in intepreting the results of animal
experiments. No passage indicates that they were focusing on the Agency's
authority to incorporate later-developed techniques for quantifying the
risks of low-dose carcinogens.
D. The Delaney Clause's Legislative History: An Evaluation
The legislative history of the Delaney Clause contains many gaps and
apparent inconsistencies. They are particulary obvious in this chronicle of
the broken path to enactment in both 1958 and 1960. In 1958, the origi-
352. Id. at 15,382.
353. G. FoLsoM, supra note 304, at 36. Defenders of FDA's current interpretation claim that
this passage, and particularly the statements of Senator Hill, who chaired the Senate Committee, is
entitled to substantial weight as evidence of Congressional understanding of the 1960 anticancer
clause. See Brief for Intervenor-Respondent at 32, Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (No. 86-1548). The cases cited for this proposition, however, all involve statements made by the
managers or proponents of legislation prior to passage. The quoted statements of Senator Hill were
made a week after the Color Additive Amendments were passed and outside the hearing of its chief
proponents. Moreover, they were made in the chamber that had initially, albeit without comment,
declined to include the anticancer language. The reader will note that the Senators are careful not to
claim that Secretary Flemming, the chief architect of the 1960 clause, agreed with their position.
Indeed, the staging of this unusual exchange after formal enactment of the 1960 statute suggests
that the participants were worried that the case for flexibility in the application of the Delaney Clause
had been lost-or, more accurately, had been surrendered by FDA's chief spokesman, Secretary
Flemming himself.
354. 106 CONG. REC. 15,381 (1960).
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nal Delaney Clause appears in the House bill just before floor passage,
and is agreed to by the Senate without careful review. The 1960 version
of the Clause receives more attention, and a vigorous defense from HEW,
during the House deliberations, but again gains Senate approval without
discussion.
Notwithstanding the fragmentary character of this legislative record,
several conclusions can be ventured. First, by 1960 FDA (or at least its
parent, HEW) had not only embraced the principle of the Delaney
Clause but had adopted what industry spokesmen considered an overly
rigid interpretation of the 1958 language. Second, while one can identify
differences in the language used to explain and defend the two versions of
the Delaney Clause, there appears to have been general agreement that
they meant the same thing-at least with respect to additives that consum-
ers ingest. Third, Agency (as well as industry) spokesmen appear to have
secured agreement that the Clause as enacted preserved an important role
for scientific judgment in determining whether an additive caused can-
cer-what will be termed diagnostic judgment. FDA sought to protect, it
seems, those areas of judgment involving the interpretation of experimen-
tal observations and the assessment of routes of administration.
Fourth, the history strongly supports the conclusion that FDA was not
to have authority to set "tolerances" for carcinogenic additives, that is, to
determine that specific use or residue levels would be safe for human con-
sumption. The history says nothing about the Agency's authority to decide
that the estimated incidence of cancer in test animals at "realistic" expo-
sure levels is so low that a carcinogenic additive cannot be said to "induce
cancer" within the meaning of the statute. But this is so novel a theory
that the history's silence tells us nothing. While the history supports
FDA's central role in determining whether an additive "induces cancer,"
this is repeatedly characterized as a scientific, rather than a legal,
determination.
The most telling passages of the legislative history are those from the
1960 House Report and the preceding hearings in which Secretary Flem-
ming-the official formally responsible for administering both
laws-discusses the relationship between administration and legislation.
Before the committee that, in both years, was the main arena for debate,
he not only disclaimed the ability of Agency scientists to determine levels
of carcinogenic additives that humans may safely consume; he promised to
seek formal Congressional approval before allowing FDA to rely on any
subsequent insights into the risks posed by low-dose carcinogens. No
member of Congress or spokesman for FDA ever questioned or challenged
Flemming's assurances.
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VI. Conclusion
FDA's protracted divorce of the Delaney Clause revives debate over the
allocation of policy-making power between Congress and the executive.
The Agency's immediate policy, while explained as the product of statu-
tory interpretation, is obviously the work of administrators. As such, the
policy does not differ substantially from those adopted by other regulatory
agencies.3 55 Nor is FDA's theory that the Delaney Clause does not forbid
approval of all carcinogenic additives noteworthy simply because it de-
parts from the Agency's historical interpretation. Administrators often
change their policies, and their legal authority to do so is well estab-
lished.15' Rather, FDA's current approach is provocative precisely because
the statute appears, and has long been considered, more explicit than
other health laws. It has been assumed that FDA had less discretion to
ignore (or approve) low-level carcinogens than sister agencies because
Congress had, with uncommon clarity, declared that carcinogenic additives
should not be allowed in human food.357
In this conclusion, after endorsing the substance of FDA's policy, I ex-
amine the practical consequences of these efforts. I then question the le-
gality of FDA's de minimis theory and briefly discuss the rebuff that the
Agency suffered in the first court challenge to its interpretation. I conclude
with some comments on the roles of legislation and administration in the
formulation of regulatory policy.
A. The Anomalies of the Delaney Clause
I accept the premise that the policy articulated in the Delaney Clause is
unsound. If interpreted to require banning of all food and color additives
that are animal carcinogens, without regard to potency or extent of human
exposure, the Clause will dictate many disruptive decisions that yield little
355. For example, EPA's proposed acceptable risk level for hazardous waste constituents classified
as probable carcinogens on the basis of human epidemiology or animal bioassays was a lifetime risk of
10-6 (one case in one million lifetimes). EPA, Hazardous Waste Management System: Land Disposal
Restrictions, 51 Fed. Reg. 1602, 1628 (1986). The Agency also relied on risk assessment in setting
maximum contaminant levels for drinking water: "For drinking water contaminants, the target refer-
ence risk range is 10- 4 to 10-6 and most regulatory actions in a variety of EPA programs have
generally fallen in this range .. " EPA, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Synthetic
Organic Chemicals; Monitoring for Unregulated Contaminants, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,690, 25,698 (1987);
see also D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,344-45 (FDA's own discussion of other agencies'
approaches, including EPA and OSHA).
356. "An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the
agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of
its policy on a continuing basis." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984).
357. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note
13, at 182, 196, 204.
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or no public health gain. Carcinogens differ in potency, 358 sometimes dra-
matically, and human exposure to materials used in food production var-
ies widely.3"9 Since the human risk associated with exposure to a carcino-
gen is a function of potency and exposure, a policy that allows no
discrimination among carcinogenic additives will ban some that pose only
trivial risks.3"
FDA is convinced, correctly in my view, that the number of compounds
this policy imperils is larger than Delaney's proponents ever anticipated.
More "additives" are being detected in food and a sizeable share are labo-
ratory carcinogens." 1 Even if one concludes from this evidence that we
should be more, rather than less, concerned about carcinogens added to
food-a conclusion I do not accept 382-one should favor a policy that
allows regulators to differentiate between large and small risks.
The Delaney Clause's limited reach creates other anomalies. The
Clause does not apply to constituents that are not "added" to human
food-an elusive, but not empty, category.363 It does not apply to ingredi-
ents sanctioned by FDA or the Department of Agriculture prior to
1958.364 It does not forbid residues of carcinogenic pesticides on raw foods
or in processed food at levels that do not exceed raw food tolerances.3 5
These "exceptions" to the Delaney Clause are apparent on the face of the
statute. The number grows when one adds the exceptions resulting from
FDA's careful parsing of the DES proviso and of the definition of
"additive." 366
Thus, even if one embraced the heroic view that we should allow no
carcinogens to be added by human agency to food, the Delaney Clause is
a pale imitation of such a policy. Its boundaries and exceptions invite in-
genious, sometimes sophistical, arguments to protect important food ingre-
dients suspected of inducing tumors in rodents. Combined with the gen-
eral propensity of regulators to demand more evidence before restricting
old chemicals than before refusing approval of new ones, the large gaps in
Delaney's wall favor old additives and disfavor new ones. Peter Huber
358. Ames, Magaw & Gold, supra note 95, at 272; OFFICE OF T CHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
supra note 13, at 191.
359. RIsK ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 27.
360. See Ames, Magaw & Gold, supra note 95, at 271.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 65-94.
362. Basic food constituents, such as fat, are considered more worrisome. See Cohen, Diet and
Cancer, So. AM., Nov. 1987, at 42; COMMITTEE ON DIET, NUTRITION AND CANCER, supra note
11.
363. See R. MERRILL & P. HUTT, supra note 129, at 59-62. Some of these inherent constituents
are animal carcinogens. See supra text accompanying notes 94-112.
364. See supra text accompanying note 54; Merrill, supra note 19, at 214-17.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51; REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 31, at
25-27.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 117-57 & 203-16.
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has discussed this subject elsewhere, revealing the law's inequity and doc-
umenting its perversity, for newer technologies are often safer than older
ones.
36 7
The Delaney Clause imposes another cost, a cost which will be paid so
long as their boundaries remain elusive. Whenever a food constituent that
enjoys consumer or commercial acceptance falls under suspicion, FDA
comes under pressure to delay a decision. The temptation to seek addi-
tional tests or invite review by esteemed experts becomes very strong.36 8
Agency decisionmakers recognize that their room to maneuver will shrink
as soon as they acknowledge that an additive "induces cancer" or that
traces of a known carcinogen have been found in food. Public and Con-
gressional reactions to FDA's abortive effort to ban saccharin have likely
reenforced inclinations to equivocate and delay.
In short, the case for repeal of the Delaney Clause seems to me con-
vincing. And to the extent that FDA's inventive interpretations have
sculpted a wiser policy, analysts ought to congratulate the Agency. But
there remain important questions about the content of the policy that
FDA has devised, and serious doubts about its legality.
B. Policy Implications of De Minimis
1. Accuracy of FDA's Risk Estimates
FDA officials profess confidence in their ability to differentiate between
carcinogens that pose significant health risks for humans and those that at
most pose trivial risks. 69 The basic methodology that the Agency uses
enjoys broad, though not unquestioning, support within the scientific com-
munity, and it parallels the approaches of other agencies responsible for
regulating carcinogens. 7 ' Quantitative risk assessment assumes that the
human risk posed by exposure to a substance capable of causing cancer is
a product of the substance's potency and the extent of exposure. 71 At
some level of generality, this assumption appears to command universal
acceptance. Accordingly, if FDA's methods for measuring potency and ex-
posure and estimating risks were equally well accepted, it would be hard
to reject its policy on public health grounds. Because these methods re-
367. See Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1107 (1983);
Huber, Exorcists vs. Gatekeepers in Risk Regulation, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1983, at 23.
368. See Hutt, Public Policy Issues in Regulating Carcinogens in Food, 33 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 541, 550 (1978). FDA referred cyclamate twice, and saccharin three times to the NAS for review
of their safety. See Merrill & Taylor, supra note 10, at 28-43.
369. See, e.g., Policy for Regulating Carcinogenic Chemicals in Food and Color Additives, 47
Fed. Reg. 14,464, 14,466 (1982) (FDA "Constituents Policy" authored by Commissioner Hayes).
370. See supra text accompanying note 361.
371. REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 31, at 33.
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main unverified, we cannot be confident that FDA's risk estimates will
always prove true. But science has not yet produced better methods, and
the alternative to quantitative risk assessment is ignorance-with or with-
out Delaney.
Two circumstances persuade me that FDA's estimates of cancer risks
are not likely to jeopardize public health. First, like EPA and OSHA,
FDA incorporates into its calculations assumptions about likely human
exposure that are almost certainly exaggerated.372 The second key step in
estimating the risk of a chemical shown carcinogenic in animal studies is
to extrapolate from the measured incidence of cancer at known exposure
levels to the potential incidence at projected human exposure levels. Here
again FDA's standard risk assessment procedures are calibrated to avoid
underestimating human risk. 73
We should not ignore the uncertainty inherent in FDA's claim that the
human cancer risk of Red No. 19, for example, is no greater than one in
nine million. But the Agency's basic approach makes sense. There ap-
372. In estimating dietary exposure to residues of carcinogenic pesticides, EPA assumes that all
acres of a crop have been treated with the agent and that all food sold contains residues at the permit-
ted tolerance level. FDA's exposure estimates for conventional food ingredients are based on more
concrete use and consumption data, but they nonetheless tilt towards overestimating exposure. Id. at
32. FDA has similarly relied on "worst case" exposure estimates for color additives in cosmetics when
it was not confident that "reasonable estimates" could be made. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27,
at 28,337-41; see RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 101; Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Chemical Carcinogens; Review of the Science and Its Associated Principles, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,594,
21,648-49 (1984); Policy for Regulating Carcinogenic Chemicals in Food and Color Additives, 47
Fed. Reg. 14,464, 14,468-69 (1982).
373. The extrapolation involves two important assumptions. One is that humans are likely, as a
qualitative matter, to respond to the chemical as rodents do. RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at
22-23; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 169-70. The second assumption is
that the relationship between dose and response in humans is likely to mimic the dose-response ob-
served in animals. RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 24-26; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
supra note 13, at 169-70. Scientists have no way to validate this assumption for compounds that have
been evaluated only in animals, the class into which virtually all putative candidates for regulation
under the Delaney Clauses will fall.
Even acceptance of this second assumption does not avoid uncertainty, for the analyst usually has
no direct evidence in animals of the relationship between dose and response at levels of exposure
comparable to those that humans encounter. The accepted practice of administering agents at the so-
called "maximum tolerated dose" typically produces tumors only at dose levels far higher than any
humans will encounter. To bridge this gap the analyst uses one of several mathematical models to
simulate a dose-response relationship at levels below those actually administered. These hypothetical
lower doses are then converted into human equivalents to derive estimates of human risk. For a more
detailed account of risk assessment see RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 17-49.
This discussion illustrates only the most obvious uncertainties involved in the analysis that is the
heart of FDA's current policy. The resulting estimates would be subject to dispute even if only one
extrapolation model were available. But several models exist, and they may predict quite different
risks at low human dose equivalents. Id. at 24-25; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note
13, at 160-63. FDA has sought to meet objections by incorporating several "conservative" features in
its risk assessment protocol. For example, it generally employs one of the most conservative extrapola-
tion models and often offers estimates from more than one model before concluding that the risk posed
by an additive is de minimis. Policy for Regulating Carcinogenic Chemicals in Food and Color Addi-
tives, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,464, 14,468-69 (1982).
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pears to be no good alternative if one believes it desirable to try to differ-
entiate among the health risks posed by carcinogens found in human food.
Furthermore, while evidence bearing on the assumption that humans ex-
posed to comparable doses are likely to display approximately the same
(or no greater) rate of cancer predicted for animals is not voluminous,
what evidence there is, is reassuring. A recent survey supports earlier
findings, based on a smaller sample, that quantitative estimates based on
animal studies are not likely to underestimate human risks.374
No agency or legislator can escape the reality that regulating human
exposure to chronic health hazards is an uncertain exercise. Data about
health effects is costly and always in short supply. Information about
human exposure is often meager. Limitations inherent in epidemiological
studies prevent discovery of the effects of many environmental agents. In-
deed, these limitations will as a practical matter prevent validation of any
FDA finding that a specific carcinogen poses risks too small to worry
about, for the background incidence of cancer obscures the contribution of
all but the most significant causes. We must find comfort in the knowledge
that the primitive tools FDA has relied on to fashion a more risk- and
cost-sensitive regulatory policy are the best available.
2. Impact on Additive Approvals
Before assessing the operational impact of FDA's new policy, we must
first establish what that policy is. This exercise was difficult before the
D.C. Circuit's recent rejection of FDA's de minimis interpretation be-
cause the Agency had never embraced general criteria for classifying risks
as trivial; the court's ruling has added another major uncertainty to the
calculus. But an even greater source of uncertainty is our ignorance of the
results of toxicological studies yet to be done on additives yet to be devel-
oped. To assess FDA's detour around the Delaney Clause requires more
than a map of the new route and an estimate of structural stability-we
need some estimate of the traffic.
If the Supreme Court were to reverse the D.C. Circuit, the immediate
consequence of FDA's decisions would be the continued approval of Red
No. 19 and Orange No. 17. At first blush these appear to be gains as
trivial as the risks that are said to accompany the colors. But the persis-
tence of their users suggests either that the two colors are commercially
important or that other important colors are likely to be sheltered by a
favorable ruling. Both may be true. FDA's "constituents" policy protected
374. See K. Crump, Correlation of Carcinogenic Potency Between Animals and Humans, Presen-
tation of the Risk Science Institute of the International Life Sciences Institute (May 5, 1987); OFFICE
OF [TFCHNOLOGY ASSwSSMENT, supra note 13, at 170-71.
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more than Green No. 5.3"" And its SOM proposal purported to set gen-
eral standards for the continued use or fresh approval of carcinogenic
animal drugs, although the Agency (correctly) anticipated that DES
would fail the test.8
76
One can identify several approved additives that have survived as a re-
sult of FDA's efforts to escape or make sense of the Delaney Clause. 3 7
But it is more difficult to identify any new additives-direct ingredients,
colors, animal drugs, or packaging materials-that have gained approval.
Pesticides comprise the category in which such gains might be observed
first; while many display carcinogenic properties, some uses carry low
risks because exposure is low.3 8
Some ingredients would not be saved by any theory yet advanced.
FDA's original de minimis theory asserted that carcinogenic additives
whose risks were trivially small could be ignored. While the Agency never
purported to set a specific risk cutoff,3 7 9 its adoption of one in one million
lifetime risk in its SOM proposal and its frequent allusions to this prece-
dent suggested that this risk level had become an operational definition of
"safe." 8 ' The implication has been that additives posing higher risks
would encounter difficulty. On this assumption, saccharin would not gain
approval. FDA's original estimate (prepared hurriedly in 1977 to support
its conclusion that the sweetener would have been banned even if the De-
laney Clause had not applied) placed the bladder cancer risk at four in
ten thousand. 81 Few carcinogenic direct additives are likely to fall within
375. Both Agency officials and industry representatives were aware that other colors had been, or
would be, found to contain carcinogenic contaminants whose presence, under FDA's old interpretation
of Delaney, would require them to be banned. See D&C Green No. 5, Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg.
24,278, 24,279 (1982).
376. There is doubt, however, whether the SOM theory has facilitated approval of any animal
drug that might have failed under a more wooden interpretation of the law. The costs of performing
the several studies needed to determine the required level of assay sensitivity for a carcinogenic drug
are potentially very high, and may deter manufacturers from seeking to secure, perhaps even to de-
fend, FDA approval of products whose economic returns are not expected to be, or are not, fully
compensatory. See Becker, Sensitivity of Method-Legal Implications, 35 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J.
355, 358 (1980). Even FDA officials have acknowledged that the conditions for satisfying the
Agency's revised interpretation of the DES proviso could prove expensive. See Norcross, Sensitivity of
Method-A Wave of the Future, 35 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 342, 346 (1980).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24 (PCBs), 125-27 (aflatoxin), 130-39 (selenium),
173-85 (acrylonitrile), 190-99 (lead acetate), 205-16 (Green No. 6), 223-27 (methylene chloride).
378. REGULATING PESTncIDES, supra note 31, at 54, 76-77.
379. See Cosmetics; Proposed Ban on the Use of Methylene Chloride as an Ingredient of Aerosol
Cosmetic Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,551, 51,557 (1985); D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at
28,344-45.
380. See Cosmetics; Proposed Ban on the Use of Methylene Chloride as an Ingredient of Aerosol
Cosmetic Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,551, 51,557 (1985); D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at
28,344-45.
381. Saccharin and its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996, 20,000-01 (1977).
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FDA's operational definition because they generally are consumed in
quantities too large to yield risks of one in one million or less.
Thus, before the Justice Department intervened, the principal benefi-
ciaries of FDA's de minimis theory appeared to be existing direct addi-
tives used in small quantities, such as colors, and various existing indirect
additives, such as packaging materials and pesticides. This is hardly sur-
prising, for the theory was a product of the Agency's desire to avoid dis-
ruptive actions against incumbent chemicals whose carcinogenicity was
discovered long after their original introduction.
We should not overlook another of FDA's theories for avoiding the De-
laney Clause-the so-called "secondary carcinogen" theory, which sus-
tained its approval of selenium as an animal feed supplement. 82 This
decision can be viewed as the earliest official embrace of the now widely
accepted belief that carcinogens operate by different mechanisms. This
topic is too arcane to explore in detail here. 83 Suffice it to say that as
scientists have learned more about how cancers develop they have recog-
nized distinctions among different kinds of agents associated experimen-
tally with tumor induction.38
The significance of these scientific advances for regulation lies in the
acceptance of the proposition that some carcinogens do not produce tumors
in the absence of exposure to other toxic agents and the speculation that
the tumorigenic effect of others may be dose-dependent. Former FDA
Commissioner Donald Kennedy once acknowledged that he expected
scientists eventually to be able to demonstrate that some carcinogens dis-
play thresholds, i.e., do not cause cancer below specified doses.385 FDA's
selenium decision in effect interpreted the statutory language "induce can-
cer" as applying only to carcinogens that conform to the no-threshold gen-
eralization on which the Delaney Clause rests. Evidence for a threshold
for specific additives may be difficult to generate, but it is likely that such
a showing can be made for some. And, in such cases, the escape from
Delaney has already been charted.386
382. See supra text accompanying notes 130-39.
383. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING CARCINOGENS
62-65 (1987).
384. See Office of Science and Technology Policy, Chemical Carcinogens; Review of the Science
and its Associated Literature, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,594, 21,600-15 (1984).
385. Oversight of Food Safety, 1983: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983).
386. FDA is currently considering permanent listing of a color additive, Red No. 3, which ap-
pears to be carcinogenic in rodent bioassays, but only, according to its proponents, by a "secondary"
mechanism of action. According to the Agency, this hypothesis suggests the possibility of regulating
the color "under the general safety requirement, rather than the anticancer clauses," of the FD&C
Act. FD&C Red No. 3; Availability of Final Report of FD&C Red No. 3 Peer Review Panel, 52
Fed. Reg. 29,728 (1987); see also Provisionally and Permanently Listed User of FD&C No. 3 and of
its Lakes; Request for Data for Specific Uses, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,485 (1987).
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This route will not be closed even if the courts decisively reject FDA's
de minimis theory. The Agency's explanation for approving selenium did
not require it to renounce prior statements about the meaning of Delaney.
Furthermore, the 1958 and 1960 legislative histories contain numerous
statements that FDA retained discretion to decide whether a particular
additive "induces cancer." These passages did not touch on the possibility
that FDA might be presented with evidence that an additive caused tu-
mors but only when administered with other agents or at doses high
enough to cause obvious organ damage. But statements that FDA was to
employ the best science in its assessment of animal experiments are easily
found.3"" Moreover, the issue of what "induces cancer" means is of the
sort that the Agency is empowered to resolve. 88
This detour around the Delaney Clause may prove more significant
than FDA's de minimis theory, which by its terms applies only to addi-
tives that have been found to "induce cancer" and in practice protects only
those used in small quantities. The selenium decision, by contrast, is ar-
guably a precedent for approving any additive, new or old, for which con-
vincing showing of dose-limited carcinogenicity can be made. And nothing
in the D.C. Circuit's recent rejection of FDA's de minimis theory speaks
to the vitality of this precedent.
C. Is FDA's Position Lawful?
This article is not primarily concerned with the legality of FDA's rein-
terpretation of the Delaney Clause, but an understanding of the difficulty
of the Agency's argument will contribute to an appreciation of the practi-
cal considerations that have motivated it. Accepting the premise that the
policy embodied in the Delaney Clause, as historically understood, is dys-
functional, the question is whether the statute allows FDA to depart from
that understanding.
The D.C. Circuit recently provided an unequivocal response." 9 Writ-
ing for a unanimous panel, Judge Stephen Williams had no difficulty con-
cluding that Congress, at least in the 1960 version of the Delaney Clause,
had ruled out precisely the sort of discretion that FDA purported to exer-
cise in approving Orange No. 17 and Red. No. 19. While he accepted as
"altogether correct" FDA's characterization of the colors' risks as "triv-
ial," Judge Williams found that Congress could plausibly have concluded
387. See supra text accompanying notes 327, 329, 340 & 335.
388. "When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
389. Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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that it was prudent to forbid the use of any color additive shown to cause
cancer in laboratory animals. Though I find the court's opinion convinc-
ing, it may not be the last word on the issue, and thus one can justify
some further, albeit abbreviated, examination of the legal issue.
Any attempt to divine the meaning of statutory language must concede
the problematic character of the undertaking.'" 0 One cannot say with cer-
tainty that the members of Congress who voted for the Delaney Clause
intended that it should bar approval of all carcinogenic food and color
additives, regardless of potency, regardless of exposure, regardless, in
short, of their safety for human consumption. This is, however, what the
statutory language seems to me to say, and the conventions of statutory
interpretation hold that this "plain meaning" of the statute should
govern-absent convincing evidence that it conflicts with the understand-
ing of the drafters. 9 ' At the very least, FDA bears a heavy burden to
demonstrate that another reading is legitimate as well as desirable. I am
not satisfied that it has done so.
In assessing FDA's position we should distinguish between the argu-
ments made by the Agency prior to the filing of the government's brief in
the color additives case and those later advanced by the Justice Depart-
ment. FDA originally argued that the Commissioner has authority to de-
part from the literal language of the Delaney Clause when its application
would yield trivial public health gains, i.e., when the risk posed by a car-
cinogenic additive is de minimis 92 This authority, FDA claimed, was
"inherent" in every regulatory scheme, absent evidence that Congress had
been "extraordinarily rigid" in its instructions.3 9 The Agency's treatment
390. Legislating is a collaborative process, in which some participants are more informed, or in-
terested, or influential than others, and it is reckless to ascribe the views of articulate participants to
all who vote for (or against) specific provisions. Drafters often select vague language because they are
not capable of visualizing all of the situations to which a provision might apply, or because vagueness
allows legislators holding divergent views to reach agreement, while consciously (or unconsciously)
leaving the resolution of future disputes to the administrative process or judicial review. Even when
legislators adopt precise language, they may entertain different views about what it means. And it is
by no means uncommon for legislators who fail to secure adoption of the language they desired to
litter the legislative record with assertions that the language actually enacted means more or less than
its terms suggest. See generally G. FoLsOM, supra note 304.
391. "When Congress has thus spoken 'in the plainest of words' .. we will ordinarily decline to
fracture the clear language of a statute." Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 356 (1978) (citation
omitted); see also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Our individual appraisal of the wisdom
or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the
process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutional-
ity determined, the judicial process comes to an end.").
392. See supra text accompanying notes 29-43, 228-33; D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at
28,342-44; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at 28,359-60.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43; D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,342;
D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at 28,359.
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of the legislative history was designed to negate the inference that the
1960 Delaney Clause represented an example of "extraordinary rigidity."
Thus FDA implicitly conceded that the "plain meaning" of the statute
would dictate a contrary result. Furthermore, FDA acknowledged, as the
Court of Appeals noted, that it historically had embraced this "plain
meaning" view of the Delaney Clause. 94 An agency may, of course,
change its policies and even its interpretation of statutory requirements,
but FDA did not invoke this principle because it was not purporting to
interpret the Delaney Clause. Rather, it sought to justify a noninterpre-
tivist application of the statute.
FDA's argument faced difficulty on its own terms. If ever a statutory
provision can be "extraordinarily rigid," the Delaney Clause would ap-
pear to be such a provision. This apparent rigidity is not simply a product
of language, but also of the Clause's location. The Delaney Clause does
not merely repeat Congress's basic directive not to approve additives not
shown to be safe; it appears to restrict the sort of scientific judgment that
the Commissioner is authorized to reach under the general safety clause.
It purports to dictate the policy consequences of a biological phenome-
non.3 5 And this language was twice added to the law after the introduc-
tion of language requiring merely proof of safety. If the resulting provi-
sions do not curtail administrative discretion, the exception recognized in
Alabama Power would seem a null set.
FDA sought support for its theory in the legislative history. Several
passages endorse FDA's flexibility in administering the Delaney Clause,
but one should distinguish between those (like HEW Assistant Secretary
Elliot Richardson's statement in 195839) that claim the statutory lan-
guage allows flexibility and those (like the report of the White House
special panel in 1960 ..) that express the hope that the language can be
flexibly interpreted or if necessary amended. For me, the two key passages
are from 1960, and they suggest a contrary answer. In one, HEW Secre-
tary Flemming assures the House Committee that the executive will seek
new legislation if scientists ever devise methods for reliably determining
that humans may safely be exposed to some doses of some carcinogens. 98
This reads like an acknowledgement that the Congress is the appropriate
body to decide whether quantitative risk assessment may be relied on to
394. See D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,342-43; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,359-60; Merrill, FDA's "Erasure" of the Delaney Clause: A Study in Statutory Interpretation(The Glenn A. Kilpatrick Memorial Lecture), 50 A. Foot) & DRUG OFFICIALS Q. Bu.i.. 199,
201-06 (1986).
395. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 202; Blank, supra note 270, at 1084-86.
396. See supra text accompanying note 301.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 336-40.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 329-31.
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allow human exposure to carcinogenic color additives. The other key pas-
sage appears in the House Committee Report, whose authors explained
that they declined to accept amendments that would empower FDA to
allow traces of carcinogenic color additives if it found they would present
no risk to humans. 99
It is not necessary, however, to accept the proposition that the legisla-
tive history demonstrates that the Delaney Clause was meant to be as
rigid as FDA had long contended. It is sufficient to point out that the
legislative history is at very best ambivalent. The claim that the history as
a whole demonstrates that the Delaney Clause was little more than a cau-
tion flag, a temporary reminder to FDA to "take care" with all carcino-
gens until science provided ways to differentiate those that pose only slight
risks, is unconvincing.'00
It may have been such difficulties that led the Justice Department to
insist that FDA revise its reasoning. The government's litigating the-
ory-that the two colors do not "induce cancer within the meaning of the
Delaney Clause" and thus are not barred by it4° 5-avoids concessions im-
plicit in the Agency's original position, but it confronts even greater
difficulties.
The government's latest argument gives no ground to advocates of
"plain meaning." The Commissioner's assertion that neither color "in-
duces cancer," accompanied though it was by a disingenuous explanation
that the Agency had never meant to say that they do, "" renders the Dela-
ney Clause literally inapplicable. Thus, the government has attempted to
399. See supra text accompanying notes 344-45.
400. Judge Williams found other passages in the 1960 legislative history that supported the con-
clusion that Congress had indeed meant to be "extraordinarily rigid" in the Delaney Clause. He
expressly limited his ruling to that provision, holding out the possibility that the history of the 1958
version, which was not before the court, might support a different, more flexible reading. See Public
Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987). And, to be sure, the passages most
damaging to FDA's case are to be found in the history of the Color Additive Amendments. But FDA
has not been entirely punctilious in its examination of the legislative history, and the Justice Depart-
ment in its 1978 opinion on FDA's contemplated "phase out" of sodium nitrite treated the 1960
history as reliable evidence of the reasoning that inspired the 1958 clause. Several passages of the later
history say or imply that the 1960 version was intended to replicate-for colors-the same policy that
Congress had adopted for food additives two years earlier.
FDA passed up, at least temporarily, the opportunity to make the case that the 1958 Delaney
Clause allows it more discretion when it moved successfully to dismiss as premature the challenge to
its continued approval of methylene chloride to decaffeinate coffee. Public Citizen v. Bowen, 833 F.2d
364 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
401. See supra text accompanying notes 234-51.
402. Commissioner Young's language in the 1986 final rule listing Red. No. 19 suggests that the
color fell squarely under the Delaney Clause: "Because D&C Red. No. 19 has been shown to be a
carcinogen when ingested by laboratory animals, as discussed above, the Delaney Clause . . .is appli-
cable. A strictly literal application of the Delaney Clause would prohibit FDA from finding that
D&C Red No. 19 is safe, and therefore prohibit FDA from permanently listing the color ....
D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at 28,357. The same pronouncement was made for D&C Orange
No. 17. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,341.
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shift the legal debate from the dubious existence of FDA's authority to
ignore the Delaney Clause to the scope of its conceded authority to decide
whether individual additives do "induce cancer," and, more important, to
its implicit authority under Chevron to decide what "induce cancer"
means. For the Justice Department this no doubt seems more congenial
terrain.
But the government's claim for deference here strains credulity. The
full details of the negotiations between FDA and the Justice Department
are not public, but it appears clear that it was the lawyers who concocted
the novel notion that an additive which causes malignant tumors in ani-
mals only at doses so high that the likelihood of tumors at comparable
human doses is de minimis does not "induce cancer within the meaning of
the Delaney Clause."'" 3
The government's current legal position is difficult to reconcile with
FDA's historical view, shared by other agencies, that high-dose animal
tests are a reliable means for identifying human cancer hazards. In only
two other cases has FDA discounted positive findings from such studies,
and in only one of these cases did the Agency imply that such findings
might not satisfy the "induce cancer" language of the Delaney Clause.""'
The Commissioner's last-minute assertion that Red No. 19 and Orange
No. 17 do not "induce cancer" is not merely a departure from the
Agency's past statements about these colors; it repudiates a central pre-
403. To be sure, this notion has now been embraced by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs.
The Justice Department prudently insisted that the Commissioner publish new decision documents
embracing their theory, no doubt so they can escape precedents rejecting the "post hoc rationalizations
of counsel."
The rule which the Agency sought to avoid is stated, for example, in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983): "[C]ourts may not accept appellate
counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action .... It is well established that an agency's action
must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself."
For additional comment on FDA's revised interpretation of the Delaney Clause, see Food Chemical
News, Feb. 23, 1987, at 35.
404. In evaluating selenium, FDA (and NCI) scientists found that tumors occurred only at dose
levels high enough to cause frank liver damage, which appeared to be an essential precursor of cancer.
The decision was qualified by findings that selenium was also ubiquitous in some regions, was an
essential nutrient, and was naturally present in food derived from many animals. Selenium in Animal
Feed, Proposed Additive Regulation, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,458 (1973).
In the case of lead acetate, FDA relied on the "appropriate test" language in the non-ingestion
phrase of the 1960 Delaney Clause to discount the applicability of animal feeding studies in assessing
the carcinogenicity of an additive to which humans would be exposed, if at all, only by dermal absorp-
tion. The Agency did not suggest that the lead acetate had not "induced cancer." See Lead Acetate:
Listing As a Color Additive in Cosmetics That Color the Hair on the Scalp, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,112,
72,115 (1980). FDA specifically rejected arguments that the feeding studies of Red. No. 19 and Or-
ange No. 17 were not "appropriate" for assessing the cancer risks posed by the external uses of these
colors. D&C Orange No. 17, supra note 27, at 28,342; D&C Red No. 19, supra note 27, at
28,358-59.
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mise of carcinogenicity tests, which routinely employ high doses to reveal
whether an agent has the capacity of causing tumors. 0 5
The Justice Department has had the Commissioner claim that the
phrase "induce cancer" is a term of art, to be given meaning by FDA in
light of the objectives of the Color Additive Amendments. Though this
argument has superficial plausibility, on close analysis it is unconvincing.
Without question, FDA has always recognized the "induce cancer" in-
quiry as requiring the exercise of judgement. A report that a compound
has proved carcinogenic in one experiment does not automatically trigger
the conclusion that it "induces cancer." This label is for the Agency to
apply, and its application customarily has been the product of careful,
often protracted review of the evidence.'08 But FDA has not previously
suggested (save perhaps in the case of selenium) that whether an additive
"induces cancer" in animals depends on the magnitude of the cancer risk
that it presents-for animals or for humans. Indeed, until recently the
Agency's position was that Congress had made this inquiry irrelevant, at
least for direct additives.' It viewed the "induce cancer" inquiry as a
matter of investigating a compound's biological activity in animals, an in-
quiry distinct from, albeit obviously linked to, assessment of its risks for
humans. The Commissioner's revised ruling has entirely obscured this
distinction.0'40
The D.C. Circuit's treatment of the government's argument is bemus-
ing. While Judge Williams recounts in skeptical language the Commis-
sioner's attempts to retract earlier statements that Red No. 19 and Orange
No. 17 induced cancer, he proceeds to decide the case on the basis, and in
the face, of the arguments originally advanced by FDA. The Department
of Justice's novel theory is given virtually no attention.40 9
405. See RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 23-24; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
supra note 13, at 123-26.
406. FDA scientists have embraced a rather elaborate set of formal criteria for evaluating animal
studies-criteria for pathological diagnosis, differentiation between benign and malignant tumors, for
statistical significance, etc. See generally BUREAU OF FOODS, FDA, TOXICOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
THE SAFETY ASSFSSMENT OF DIRECT FooD ADDITIVES AND COLOR ADDITIVES USED IN FOOD
(1982).
407. See Saccharin and Its Salts: Proposed Rulemaking, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996 (1977). Saccharin
also demonstrates that some carcinogenic additives provide benefits that may outweigh even significant
cancer risks. The Delaney Clause is often cited as the reason FDA could not take those benefits into
account. But this is one defect of the statute for which Delaney is not responsible, and which judicial
(or legislative) approval of FDA's de minimis theory would not correct. FDA has consistently held
that the general safety clause does not allow consideration of an additive's benefits. This position has
never been seriously challenged, and the legislative history supporting the Agency's view appears
unconvincing. See Cooper, The Role of Regulatory Agencies in Risk-Benefit Decision-Making, 33
FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 755, 757-58 (1978).
408. For the importance of maintaining the distinction, see RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at
19-40.
409. See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1120-22 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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FDA's de minimis theory and the Justice Department's reformulation
share one common feature; both deprive the Delaney Clause of any inde-
pendent force. Or perhaps, more cautiously, one should say that neither
identifies a set of circumstances in which the Clause would affect decisions
FDA would reach under the general safety standard alone.41 This result
is not inconsistent with FDA's latterday view of the Delaney Clause as
essentially a reaffirmation of the general safety clause, couched in terms
that reflected scientists' prevailing, but temporary, inability to determine
"safe" exposure levels for carcinogens. The Agency's willingness to read
the Delaney Clause out of the statute contrasts sharply with the reasoning
in its SOM proposal. There it claimed that to interpret the DES proviso
as forbidding approval of any carcinogenic drug which might leave resi-
dues, no matter how minuscule, in food derived from treated animals,
would render the provision a nullity. It invoked the familiar rubric that
statutes should be interpreted to give effect to all of their provisions.411
D. The Roles of Congress and Executive
I have suggested that the debate over FDA's reinterpretation of the De-
laney Clause is at one level a debate over the appropriate arena for mak-
ing food safety decisions. For someone who views the Clause as at once an
explicit and imprudent expression of legislative will, this debate is espe-
cially disconcerting. Congress not only adopted a clear but unwise rule for
regulating carcinogenic additives; it has since displayed no capacity to
come to grips with the serious practical problems that the current law
creates.
I believe that the law should allow FDA to use quantitative risk assess-
ment in evaluating and regulating all carcinogens found in food. I say
"allow" because it would be a mistake for Congress to dictate that quanti-
tative risk assessment or any other specific methodology be used. To pre-
scribe a specific analytical approach for the resolution of food safety issues
would be to repeat the error of Delaney. Before it was amended to satisfy
Congressman Delaney, the proposed food additives bill provided a right
answer: it specified that only "safe" additives were to be approved, thus
mandating a risk-averse strategy and clearly (albeit implicitly) ruling out
consideration of benefits. This answer was "right" because the democrati-
cally responsible branch would have established the contours for adminis-
trative decisionmaking in language that would have allowed FDA to ex-
410. See Merrill, supra note 394.
411. See Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for Evaluat-
ing Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,070, 17,077 (1979); see also supra text accom-
panying notes 140-57.
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ploit advances in toxicology, chemical analysis, and risk assessment as
they gained acceptance and proved practical in regulatory decisionmaking.
FDA's decision to ban saccharin in 1977 suggests that this framework
might not always have worked. But one hard case does not prove that a
"safety only-no benefits" formula would not be the appropriate formula
for Congress to embrace for the general run of cases.
By the same token, it would not have been a mistake for Congress,
either in 1958 or later, to allow FDA to consider the benefits of individual
additives. Whether such factors should generally have a role in decision-
making is the sort of question Congress ought to resolve, and FDA could
have lived with either choice. The Delaney Clause is troublesome because
it prescribes a formula for decisionmaking that has proved more than re-
dundant of the general safety clause-and has threatened (if rarely pro-
duced) disruptive decisions that would not contribute significantly to con-
sumer safety.
The more troubling message of the saccharin episode was that Congress
seems unprepared to correct the deficiencies in the current statute. Dis-
trust of the executive branch produced proposals couched in language al-
most as rigid and as likely to prove dysfunctional as the original Delaney
Clause. The challenge of devising different formulae and procedures for
regulating several categories of food constituents taxed the patience of
members of Congress and their staffs. Quick action to protect saccharin
eliminated immediate pressure to act, and FDA's subsequent ingenuity in
applying the Delaney Clause has averted further crises." 2
The price of Congressional inaction is probably small: the evisceration
of a controversial but ultimately unimportant provision, coupled with very
slight increases in the cancer risks of food consumers. But there is another
cost as well. It is not any loss of administrative authority. FDA is as well
armed, statutorily, to regulate food safety as it would have been had Con-
gress declined to adopt Congressman Delaney's famous clause. Even if its
decisions approving Red No. 19 and Orange No. 17 are finally over-
turned, it will find ways to avoid banning carcinogenic food constituents
that pose very small risks. But its success in the face of such statutory
precision should convince drafters of the futility of efforts to cabin admin-
istrative power through positive law. Perhaps this is a small cost too.
412. For a brief account of legislative attempts to broaden the discretion that FDA could exercise
regarding food safety in the years following the Saccharin Ban, see Hutt, supra note 169, at 598-600.
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